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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

January, 1944

CREDULITY IN RELIGION	*I. G. Matthews*	3
THE PROTESTANT MINISTRY IS THREATENED	*Winthrop S. Hudson*	15
THE CRUCIBLE OF RELIGION AND THE PASTORAL FUNCTION	*Peter A. Bertocci*	25
THE JANINA GOSPELS AND THE ISLE OF PATMOS	*Merrill M. Parvis*	30
CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW WORLD	*Eugene William Lyman*	41
WHERE IGNORANCE IS BLISS, 'TIS FOLLY		58
FROM OFF THE CAMPUS AND ON		60
BOOK REVIEWS		62
BOOK NOTICES		87
BOOKS RECEIVED		91

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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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CREDULITY IN RELIGION

I. G. MATTHEWS

Crozer Theological Seminary

IN HIS religious pilgrimage man has ever been on the move. When he came to himself, long predating any biblical chronology,[1] he was the possessor of a rich heritage. His senses, the product of biological development over millions of years, were alert and more or less adequate for his primary needs. For economic necessities he had a store of knowledge, the residuum of survival values, that aside from unforeseen "acts of Providence" assured him an existence of some threescore years and ten. Social folkways were well established, and the trial-and-error method of adjustment to environment had long been operative among all living things.

Then, toward the close of the last glacial epoch, some thirty thousand years ago, a new era dawned in Western Europe. Crô-Magnon[2] man, straight-limbed, smooth-browed, well-developed chin, large capacity for speech, erect of carriage, possessing a greatly enlarged roof-brain—the original high-brow—appeared on the scene. His ancestry was the same as that of his European predecessors, but in his early habitat, Asia in all probability, he had been long isolated from other human groups by vast water areas. Here, due to many complex causes, operating over many millennia, he had acquired definite physiological and cultural characteristics that distinguished him from the extant European inhabitants.

The extraordinary size of his roof-brain,[3] the latest development of the nerve-cell system in the human is of peculiar interest in religion. In it

[1] Biblical chronology built up from the data found in the Old Testament is valueless. More than three hundred different systems have been worked out in which the date of creation ranges from 6984 B.C. to 3483 B.C., a divergence of over thirty-five hundred years. The Greek Orthodox church, using the LXX, places the beginning at Sept. 1, 5508 B.C., while the rabbis, working from the Hebrew text, arrived at Oct. 1, 3761 B.C., and Ussher concluded that 4004 B.C. was the correct date. Cf. *Ency. Americana,* "Chronology."

[2] So named from the place in which the first fossil remains were discovered. He may have entered Europe from Africa (H. J. Fleure, *The Races of Mankind,* pp. 9, 10, 20), and though distinguished from Neanderthal man, his predecessor in Europe, the chasm may not be so absolute as sometimes stated (Ales Hrdlička in Huxley Memorial lectures; cf. H. H. Newman, *The Nature of the World and of Man,* pp. 347-367; R. R. Marett, *Anthropology,* pp. 79-84; J. Y. Simpson, *Nature: Cosmic, Human and Divine,* pp. 75-78).

[3] The roof-brain, *i.e.,* the cerebrum or forebrain, is the latest development of the nervous system. Composed of more than ten thousand million nerve cells, it lies over the earlier nerve-cell masses, with which it is connected by nerve-fibre cables. It has been compared to an electrical telephone exchange system, in which each cell functions democratically. While the laboratory has not established the definite relation between these nerve cells and the mind, common sense is sure that there is a relation. It is known that this nervous organ can learn by experience (cf. Sir Charles Sherrington, *Man on his Nature,* pp. 218-233, 251-262, 290-291).

lay the capacity for analysis and synthesis, for abstract thinking. Crô-Magnon man, like other somewhat gifted groups, such as Grimaldi man, who arrived in Europe about the same time, was a thinker, a potential theologian. Modern man,[4] mentally superior to his predecessors, had arrived. This aristocrat of nature, generally known as *Homo sapiens,* in due time preëmpted the whole earth as his private domain and proceeded to establish his rule over creation. Earlier and more primitive man was intelligent, and had solved many problems; yet, on the whole, he had been dominated by the animal appetites, and the well-beaten paths of the instincts had formed his life pattern.

But Modern man was of another mind. The full dinner pail was essential, but that was not his ultimate goal. Far horizons evoked his curiosity. The sun rising and setting, the moon waxing and waning, the bud breaking into blossom, and the fruit maturing—all this awakened his reflection as to the meaning of things. The howling wind and the thunderbolt, the silent plague and the swift pestilence challenged him. Each and all stimulated his mental responses. During some twenty thousand years he experimented until he polished the spear point, tamed a few animals, devised a crude pot for cookery, and mastered the primary principles of a victory garden. Thus was ushered in the Neolithic period, a long step forward in civilization, marked by a definite control of natural resources, and a closer-knit social organization. Life was thereby lifted to a new and higher level—fuller, freer, less brutal, more humane; and in the process, man himself gained in mental and moral stature.

Religion,[5] however described, played a vital part in this and in subsequent movements. As no master taught him geography nor schooled him in cosmogony, neither had anyone tutored him in psychology nor guided him in religious rites or in the abstractions of theology. The wide world beckoned him; from within came the response, and, as ever, the seeker was rewarded.

Our knowledge of his struggles and achievements is derived from various sources. Much of the folkways and the mythologies, the result of

[4] Modern man is the result of the cross-fertilization of a number of different groups, such as Crô-Magnon, Grimaldi, etc., that were merged into a cultural unit by or before the beginning of the Neolithic period, some ten thousand years ago.

[5] Religion has been variously defined and described. The original significance of the word, from *religare* to hold back, probably laid the chief emphasis on taboo. In early periods there was no line drawn between religion and magic, and even now they often overlap. Even in high circles different schools, like Parson Thwackam in *Tom Jones,* make their own philosophies central. Hence we have definitions in which the sacramental, the intellectual, the mystical, or the social is basic. In recent years a trend has set in in which all life has come to be thought of as religious. Attitudes, thus assume greater importance than any of the usual narrow limitations. Two definitions, different, yet similar, may be noted: the one by Professor Rall, "The deepest response of the self to the highest we know"; and the other by Professor Dewey, who considers that any activity that is the result of a conviction that it is of real value, especially if it is pursued at personal loss or against private interest, is religious (John Dewey, *A Common Faith,* p. 27). Both of these avoid the artificial distinction between magic and religion, as well as the ambiguities implicit in "experience." They further recognize true religion under many different forms.

early group thinking—that slow, devious, democratic process in which the wise man was the spokesman for the tribe, which both stimulated and limited his utterance—has been preserved in the monuments of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Asia Minor. Even in the carefully expurgated text of the Old Testament much that was primitive still lies on the surface. The customs of still extant primitive tribes likewise contribute a substantial quota to our knowledge of early religious practices. Add to these the remains found in caves in southwestern Europe and in Palestine, the old cemeteries that range back a hundred thousand years, and we are provided with ample material to sketch the picture.

The oldest burials[6] preserve the earliest of all religious ideas and practices. In these the bodily posture of the deceased, as in the womb, or as asleep; its orientation; the bones painted red, the symbol of life; the provision of food and drink; the utensils of the earth; the implements of chase and war; and the presence of the mother goddess, the symbol of fertility—all these indicate a definite desire for and a belief in continued existence, possibly a reawakening or a rebirth of the departed. That this was the fundamental idea in religion is not surprising. The urge to live is dominant in tribe and individual. The evidence from all our sources shows that early man was convinced that those who had ceased from physical activity were still with him in spirit. The bodies of the dead were placed near by in the family cave, and later under the floor of the hut. Some of the great dead appeared in dreams and walked by night. In periods of crises they sometimes forewarned their kin, or even aided them in mysterious ways. "To be gathered to ones forefathers" originally spoke more emphatically of life—tribal life—than of death.

If life was man's chief desire, the happy perpetuation of that life was his basic religious problem. For this task he was abundantly furnished with raw material. His senses, his nervous reflexes, his coördinating centres, his enlarged roof-brain were peculiarly fitted to explore and interpret the universe. By instinct and brute inheritance he knew the way around in the lower physical areas. Beyond that he was an infant, a promising one, no doubt, but untutored, without a key or blueprint of the mysteries beyond.

Credulity, that is, a readiness to believe on slight or uncertain evidence, must have played a major rôle in the origin and the development of all religious forms and concepts. Indeed, all advance in understanding must have been the result of experimenting on slight or uncertain evidence.

[6] Burial has been found in only a few cases of Neanderthal man; with Modern man it became an established habit (Marett, *Anthropology*, p. 79; Fleure, *The Races of Mankind*, pp. 11, 12). The reports of all excavations of prehistoric cemeteries provide detailed material concerning the belief of early man in continued existence, all of which simply duplicates the life which they had known.

Such is the working method in all the sciences. Hence, unless in the definition we insist on emphasizing "to believe," the term "credulity" carries no stigma. It is implicit in the method that the Newtons of yesterday and the Einsteins of today use in order to arrive at certainties as yet but dimly suspected.

The following facts make it clear that credulity has been present throughout all the history of religion.

First, the magnitude of the task and the ignorance and inexperience of man warn us that every effort toward understanding and adjustment to the world forces must, at least partly, have been a step in the dark. In this vast, complex, ever-changing universe, swarming with energies, visible and invisible, man had to grope his way. In religion, as elsewhere, every forward step was a hazard. The royal road had to be determined by trial and error in an ever-widening field of knowledge. Hypotheses were suggested, supported, challenged, rejected. Others claimed the field. Evidence accumulated, and new theories held the stage, in turn to give way to better.[7] Primitive man was a pragmatist, and worked out his salvation in the school of democracy. Will a grain offering please Yahweh? Assuredly, said the farmer. Never, scorned the shepherd (Gen. 4:4). Let us have a king, said the progressives (I Sam. 9:1—10:16); you are rejecting Yahweh, protested the conservatives (I Sam. 8:1-22). Let us honor Yahweh with a temple, proposed the High-Church party (II Sam. 7:1-3); but the pious replied, True religion tolerates no innovations (II Sam. 7:4-7). So in the long development of religion, every change has been the result of experiment, with continuing conflicts, and often with little or no evidence as to value.

A second fact indicating that many conclusions must have been temporary and relative is that all our senses, those channels through which come all phenomena, are limited in scope and inaccurate in fact. They are sources of error that can be eliminated only by recognizing and checking their imperfections.

Man had eyes to see; yet he saw but little, and that little was sadly blurred. The sun seemed to rise over the eastern hills; but it did not. The horizon closed down over land and sea; but that was an illusion. The earth appeared to be flat and to stand still; both were wrong. My desk seems to be solid, stable, and hard, when I look at it and rest my arm on it; but science corrects me and proves that it is only "a series of electrical charges rushing about at great speed," and is "chiefly emptiness." So it goes; many of life's most fascinating visions have been but alluring mirages.

[7] It is fully realized that this urge for the better is only a small part of the whole story. Most were satisfied with the *status quo*. Many of the experiments were futile, and others were on the lower level, rather than on the higher. In religious practices degeneration may have been more prevalent than progress.

"Seeing is believing" may be psychologically true, but often it is objectively false.[8]

The imperfection of our senses is borne in on us these days with crushing effect. Galileo by use of the telescope so improved his vision that the observation of Aristotle that there were one thousand and twenty-seven stars—no more, no less—which had become a test of orthodoxy in the church, could no longer be accepted by intelligent men. Now the electronic microscope, which enlarges up to one hundred thousand diameters, makes the dewdrop appear larger to us than did the sun to the mediæval observer, and the germs therein have become like ferocious Saurians. Due to this new vision, the plague-gods of the ancients have been hunted to their lairs, photographed, and by lethal drugs are being exterminated. Eyes had we to see; yet we scarcely saw.

As with our eyes, so with our ears. Radar, that miracle of modern warfare which detects an object far distant, in the air or under the water, and reports both distance and direction, is a reflection on the capacity of our hearing. So with all our senses. A friend lost his right arm on the battlefield, but when his left hand is cold, or is tightly gripped, he has a sensation as of acute suffering in the fingers of the missing right hand. Thus we see that conclusions based on sense perception are not always reliable. They provide a rough approximation to the general facts, which suffices for the demands of lowly physical existence.

A third fact that adds to our distress is this, that the mental processes themselves—the collecting, correlating, and interpreting the data provided by the senses—too often are far from trustworthy. Endowed with amazing possibilities, with more raw material partially dormant in the roof-brain than exists in any other area of nature, gifted with insatiate curiosity, the thinking of primitive man was distinctly prelogical. Unaware of much of the data in any given case, and untutored in accurate, logical processes of thought, our far-off ancestors following instincts and intuitions usually jumped at conclusions. Seeking the origin of disaster or of prosperity, not infrequently they concluded that the coincidental was the causal. A thousand illustrations of this short-circuiting in thinking, no more prevalent in religion than elsewhere, lie around us in every period of history.

A battle had been lost. Why? A sheikh had appropriated a fine Babylonish mantle and some gold and silver (Josh. 7:21), or some one had tasted a little honey during the rout (I Sam. 14:43), or the enemies' god was a god of the hills (I Kings 20:23). A battle had been a smashing victory. Why? The priests had held up the hands of the leader (Exod.

[8] These popular illustrations only suggest the facts disclosed by the scientist. Between the object and the mental concept there is a great gulf. Cf. A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. ix-xv, 96, 266, 328-329; Sir C. Sherrington, *Man on his Nature*, pp. 179-180, 275; Paul Schilder, *Mind, Perception and Thought*, pp. 3-66, 365-376.

17:12), or a gentle whisper had been heard in the tops of the balsam trees (II Sam. 5:2), or the sacrifice of the prince had pleased Chemosh (II Kings 3:27), or the fumbling hand of the priest had brought the white stone out of his pouch (I Sam. 30:7; II Sam. 2:1-2). The ravages of plague or of drought had ended. Why? Golden mice had been offered to the plague-god (I Sam. 6:5), or oxen had been slaughtered on the hill of Zion (II Sam. 24:21-25), or the grandsons of Saul had been sacrificed to Yahweh (II Sam. 21:1-6). A farmer had unusually good crops. Why? In his house was a sacred box, before which he made his vows (II Sam. 6:11), or he regularly paid tithes (Mal. 3:10-12). Such irrelevant conclusions may be pardoned in the far past when most of the facts relating to complex problems were unknown; they may, indeed, have been way stations to more cogent deductions.

Yet modern man is so akin to the primitive, and so deeply rutted are the prelogical thought patterns, that today similar conspicuous irrationalities are altogether too prevalent, especially in the defense of certain types of religion. The following all belong to our own day, and are but a fraction of a per cent that have come within the observation of the writer. Disease, disaster, war clouds, and crime waves some thirty years ago seemed to be sweeping the country. Why? Modernism, shouted a well-known New England orator in one of the most impassioned perorations the writer ever heard. Flu ravaged the Eastern States in 1918-1920. Why? Godless men had introduced daylight-saving time, declared a writer in a New Haven paper in 1920. Lord Carnarvon died in April, 1923. Why? Six months earlier he had opened the tomb of Tutankhamen. When in the summer of 1918 the French Fifth Army split the German front line and saved Paris, Lord Roberts was reported to have said, "Somebody must have been praying." "Yes," arrogantly declaimed an internationally-known pulpiteer before a great Toronto audience, in my hearing, "I and two of my deacons at that very moment were in prayer in the vestry of the Tabernacle." Japan is now waging war against the Anglo-Saxon nations. Why? Inadequate support to Christian missions in Japan was recently asserted, and five hundred businessmen heartily applauded.[9] How silly! Then why are Christian Germany and Christian Italy at war with us? All such patent disregard for fact, in the name of religion, simply serves to inflame the passions and to perpetuate the low levels of prehistoric thinking. It is the way of darkness and not of light.

A still more serious limitation is the fact that the categories of matter, space, and time[10]—the very framework of theological thinking—are but

[9] *Science, Philosophy and Religion,* Symposium No. 3, p. 46.

[10] Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World* gives a popularization of the scientific problem involved in *time* and *space,* pp. 36-62, while he deals with the four-dimensional world, pp. 52, 53.

imperfect and superficial patterns of cosmic reality. Matter only seems to be a dependable solid. Like ice, which is unstable and ultimately is invisible hydrogen and oxygen, or the atom, which is a vortex of electrical energy, or like my desk, so, all matter is not what it seems to be. To us time is the relationship of past, present, and future; but we are assured that it "may be an invention of the mind." In nebulæ that lie five hundred million light-years beyond the earth the *now* there cannot exist for the observer on this earth for five hundred million light-years. Thus our category of time fails completely to express cosmic reality. Our idea of space is no less at fault. Standing on a seemingly flat earth, spatial relations have resolved themselves into the horizontal and the perpendicular, and our universe is three-dimensional. On this basis mythology constructed its celestial geography, which still controls most of our thinking. But the mathematical physicist, if we are willing to study with him, shows us that the universe is four-dimensional. All our common ideas of space relations, the *here* and the *there* and the *above* and the *below,* are altogether inadequate for a philosophic understanding of the universe.

From the above it immediately follows that some of the old landmarks of *apriori* reasoning are in the discard. Terms such as *absolute, infinite, eternal* do not adequately describe the boundless vitalities of the cosmos. Even *truth* itself must give place to *relativity.*[11] These words all imply that we have accurate and final knowledge of all the energies in the universe, and that the universe is unchanging, static. Both implications are absurd. Likewise the doctrines which originated under these limitations, and which are preserved to us in mythology, often rest on uncertain bases. They were the product of haphazard guesses, unverified fancies, wishful thinking, faulty interpretation of experiences, the residuum of constant readjustment of hypotheses.

The story of the early idea of the gods—early man's interpretation of those powers and energies within and beyond him—bears evidence to this process. These outside powers, both in nature and in society, were thought of in terms of personal experience. Even the names for these powers disclose this fact. In Semitic lore, as elsewhere, they were the *strong ones,* the *mighty ones,* the *masters,* the *owners,* the *kinsmen,* the *begetter,* the *father,* the *mother,* the *thunder-god,* the *plague-god,* the *fly-god,* the *corn-god,* and similar terms, while chief in the Hebrew religion was Yahweh, originally the *storm-god.* All such names originated in concrete fact, and expressed characteristics or functions of man or of nature. They were energies, active and effective, like man himself, yet different. They were more vague, uncertain, powerful, and often invisible. They

[11] Eddington, *op. cit.,* makes a brief, simple statement on *relativity* (pp. 20-35); cf. also J. Y. Simpson, *Nature: Cosmic, Human and Divine,* p. 17.

were *wind, breath, anima, spirits.* In the course of time they became differentiated and organized as gods, seraphim, cherubim, angels and archangels, devils and demons. Such conclusions seemed reasonable and at a certain stage in thinking marked progress. But, to say the least, it was a faulty interpretation of fact, and does not stand the scrutiny of the microscope.

Likewise the doctrine of salvation, or of the perpetuation of existence, had its beginning in human desire and experience. It seemed that what pleased man must also be acceptable to the *spirits.* Thus to win their good will he must needs approach them as he would his neighbor, his sheikh, or his enemy. To the nomad, a feast—and of all viands, the fat, so seldom tasted—was most acceptable. So when strange *spirits* disturbed the sleep of Jacob, he smeared the stone—Bethel, that is, a "house of god"—with fat, and his successful mission was ample proof that the god of the place was pleased (Gen. 28:18). Man was refreshed, physically and mentally, by the social meal, and in it entered into friendly compact with his neighbors (Exod. 18:12). Hence, at an altar erected to a particular deity, the tribe and the local god entered into covenant relations, the tribe partaking of the lamb (Exod. 19:5, 24, 28; 34:10), while the deity accepted the sweet savor of the burnt offering (Gen. 8:21; Exod. 29:18, 25; 19:14-17; 24:8).

The effective means in salvation among primitive peoples has been called magic,[12] of which sympathetic magic—like cures or produces like—is the simplest form. Such may be called the philosophy that underlay early religious practices. To illustrate: the hunter who wished to make a kill drew an outline of the animal hunted on the wall of his cave, muttered approved formulæ, punctured the outline with a spear point, thereby wounding or killing the spirit of the animal. Going out he got his meat, or if not, he returned and improved the drawing, the spear thrust, or the formulæ, and in the end, thanks to the old or the improved magic, he succeeded. In times of drought, rain was made in ritual, and rain came when the rain gods were satisfied (I Kings 18:34-35). If a tribe desired fertility of field or flock, the proper ceremonies, with definite fertility rites, were performed, and the gracious gods responded. All such rites, begin-

[12] Magic is so important in the study of religion that its general principles should be understood by every religious leader. The word [illegible] in its strictest sense referred to the religion, wisdom, and practices of the Persian Magi. But it early became a general term for practices that were suspect. To know the origin and development of those practices and to recognize their contributions, psychological and practical, in the days when man was eagerly groping for the light; to trace their failures through the centuries, the antisocial tendencies, the appeal to ignorance by a self-seeking priesthood, and the enslavement of intelligence—such knowledge is essential to an intelligent Christianity. The literature on the subject is enormous. The *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. 8, devotes pp. 245-321 to its treatment. A little volume by R. R. Marrett, *Man in the Making,* pp. 14-20, has a very suggestive, if very primary, treatment. Edward Langton in *Good and Evil Spirits,* pp. 41-48, has a brief, critical study. Lynn Thorndike's monumental study in four volumes, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science,* is indispensable for a comprehensive outlook.

ning with very simple and concrete acts, under priestly guidance were corrected, perfected, and became more complex and more numerous. Gradually they gained wide acceptance and finally became the symbols and essentials to salvation in any given group.

It is beyond question that these ceremonies often brought *salvation* to the participants; and even more frequently they nourished those personal satisfactions that always accompany the coöperative effort of kindred spirits to please the powers beyond. Nevertheless, they are all the product of haphazard guesses and wishful thinking, and there is no sufficient evidence that any of these rites, amulets and charms, gestures and formulæ, vows and offerings, *per se* ever was endowed with any objective efficacy. True, plagues ceased and droughts came to an end; but the slaughter of Saul's grandchildren (II Sam. 21:1-9) or the drama on Mount Carmel (I Kings 18:30-46) cannot be credited with the achievement. Battles have been won and cities have been overthrown, but priestly trumpets and bishop's prayers have been little more than byplays to victory. The efficacy of such rites has long ago been discredited, and their supposed powers, so impressive to the credulous, are but the signs after which primitive religion seeks (I Cor. 1:22). The prophets of the eighth century B.C. clearly saw this fallacy, and vigorously protested against the most sacred rites of the ancient Hebrews, asserting that Yahweh desired none of these (Amos 5:21-23; Hos. 6:6; Isa. 1:11-17; Mic. 6:6; cf. Jer. 7:21-26).

Has religion then been bankrupt? By no means. As in all walks of life, imperfections never impair all the values. No mother has ever been perfect; yet most have been canonized by their sons. So in religion, there have been assets of the greatest value, the chief of which can here only be suggested.

First, even in the low stages of religion, where magic ruled, where the grossest rites were practiced, and where the concepts were the crudest, there were values to the worshipers that should not be underrated. Such rites and concepts, however futile and fantastic in themselves, were the *status quo* at which the group had arrived in its religion. They were the residuum of their history, and crude as they may have been, in many cases they marked an advance on the rites of earlier days in the direction of order, of meaning, and of humaneness. They made an undeniable appeal to the devotees. The menacing throb of the war drum, the sensuous, staccato rhythm of the folk dance, the social orgies, and the secret tribal initiations, each and all, stir tribal emotions to their depths. They often induce abnormal psychic states (cf. I Sam. 19:20-24), and awaken latent powers in the individual and in the tribe. Under such conditions passions are

stimulated, courage is intensified, social loyalties are strengthened, and often the inexplicable and unbelievable is accomplished. Mysterious rites, guaranteed to bring the invisible forces to our aid, will always infuse in the believing a conquering confidence. Nor must we forget that the more primitive the emotion, the stronger will be the conviction. The mob is more confident that it is right than is the savant.

Furthermore, experimentation in itself is a boon to humanity. It is the spirit of adventure, a dissatisfaction with the present level in religion, the struggle to adjust to newly discovered facts or to plot a better way of life. Like the ceaseless motion of the arms and legs of the little child, this is the process of growth, developing and coördinating the latent mental energies with which man has been so generously endowed. Struggle, a characteristic of most forms of life, is at its climax in mankind. Restlessness, not quiescence, marks and makes the man. In religion, as well as in the physical world, it is the sign of life; cessation therefrom is death. Much, no doubt, seems to be abortive, and most of it is irritating, but each higher stage in religion has been attained by the insistent exploration of the unknown by a host of nameless pioneers. No Mount Everest in religious thinking, with its clearer, wider outlook, has ever been attained apart from arduous adventure.

The awakening and development of man's moral nature are definitely related to this experimental process. With every disaster came the question of sensitive minds: What wrong have I done? In what way have we displeased the spirits? The drought, the plague, the defeat in battle, the death of the child; and always the question, why? The answer given may have been wide of the mark, but the self-criticism often led to right doing, if not to straight thinking. Achan's theft had little to do with the defeat at Ai, but the thief was held guilty (Josh. 7: 16-26). David's son may have died from some contagion, certainly not from the violation of a marriage taboo; but the people judged adultery to be wrong (II Sam. 12: 11-18). The great drought was not due to Tyrian Baalism; but it served to stay the evils of nature worship (I Kings 18: 1-40).

In this way, both individual and social righteousness have been promoted. The sense of right and wrong, deep-rooted in human nature, through the ages by this method has been reaching ever wider areas, and has been arriving at ever finer ethical distinctions. Thus through long struggle, justice and mercy, goodness and humility have become recognized the world over as human ideals. Details of application may differ widely in different climes, but in general there is all but universal agreement on basic principles. The emphasis in the main of the Hebrew prophets and that of Paul and of Jesus meet with general approval the world over. The line of reasoning may often have been faulty, but certain results are

established beyond dispute. The byproducts of the laboratory are in no wise discredited by their fortuitous origin.

A growing confidence that in the world there are unmeasured reliable potentialities for the enrichment of human life is the most important contribution of this agelong experimentation. Outside ourselves, as within, there is that power that makes for righteousness whenever a man intelligently explores and directs it.

At the dawn of consciousness, to man the world was storm-tossed, plague-infested, spirit-ruled, an irresponsible and savage antagonist. He was ever in deadly struggle with the unexpected, the sorry victim of the gods of chance. By magic he labored to gain the good will of these forces and thus avoid misfortune. Slowly he has learned that fertility of the field depends more on the sweat of the brow than on the festal offerings to Baal, and that victory in battle is determined by equipment, man power, and morale, rather than by prayers and vows. It has been a devious pathway, an uphill struggle. But plagues and droughts, earthquakes and hurricanes, triumph and defeat, life and death are no longer held to be the acts of capricious spirits. They are the results of physical causes, the operations of natural laws. Often the scientist has been the pathfinder in religion. When Newton proved that gravity was a "law of nature," the arbitrary had to give way to the dependable; an "act of God" became understandable, and lost its terror. Darwin's *Origin of Species* resolved a few million special acts of creation into an orderly process of development, no less mysterious, but orderly, intelligible, and trustworthy, not the response to fiat. Angels and demons have lost face as the microscope has gained in power. To burn witches and to throw inkwells at the devil would today be considered childish. But the gain has more than matched the loss. What seemed chaos is now recognized to be a well-ordered, law-abiding, creatively-unfolding universe.[13] Nature is not a meaningless muddle, nor is man a chance fleck of foam on a storm-tossed ocean.

Man understands but little of the vast mystery around him, much of which is still a menace to life, liberty, and happiness. But what he has learned proves that the mystery, with its unmeasured potentialities, is a dependable cosmos, that all of it is ready, awaiting release for human well-being. Man no longer needs be the victim of the magic brew of the voodoo

[13] Law-abiding can no longer be thought of in the Newtonian sense in a world of relativity, which is ever "becoming." In thermodynamics there is what has been called a random element that always increases and never decreases. This has been called entropy, and the law is the second law of thermodynamics. Though spoken of as a secondary law, it is in no sense unreasonable, and is supported by overwhelming evidence. It provides for relativity and an expanding universe. Cf. A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World,* pp. 74-78, 87-110, 20-35; J. Y. Simpson, *Nature: Cosmic, Human and Divine,* pp. 17, 49; and Edwin Hubble's article, "The Problem of the Expanding Universe," in *American Scientist* (April, 1942). R. A. Millikan, *Evolution in Science and Religion,* pp. 3-95, is the most comprehensive statement in brief form on the theme, religion adapting itself to a growing, developing world.

priest, the plague-scared slave hiding behind the bloodstained doorposts, or the suppliant depending for aid on the ancestral prayer wheel. Man is increasingly conscious of the ready response of nature to his efforts. The old plague-gods and the storm-gods are vanishing, while the winds and the waves obey his will, King Canute to the contrary. Man knows he can exploit and direct the world forces to yet more breath-taking achievements. More important still is the fact, bearing especially on religion, that since the dawn of conscience, more than five thousand years ago, humanity has shown an ever-increasing response to the moral imperative.

But such knowledge of affairs physical and social fosters no arrogance. It is freighted with humility, and makes aware of grave mental and moral responsibilities. It exalts the lowly to a pinnacle of rewarding obligation to reach yet higher levels of religious thought and practice. Eagerly adventuresome, yet deeply reverent, man must ever seek to understand better and to coöperate more fully with the Great Mystery.

THE PROTESTANT MINISTRY IS THREATENED

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"WHAT shall our churches do for an educated ministry when our present ministers shall lie in the dust?" This question, which led to the founding of Harvard College, has been raised once more by Albert W. Palmer in an article appearing in the *Christian Century*. The problem which brought forth this query was that occasioned by the lowering of the draft age to eighteen. The colleges in the past have served as the principal recruiting grounds for the Christian ministry and have provided the general cultural education which stands as the indispensable prerequisite to specialized theological training. If the liberal arts colleges are to disappear under wartime regulations and if the military authorities are to take all young men at eighteen and put them through a "short course" sufficient simply to equip them for wartime service, to what source shall we look for candidates for the Christian ministry? Furthermore, if ministerial recruits are to be enlisted at the ages of fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen, how are they to be given at least a minimum of training in the humanities and social sciences? These are critical issues which must be faced and met. But there is a more fundamental threat to the Protestant ministry—a threat of long standing—which also clamors for attention, and the present situation, in this instance, provides favorable circumstances in which to deal with it.

For the past few decades the Christian ministry has been losing its place of leadership in the affairs of society. The clerical son of Harvard, in the early days, was popularly known as the parson because he was the "person" of the community, the first citizen of the town who was consulted on all matters of moment and to whom the townspeople looked for guidance in common concerns. Not so, today! The editors of *Fortune* in 1940 summed up the present situation tersely and succinctly in their discussion of the failure of religious leadership. "The voice of the church . . . is the echo of our own voices. . . . When we consult the church we hear only what we ourselves have said." "The flock is leading the shepherd." We may protest outwardly at such an extreme characterization of the minor rôle of the church and the clergy in modern society. It is overdrawn. But inwardly we know that those words come too near the truth for our consciences to be wholly at ease. In many ways the minister of today is a sort of celestial handyman whose principal function is to give an air of sanctity to completely secular concerns. His function too frequently is simply to invoke God's blessing upon courses of action that have been determined on grounds other than religious. *Of what use is it to safeguard*

the recruiting and training of the clergy if the outcome is merely to have them become the tail of some kite the secular world is bent on flying?

A major factor in the decline of religious leadership as a significant element in contemporary life is the lack of integration in theological education which leaves the student at the end of his course more confused and bewildered as to the exact function he is expected to serve in the social order than he was at the beginning. Effective leadership in any realm is dependent, first of all, upon a clear conception of the nature of the task which the leader is to perform and of the manner in which that task may be discharged, and, in the second place, it is dependent upon a carefully designed course of training which will equip him specifically and adequately for the rôle he is to play in society. He needs to know what he is to do, how it can be done, and to have his preparation shaped to that definite and concrete end.

A century ago the basic considerations with regard to theological education were perfectly clear. The preaching of the gospel was the supreme end of the minister. He was to save souls by bringing them to Christ, and he brought them to Christ by expounding a divinely revealed plan of salvation and persuading them to accept it. He also was expected to serve as the representative of God in the elemental crises of birth, marriage, and death, and not infrequently he played a significant part in politics by extending the application of revealed truth to political affairs. For this central business of the minister an entirely adequate program of studies was formulated, which sought to give him a mastery of the original languages in which the revelation was written, a systematic organization of that revelation into a body of beliefs, a knowledge of how far rival denominations had departed during the course of history from the originally pure type of doctrine and practice, and finally a skill in the use of "sacred rhetoric" for the effective advocacy of revealed truth.

This was all to the good in that day and generation; but as the days slipped by and the generations passed away, theological education found itself in a situation quite different from that in which its curriculum had been organized. A changing society made new demands upon the minister and called for new services to be rendered by religion. Urban growth required new techniques and revealed new needs. Historical and critical studies of the Bible began to create a new attitude toward the absolute authority of revealed religion, while developments in scientific thought suggested new explanations for natural phenomena. New insights were obtained with regard to the nature of religious experience, the structure of society, and social change. The emphasis upon religious nurture, the stress upon community service, the appreciation of the importance of the environment for the spiritual life modified the minister's task and redefined the

rôle of religion and the church in social life. These new circumstances which surrounded the minister and conditioned the work of the church made necessary and inevitable the "enrichment" of the curriculum.

The new curriculum that developed was not the result of a careful analysis of the function that a seminary education should fulfill. It was not planned, but, like Topsy, "jest growed." Courses in religious education, psychology, dramatics for juniors, radio speech, social ethics, mental hygiene, comparative religion, storytelling, premarital counseling, and comparative economic systems were added with reckless abandon while all the old courses were retained. Topsy at least had a degree of organic unity in the body she "jest growed," but the theological curriculum bequeathed to us by a similar process is utterly chaotic. It is a crazy quilt, all patchwork. Jesus had something to say about adding patches of new cloth to an old garment, and he disapproved of it.

On the one hand, there is today in seminary education what has been called the "mediæval hangover," the traditional curriculum, and on the other hand, the vast array of totally unrelated and uncoördinated "fads and frills," together with some of the newer basic disciplines. The reaction of alumni to the first element in the program—the long hours spent in acquiring statistical information about the authorship, date, and setting of biblical books, the memorization of definitions of long-forgotten heresies, and the minute exegesis of biblical texts—when they are faced with the concrete task of meeting the members of their congregations on the level of their most vital problems of living the religious life in the modern world is quite honestly to confess that much of the time so spent was wasted. The fragmented jumble of the newer courses may have saved the minister from complete futility and inadequacy in particular areas of his work, but the net impression of the anarchy they create in the curriculum is to produce a profound perplexity and bewilderment as to just what he has been "called of God" to do—run a kindergarten, a dramatic workshop, or a labor union. The task of guiding persons into significant religious living and of leading humanity toward a brighter future through the intricacies of the present-day world is inadequately defined by current curricula, and for this great task seminary graduates are inadequately prepared. In desperation, therefore, many of them conclude that all they can do is to forget the ends for which religion exists, and to keep the particular institution they serve functioning as best they may on an activity basis.

The conviction that something is wrong with theological education is not new. For at least twenty-five years the theological curriculum has been the problem child of seminary administrators and a matter of concern to all who are seriously concerned about the future of religious leadership in

the world. Experimentation to improve the situation has been almost continuous. But this nibbling does not yield the desired results, which suggests that the time has come when tinkering must be abandoned and fundamental revision undertaken.

The great obstacle, of course, to a fundamental reorganization of theological study is the dead weight of inertia stemming from the traditional procedures and vested interests of the members of the theological faculties. One professor is reported to have replied to a suggestion that a slight alteration in one of his courses might be desirable: "I have taught this course in this way for thirty years and I think I know how to do it." The problem has been trenchantly defined in these words:

> Habitual procedures within the seminary grow into incrusted privileges whose shell cannot be broken. The interests of certain professors in their specific fields become vested rights. The embalmed lecture notes acquire a sacred sanction that must not be violated. To suggest any changes in the features of the mummy seems heinously sacrilegious.

It is at this point that the present wartime emergency gives to us, not exactly a heaven-sent opportunity, but an opportunity, nevertheless, to do something about the muddle that is theological education. Dorothy Sayers, in her little book, *Begin Here,* has an encouraging word for us concerning the present situation.

> In peacetime [she writes], the reformer spends nine-tenths of his energy in endeavoring to make his voice heard above the snoring of well-cushioned indolence, to smash his way into the closed circle of vested interests, to disturb complacency and generally to overcome the disposition to let sleeping dogs lie. But war does this part of his task for him. . . . The world is startled awake, complacency is destroyed.

Applying this fact to the problem of the fundamental revision of the curriculum, the president of one of our great universities declared: "The war gives us the opportunity to do in the name of patriotism something we ought to have done long ago in the name of common sense."

Is this a moment to become discouraged with regard to the training of religious leadership? To the contrary, it can be utilized to make our seminaries more effective educational instruments. If there are to be fewer students or if they are to be recruited at an earlier age (it should be remembered in this connection that students at Harvard used to graduate at sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen), the programs of theological instruction will have to undergo serious readjustment. Fewer students mean fewer teaching hours and fewer papers to read, and this in turn means greater leisure for serious reflection upon the problem at hand. A smaller student body, moreover, provides a more flexible and adaptable group

with which to experiment with curricula revision. The opportunity is now! God grant us the grace to use it.

It is one thing to diagnose the disease, it is quite another matter to write the prescription that will effect a cure. The latter is the much more difficult task. Nevertheless, difficult though it may be, it is a task that needs to be done and needs to be done with dispatch if the present opportunity is not to be lost.

The patchwork character of the theological curriculum, as already suggested, has been a gradual development in response to a changing conception of religion and of its function in society. It has not been a planned adjustment to new needs and altered thought-patterns but a piecemeal adaptation which has produced a loose jumble of courses so isolated in character that the student gets neither a coherent picture of what his future task is to be nor an adequate preparation to discharge it effectively. The present task, demanded by the plight of ministers and churches alike, is to make a frontal attack upon the lack of unity in the seminary program and to bring order out of the prevailing chaos. To do this it is necessary, first of all, to clarify the confusion in our thinking as to the type of training a seminary should be expected to provide.

One tendency in recent curricula construction has been to transform seminaries into graduate schools of religion. This tendency has its roots in the old content-centred curriculum of former generations which prescribed a body of truth to be mastered for later proclamation. This was a possible scheme so long as the body of truth to be mastered involved nothing more than a thorough acquaintance with the Bible and the memorization of Hodge's or Strong's *Systematic Theology*. But as the horizon of the church's interest and religion's concern broadened to make room for the rapidly expanding findings of the natural and social scientists, the divinity student found it increasingly difficult to arrive at a mastery of all truth. Ultimately it became impossible. The *reductio ad absurdum* of the trend was reached in one institution when it took a diligent student a large part of his theological course to pass an introductory orientation examination.

Many seminaries, finding themselves in this *impasse,* sought to escape by borrowing the educational pattern of the university graduate schools. If one could not attain unto all knowledge, he could at least become a specialist in a particular area. So graduate work of the research type, cloaked with all the scholarly paraphernalia including a thesis requirement, became the goal of a goodly number of theological institutions which proudly proclaimed the fact that they were "graduate schools." The difficulty with this solution was not only in what it did to the curriculum—making it more disjointed than ever by the addition of highly specialized courses valid only in the research discipline of a university—

but the training it afforded was worse than useless for the prospective minister.[1]

The basic aim of graduate work is to train scholars to do frontier thinking and to increase the sum of knowledge in their particular field of specialization. The fundamental goal of ministerial training, on the other hand, should be to produce men with a broader preparation who will be able to draw upon all areas of knowledge as the spokesmen for God in the general concerns of life. Both types of training are equally interested in producing men capable of vigorous and independent thought, but the one is frankly atomistic while the other should be syncretistic. The first seeks to equip men for narrow intensive work, the second for a broad, extensive task. The scholar is to be an investigator, an explorer; the minister, a synthesizer and an interpreter. While the minister can no longer expect to be the master of all truth, he can achieve a reasonable orientation within the various realms of knowledge sufficient to equip him as the interpreter of reality to his people and as a guide for them in the complexities of modern life.

A second tendency in theological education has been to transform the seminaries into purely vocational schools with a curriculum that is "job-centred" and dominated by the so-called "practical" courses. The objective here is to anticipate every type of activity in which the prospective minister will find himself engaged and to send him forth, to use the pungent words of Shirley Jackson Case, with "a well-stocked bag of tricks that are assumed to be adequate for any emergency." The flaw in such a scheme is that the ministry is not a trade, and preparation for the ministry does not adapt itself to trade-school procedures. Skills and techniques are needed, but they are not basic. There is little value in knowing how to teach a Sunday-school class if one has nothing to teach. The most effective pulpit delivery loses its point if the preacher has nothing to say. Counseling techniques are worthless if the counselor has no counsel to offer. Skill in group leadership is utterly useless without a clear concept of where the group ought to be led.

A further inadequacy in the application of vocational school methods to theological education is the fact that not even the practical aspects of the minister's job can be reduced to set patterns. Every phase of his activity is surrounded by a host of imponderables which condition the effectiveness of any predetermined technique or blueprint he may seek to apply in a given situation. The fact that some plan worked in one church is no guarantee it will work in another, and in a rapidly changing world the tested strategies of today are likely to be outmoded by tomorrow. Nor can

[1] Dean E. C. Colwell has argued this point cogently and effectively in the *Journal of Religion*, XX (1940), pp. 109-123.

any faculty, however wise, foresee all contingencies that will arise in that most unpredictable of all institutions—the church. Tentative programs and suggestive techniques should have their place in theological education, but the emphasis should be upon the training of thinkers rather than of mere technicians, upon the cultivation of an aptitude for devising techniques and developing skills to meet new situations rather than upon the imitation of authoritative patterns of procedure.

To clarify our thinking with regard to the type of training which a divinity school should provide gives us a clue as to the fundamental integrating principle that must be introduced into the process of curriculum revision. When we recognize that the ministry needs something more than a vocational technician and something less than a research specialist we are well on our way to a real appreciation of the nature of the task which the minister is called upon to perform.

There are differences of conviction in theological thought, and consequently there will be varying opinions as to the exact definition of the unifying principle we are seeking, but the foundation upon which such a principle must rest is clear. It must be based upon a functional view of religion. What are the particular tasks religion is expected to perform, the services it renders to the individual and the social order? What is its unique contribution to the common life of mankind? How are the forces of religion to be brought to bear effectively upon the central problems of life? These are the questions which must be answered before any systematic reconstruction of the curriculum that will result in a unified program of study can be undertaken. When a seminary faculty has answered these questions and has formulated for itself a theory of operative Christianity, it may then proceed to revise its course of study by articulating it around the functional aim.

The initial unit in such a functional curriculum would be an introductory course dealing with the theory of operative Christianity upon which the entire educational program is organized. It is not enough for a prospective minister to be convinced that religion has a function; he must be taught to discover what that function is if his preparation is to be at all meaningful or adequate. He needs to know the particular task that he, as the representative of religion, is expected to perform in society, and how his educational training is geared to equip him for the satisfactory performance of that task. To receive such orientation at the outset would be to achieve perspective, and the educational process would no longer be viewed merely as a specific number of courses, arbitrarily required, which must be "taken" before one is allowed to participate in the work of the practical ministry.

Viewed functionally, the body of the curriculum would fall quite

naturally into three major horizontal divisions—the Christian *tradition,* the Christian *message,* and the Christian *program.* These would replace the present vertical departmental alignment of courses. The study of the Bible, for example, would no longer be considered as a separate and distinct unit in the curriculum but would find its place, according to the functional significance of its various elements, within each of the three divisions. Material usually associated with courses on biblical introduction would be studied as a part of the general history of Christianity; the interpretation of the Bible's significance for today would be a phase of the study of the Christian message; the utilization of the Bible in worship and preaching, as well as for educational purposes, would be considered as an aspect of the Christian program.

During the first year, the student's work would centre about the Christian tradition. Here the objective would be to familiarize him with Christianity in its historical aspect. Professor Pollard has said: "The man who sees only the present is more than half-blind, and the politician and voter without some historical knowledge is like a submarine without a periscope." That statement can be applied equally well to the preacher, for unless he has an adequate appreciation of the lessons learned by former generations, he will find himself simply one of the blind leading the blind. The minister also needs to explore the past to understand the movement of which he is a part and in whose leadership he would participate. To discover the rôle Christianity has played, the means it has utilized most advantageously, and the inherent genius of its nature is to discover what the Christian enterprise is and what it is not, what it can do and what it cannot do, what the line of development has been and what it is likely to be. Such a knowledge (need it be said?) is an indispensable prerequisite to effective Christian leadership.

The Christian message, which would occupy the student's attention during the second year of his theological course, needs no defense from the functional point of view. This is the *raison d'être* of his calling, and his studies during this year should provide him with a working synthesis of conviction and belief, based upon findings in a wide variety of fields. Here he would deal with biblical interpretation, the philosophy of religion, major issues in Christian thought, Christian social theory, the relationship of Christianity to western culture, and the relationship of Christianity to other religions.

The final year of the prospective minister's preparation would be devoted to a consideration of the Christian program. The problem here would be that of securing commitment to, of applying, and of making effective the Christian message. The organization of church work, the educational task of the churches, leadership in worship, the art of preach-

ing, pastoral counseling, the missionary enterprise—these would be the major areas of study.

Such an arrangement as this would take most of the padding and duplication out of the curriculum, eliminate confusion, and introduce a large degree of integration. But more important than any mechanical advantages, this simplified program of seminary education would tell the matriculating student what the course is all about. He would see the reasons for doing this and that. And still more important, upon graduation he would have a clear vision of the task that was his to perform. The perplexity and bewilderment of too many graduates would be banished, and a long step would have been taken toward making them something more than hitchhikers on the highway of life.

Lest the general scheme that has been presented be misunderstood, some further suggestions ought to be made. The end result that is sought will not be realized merely by reshuffling the old courses to fit into the new framework. An eastern seminary has adopted a similar threefold division, but when the course offerings are examined one discovers that it is the same old hodgepodge under a new name. A satisfactory revision of the curriculum, in the last analysis, is dependent upon a rethinking of each individual course with the functional aim in view.

Furthermore, if a working synthesis of thought and belief is an essential prerequisite to an effective ministry, there must be some measure of agreement on a common point of view among the various members of the faculty. Such an agreement, in the past, has been an outstanding characteristic of every seminary that has made a significant contribution to religious leadership. Diversity in religious outlook there always will be, but those differences ought to be confined in the main to different institutions. Not much in the way of synthesis can be achieved if the instruction propounded in each classroom proceeds from a different set of assumptions. Such diversity may be of value in institutions devoted to research, but it creates havoc in those whose primary task is to train men for activity outside the cloistered halls of pure scholarship. The only result of such mutual undermining is to send forth graduates whose confusion has been worse confounded by their seminary course.

A further suggestion is that, while the curriculum should be carefully devised and closely articulated, it should not be made so rigid as to preclude the possibility of meeting the individual needs of individual students. It is imperative that the curriculum be kept sufficiently flexible and adaptable that the peculiar capacities of different students may be developed. This should be done by making ample provision for individualized work within the major divisions. If the basic pattern has been well conceived and well integrated, there is little to fear from intelligent adapta-

tions of it. The trouble always arises when, in the name of individual need, no general scheme has ever been adopted.

Finally, the curriculum must never be considered as a static entity—a wonderful construction that has been delivered once and for all to the saints. No seminary can ever pretend to offer a final system of truth, a complete kit of tools, or a perfect educational program. A functional curriculum must constantly be subject to revision, and the way must ever be kept open for reconstruction in the light of the emerging needs of each new day and generation.

Such are the proposals for reform in theological education. They ought not to be lightly dismissed. For, in the words of Albert W. Palmer, "here is a problem and a peril which concerns not only our theological seminaries but the whole of the Christian church in its task of providing an adequate and well-trained ministry for the churches in an age when free enlightened spiritual leadership is more desperately needed than ever before in human history."

THE CRUCIBLE OF RELIGION AND THE PASTORAL FUNCTION

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RELIGION is friendship with God. This definition connotes the atmosphere which permeates day-to-day religious living as opposed to thinking or even believing that there is a God. Analyze the person whose dominating drive is to live "as God would have me live." Do you not find that emotional warmth, that sense of mutual understanding of the things that count, that joyful and yet solemn dedication and commitment which pervade human friendships?

This is not to say that friendship with God is no different from friendship with men. Every friendship, in the last analysis, finds the level which reflects the achievements, understanding, and inspiration of each member. It follows that each friendship between man and God is as unique as the personalities engaged in it. The thesis here proposed is that, whatever is involved philosophically in the relation between God and man, God will not strike fire in the life of a man unless he feels friendly toward God. Even the Christian concept of God as father finds its appeal in the fundamental friendly qualities of mutual care, trust, gratitude, responsibility, and devotion. The religious relation, whenever it is dynamic, is at least one of friendliness between a man and his God.

One wonders, in passing, whether much that is disturbing on the contemporary religious scene may not be explained by the impersonalism which has crept into religious attitudes. In some quarters God has become a stranger in his own universe. God has not been forced out of our lives by atheists and materialists, by fascists and communists. He has been crowded from the centre to the periphery and then to the vague background of life by his former friends. He cannot be said to have been denied, for men seldom deny their friends face to face; they first walk afar off and soon have no more time for them. So, our lives, once planned with a certain friend in mind, are now planned with him "reluctantly" left out. How many of us are glad to live in a Christian atmosphere, even if our breath has lost the warmth of the Christian struggle! We want a Christian environment for ourselves and our children even if we think the Christian cross a bit archaic, and feel a little silly at prayers. Whatever our conceptions of God, our attitudes have become impersonal, if not unfriendly, for God has not actually had a real part in our calculations. He may be "always there" but he is hardly "in" our lives; he may be taken for granted but is rendered ineffectual at the very points where he

could make the all-important difference in our outlook toward ourselves and others.

At any rate, our thesis still stands: God's effective entrance and stay in a man's life depend upon his being conceived as a friend of that man. It is important, at this point, to think of friendship as a psychological relation and not in ideal ethical terms. A particular religious friendship may be much less than the religious norm specifies, but it does unleash forces for goodness which the ideal as such may not activate. Again, an individual's conception of friendship may be mistaken, and unworthy of the real God. Yet let God enter that area of his life which means friendship to him, and God becomes both an attraction and a source of inspiration. Otherwise God plays the limiting, restrictive part in his life which other agencies like the police force, government, or economic system play—except that God does not enter into his planning from day to day as much as these other agencies do! That person who actually bargains with God and brings God into the familiar and humble give-and-take of daily life is beginning the religious life, even though I do not happen to approve of his bargaining or his idea of God. His God is entering into his life and his plans; he is committing his life to God in ways which he conceives the relationship to call for. That is his friendship with God; that is his religion. At least he is consciously letting God make a difference to his action. That is the minimum of a religion in which man and God both play a part and make a difference to each other. Psychologically I know no other, though I can think of better qualities for the relation.

Unless religion, then, is friendship with God, God loses his vitality in the life of the individual. But the reverse is also true. I am here assuming that God is, minimally, an active agent in the universe, whose doings embrace good will toward men. The individual who neglects God is thereby cutting his end of a spiritual lifeline and denying himself vitality which friendliness would ensure. Still speaking in minimal terms, I am also assuming that while there are some things that God does for men willy-nilly, there are others he cannot or will not do unless men consciously coöperate. As soon as a man thinks that he does not need God, or God does not want or need him, an estrangement takes place, despite the lip service and elaborate ritual which may prolong "good will" but actually nullify commitment. When we reflect on the state of mind of the Salvation Army lassie, the simple Christian mother, the dedicated deacon, we may agree or disagree with their conception of God or of themselves. We nonetheless find them gratefully breaking the bread of life with God. A unique resourcefulness permeates their attitudes toward themselves and their problems, a sense that even in personal tragedy there will be salvation.

God is their friend, who not only bears their griefs and woes, but inspires courage and coöperation.

It is this feeling of intimacy with the Power in Reality and the efficacy for concentrated and disciplined as well as sensitive living that it is the peculiar function of institutional religion to preserve and increase. And in a day when the individual so easily loses his identity in the struggle to preserve his bodily being, it is all the more important to inspire and instruct that sense of God's care for what is happening in the individual life.

I would not for a moment create the impression that the God presented by some thinkers invites the friendly relation. The deistic God, a universe-maker who left his creation to run on its own after he completed it, or even a value-making Process integral to the processes of nature and of man might well impose insuperable obstacles to the psychological state of friendship. Still, I would stress the fact that whatever God is objectively, we see him from out of the context and perspective of our own lives and needs, and he becomes our friend psychologically only if he meets the conditions which our own lives set for friendship at that time. Who has not found his mother more of a friend at one time in his life than at others? This was in all probability not due to any objective unwillingness to be friendly on her part, but to an opaqueness and insensitivity in our own lives. Yet as long as that opaqueness and that imperfect perspective was there, mother did not enter the activities of our lives as a friend. At the time we were impressed by her tenderness, we were oblivious to her moral courage, which we had to grow to appreciate. So, also, whether God becomes a friend does not depend entirely on God. Indeed, men will even make allowances for the conceivable imperfections in the God who meets their dominant need for friendship at that time; they will wipe away possible imperfections in God's actions by saying that the fault really lies in their limited understanding.

We conclude once more, then, that a man's religion, his friendship with God, is a dynamic drama which represents *his* struggle with the forces of life, his thoughts and feelings, and his evaluation of the reality he takes to be God. The God he believes in, the God he befriends, is the God he needs. This may be too bad, for his mind cannot create the reality, and reality will sooner or later challenge, if not expose, his fiction. But even the real God does not enter man's conscious reflections until he is seen as relevant at some point in his struggles and his enjoyments.

It is at this point that the pastor or religious worker makes his contribution to the life of a religion. He mediates spiritual friendship. His task is so to explain the gospel that it will enter the everyday experience of men as good news about the meaning of godliness. Good news does not

always have to be immediately favorable, for its goodness lies in the direction that it suggests and in the perspective that it inspires or renews in the individual's life. The task of the pastor or teacher is the almost impossible one of helping the willing individual to translate the conceptions, ideas, principles, or dogmas of religion into terms fitting the context of the individual's personal struggle. This is frequently best done in personal meditative consultation with the individual on specific problems, in the home-to-home call. Sermons or lessons are necessarily more generalized and meet a different need. The art of the pastor and religious worker is the art of showing men that the essential issues of their lives, the kind of answers they find to their problems, are of immediate concern to the Creative Spirit who even now waits to help re-create their spirits.

But such individual adaptation cannot take place unless the counselor is aware of the factors which are creating the present context of the individual's life. The shepherd needs to know what creates the uncertainties in members of his flock. Granted basic scholarly training, the observant and penetrating pastor need never be ignorant about concrete personality patterns in his parish even though his theology has caked a little. What is lacking, however, in our day is the pastor who understands his theology *and* his people and who can bring them into effective touch with each other.

Many people today are wearing out the carpets outside the studies of psychologists, psychiatrists, and vocational counselors. I would not deprecate the fact were it not that they need bread which pastors should be giving them and which these other servants are not prepared and do not profess to give. Most real human conflicts root sooner or later in a misguided sense of values. Here is or should be the pastor's *forte.* His should be the ability to analyze sympathetically the component parts of a particular life, and to help the individual see the possible consequences of his present frustrating style of life. It is not enough to tell a person that he won't find the full meaning of life unless he devotes his energies to God. It is the concrete meaning of such devotion which the individual needs to discover. He must find light on his present situation and then guidance in deciding on specific goals commensurate with his ability and his whole predicament. Let the pastor be the spiritual psychologist or diagnostician before he is the moralist. He must be both. Sin and sickness are terrible burdens when the individual sees no path of cleansing expression and no deliverance; he therefore concentrates on forgetting and denying his sinfulness. Let him develop confidence that the spiritual doctor will reveal the roots of maladjustment even as he helps build the plan or ideals which will meet the situation! In these very ministrations the pastor is indeed the angel sent from God to remove the barriers set up between man and godliness.

I am not suggesting that every pastor become a psychiatrist or vocational counselor, though that might be desirable if possible. These professions can and should be called upon to help the pastor when his own light fails as special difficulties come up. The fact stands, nevertheless, that if a man finds the pastor either unsympathetic or unable to help him understand his own problems, and turns to secular counselors, he will invariably be led to some solution of his problem in a nonreligious context. For these counselors, barring rare exceptions perhaps, help the man adjust in terms of the prevailing social patterns and values, since they feel inadequate to deal with the more hidden religious context. The meaning of God in that individual's life is not discussed as an integral part of the problem. Is it any wonder, then, that later discussion about devoting oneself to God smacks of artificiality? If God is not present in the moment of decision, he becomes tangential to the decision and discounted from the concrete functioning of the individual's life. God is in very fact a "stranger" in that situation and is certainly not integral to the individual's thinking and feeling about his destiny.

It is, therefore, only as the divine message enters into the context of concrete daily problems and enjoyments that God becomes a living coöperator in the formation of human aspirations. Unless the God we preach and teach is capable of such functioning, unless we minister to the individual so that he sees the concern of God in his problem, religion has lost its dynamic. And the tragedy, after all, is not that religion can be a back number in the life of an epoch; the tragedy is that any man—a universe before God—should live without such a friend. In a day when we have been yearning once more, it would seem, for transcendent religious absolutes to give men security, is there not another path open, that of divine friendliness?

THE JANINA GOSPELS AND THE ISLE OF PATMOS

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Less than a century and a quarter ago, in 1819, Edward Everett of Harvard University brought back from Constantinople the first manuscripts of the Greek New Testament ever known to have reached America. By the beginning of the twentieth century, no fewer than thirty-eight such manuscripts had reached this side of the Atlantic. During the years since 1900, however, more than two hundred manuscripts are known to have been brought to our shores, and America has become a rich source of information for the student of the Greek New Testament.

In his catalogue which was completed in 1937, Kenneth W. Clark was able to list 256 manuscripts as being in America at that time.[1] In spite of Professor Clark's comprehensive work, however, America's manuscript treasures have remained largely unknown. Many of our manuscripts have never been collated, or at least they have never been collated in full. A careful, detailed study of almost any one of them will prove of value to the student who is interested in the history of the text, in iconography and ornamentation, in palæography, and in the various questions of provenance and of the relationships of various manuscripts one to another.

The manuscript which is the object of this study, while not of any great textual value, has proven to be of great interest in other respects. It is the codex in the University of Chicago collection which is known as the Janina Gospels. It is identified as number 141 in the University of Chicago collection and as number 2409 in the Gregory-Dobschütz list. It was brought to America in 1916 from Janina, the capital of the province of Epirus in northwestern Greece, by Dr. E. C. Despotes, a Chicago dentist. In April, 1931, it was purchased by the University of Chicago.

Only fifty-five folios of the Janina Gospels are now known to be extant. With the exception of some intervening lacunæ it now contains the text of the Gospel of Matthew from 12:41 to the end of the gospel, the chapter list for the Gospel of Mark, and the text of the Gospel of Mark from 1:10 to 7:27, although originally it undoubtedly was a Four Gospels manuscript. The extant folios of the Janina Gospels now measure 21.5 cm. by 16.7 cm., although they were perhaps originally larger as they show evidence of having been trimmed. The text is arranged in two columns of twenty-five lines each. The block of text measures 13.4

[1] Kenneth W. Clark, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Greek New Testament Manuscripts in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937).

cm. by 10.4 cm. Each column of text is 4.9 cm. in width. The total thickness of the manuscript in its present condition is 1.8 cm. The covers have been lost.

Our codex is fairly well supplied with nontextual material, much of which has been designed for the purpose of making the Tetraevangelion more useful. Among such nontextual material which it contains are lectionary equipment, chapter lists, titloi, chapter numbers, Eusebian section numbers, and quire numbers.

There is very little ornamentation to be found in the Janina Gospels. The use of vermilion ink throughout the codex for the purpose of writing the decorative capitals in both the text and the rubrics, the Eusebian section numbers, the chapter numbers, and the titloi, however, does furnish a certain ornamentation for the entire manuscript. One feature which should be mentioned in connection with the decoration of the manuscript is the ornamentation which the scribe attached to certain letters. Quite often when the symbol for *and* (καὶ) stands at the beginning of a line of text, or in the bottom line of text, he extended its "tail" until it reached the edge of the parchment. In the centre of this "tail," he placed a decoration consisting of two very short lines, at right angles to the "tail," between which was a small diamond. A short line was also often used by the scribe to ornament his deltas, epsilons, zetas, and taus.

The scribe who wrote the Janina Gospels wrote an attractive minuscule, semicursive hand. It is very seldom that more than three or four letters are found linked together. The letters are pendent from the ruling line. The script is firm and clear, and it is extremely legible.

There is absolutely no doubt that the Janina Gospels was written by the same scribe who wrote the Tetraevangelion known as Sinai 157 (Gregory 1194). A careful study of the script of both manuscripts has proven this. A colophon at the end of the Sinai codex indicates that that manuscript was written on the island of Patmos by one who signed himself "John a Monk" for Theoktistos, the abbot of the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist. The Theoktistos for whom the manuscript was written was abbot of the monastery from 1128 to 1157. We are, thus, able not only to date within fairly narrow limits the Janina Gospels but also Sinai 157 as well. Both manuscripts must have been written in the middle third of the twelfth century. Sinai 157 has been known to scholars for many years, but it has been erroneously assigned by Gardthausen to the tenth century and by Gregory to the tenth or the eleventh century. Professor W. H. P. Hatch, however, on the basis of palæographical evidence, correctly assigned it to the twelfth century.[2] Someone who also signed himself "John a

[2] W. H. P. Hatch, *The Greek Manuscripts of the New Testament at Mount Sinai* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1932), Plate XXXII.

Monk" wrote the will of Theoktistos. This will is now in Florence, Italy, and it is, of course, because of the present war, impossible to secure a photograph of it in order to determine whether or not the handwriting is the same as that of the Janina Gospels and of Sinai 157. We feel, however, that we are safe in assuming that the last will and testament of Theoktistos was written by the same scribe who wrote the Janina Gospels and Sinai 157.

An analysis of the text of the Janina Gospels shows it to be a very good example of von Soden's I φ^{r} group. It is interesting to note that Sinai 157, which, as we have already seen, was written by the same scribe who wrote our codex, is cited by von Soden as one of the best examples of this particular type of text. In spite of this close similarity in type of text, however, and in spite of the fact that both manuscripts were written by the same scribe, they are not identical, that is, they were not copied from the same exemplar.

By being able to place the period of our scribe's activity in the middle third of the twelfth century, we find ourselves within considerably less than a hundred years of the founding of the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist. Christodoulos, the founder of the monastery, so dominated the scene, not only during his lifetime but even after his death, that the story of his life is almost the story of the monastery.[3]

Christodoulos was born in the year 1020 in a little village near Nicæa, and at an early age his education was entrusted to a priest. As soon as the boy learned to read, he applied himself to his studies with a fervent passion. It is said that even as a youth he had no other dream than to serve Christ. At the age of twenty he retired to a monastery on Mount Olympia in Bithynia and there gave himself over to a most rigorous asceticism. At the end of three years, his humility had gained for him the name by which he is known to history, Christodoulos, Slave of Christ.

Christodoulos, however, was not destined to spend his life in the quiet of a mountain retreat. Before he was twenty-five a visit to Rome had resulted in his becoming a soldier of the church militant. The next few years saw him flee for his life before the advancing Turks, not once, but several times. At one time, he was archimandrite of the Monastery of Saint Paul on Mount Latros; at another time, he was abbot of the Kabaloures; at still another time, he was the head of a monastery on Mount Pile on the island of Cos.

Eventually, Christodoulos made his way to Constantinople and peti-

[3] Probably the best sources of information in regard to both the life of Christodoulos and the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist are: Edouard Le Barbier, *Saint Christodule et la Reforme des Couvents Grecs au XI^e* (Paris, Firmin Didst Frères, Fils et Compagnie, 1863); Charles Diehl, "Le trésor et la bibliothèque de Patmos au commencement du 13^e siècle," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, I (1892), pp. 488-525; Franciscus Miklosich and Josephus Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Græca Ævi Sacra et Profana* (Vindobanæ: Carolus Gerold, 1890), VI.

tioned the emperor to assign to him some new territory in exchange for those lands which he had accumulated. He pointed out that to live the ascetic life had become impossible on Cos and that an uninhabited and inaccessible island would be more desirable. When Christodoulos spoke of an uninhabited island, he had in mind the island of Patmos, whose chief wealth was the memory of John, the author of the Apocalypse. At length, the emperor, Alexis, urged to do so by his mother, accorded the island of Patmos to Christodoulos.

The ownership of an entire island, however, was not enough for Christodoulos. He wished to be an independent and absolute sovereign. He wished to found, not only a monastery, but an independent state which would be reserved exclusively for those who would pledge themselves to abide by the rules which he would lay down. It was necessary that this independent state should be detached completely from the empire in order that it should not be dependent upon anyone for its religious life, its social life, or its political life. It was necessary that not even the patriarch of Constantinople himself should be able to challenge the decrees of Christodoulos. In the month of April, 1088, Alexis, declared that

> Patmos shall be, from today, for ever and ever, entirely separate from the territory under our imperial power and laws. . . . It belongs to the monks, entirely, without any charge, in complete ownership and in complete sovereignty, inviolably, eternally. . . . They do not have to render an account to any person. . . . Free, independent, the monastery is self-governing, under the rule of Christodoulos, and neither the monastery, nor its dependencies, nor the island itself shall ever be subjct to the imperial authority.[4]

Fortified with this decree from the emperor, Christodoulos left Constantinople with a colony of workmen. In addition to the emperor's *golden bull,* he had taken care to secure a mandamus from the patriarch which declared that his proposed monastery should be independent of the bishops.

Patmos was uninhabited in 1088, although some ruins and some inscriptions bore witness to an ancient population which had dwelt upon its mountains. In the centre of the southern half of the island is the Mountain of Saint John. On the north side of this mountain is the Cave of the Apocalypse in which John is said to have received his vision and in which our scribe, John a Monk, says he wrote Sinai 157. It was on this mountain that Christodoulos determined to build. A more unpromising location for the establishment of a monastery cannot be imagined. A description of Patmos which was made by the imperial commissioner who was charged with handing the island over to Christodoulos reads:

[4] Franciscus Miklosich and Josephus Müller, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 45.

Having completely covered the island of Patmos, we have found it to be uninhabited, uncultivated, covered with an impenetrable growth of brambles and thorns, and entirely arid because of a lack of water. On the entire island we have not found any running water or springs; there are only a few shallow wells which, more often than not, fail to give enough water . . . to make possible the cultivation of even a few acres of land. Even these few acres of cultivable land are hidden away and, as it were, almost choked among the mountains. All of the rest of the island is a rough, mountainous, impassible country. Scarcely more than one-quarter of the cultivable land is capable of being worked with a plow. All of the rest of it must be worked with the mattock and the grubbing-axe, and irrigated with the sweat and blood of the cultivator; it is little more than stones and abrupt mountain slopes. We have not seen the slightest trace of either cultivated or wild trees with the exception of about a score of dead pear trees. We have not seen a single building except a poor private chapel which was erected to the memory of Saint John on the spot where he is said to have seen the visions and to have performed marvelous miracles.[5]

To transport a colony to Patmos was to transport it to a field of battle. Both monks and workmen were forced to struggle against nature and to labor every day in order to gain food and shelter. We can well understand why they longed to return to the peacefulness of their former homes. The soul of Christodoulos was, more than once, grieved by their complaints. At its best, life on the island was dreary. Storms beat constantly over its bare rocks. Constantinople and its taverns were far away. The workmen longed for their wives and for their families; the monks longed for the pleasant hills and meadows of Anatolia. They conspired together to leave the island and to abandon their leader.

When Christodoulos heard of this impending danger, he reproached the conspirators for their inconstancy. The monks were soon appeased when he began to share all of their dangers and all of their sufferings. By the sheer force of his example he regained their loyalty. They did not dare to betray the thin old man who carried stones and lime all day and who prayed all night. The loyalty of the workmen, however, was not so easily regained. Their desire to be with their wives and their children triumphed over their admiration for their aged leader. Christodoulos was obliged to lift the ban which prohibited women from stepping foot upon the island. He consoled himself by assigning a fixed territory to them in the northern part of the island at the most distant point from the monastery. During five days of the week the laborers had to work and to live on the half of the island which was set aside as holy ground. During that time they could not even so much as see their families. From Friday night until Monday morning they were permitted to live with their wives.

In a short time the half of the island which was reserved for the workmen and their families became the most prosperous part of Patmos. The women spun their wool, tilled their gardens, and cared for their

[6] *Ibid.*

homes; the children guarded the pigs and the goats; and, the men, during the two days allowed to them, cleared the land and built and planted. Soon a prosperous little village had grown up.

It was only because of the concessions which Christodoulos made to the workmen that the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist was built and the island of Patmos colonized. The arrival of the women and the children, however, at first, greatly increased the amount of money necessary for the support of the monastery. His income was not sufficient to meet the needs of the people, and Christodoulos was forced to appeal to the emperor for aid. In response to his plea, the emperor returned the Kabaloures and the monastery on Mount Pile to him. In addition, he gave him the little island of Pharmacon, the metochion of Stylon on the island of Crete, and a mill, vineyards, fields, and serfs on the island of Lemnos. All of these possessions enjoyed the same privileges as did Patmos. The governors of the territories which were given to Christodoulos were no longer able to collect taxes on them or to avail themselves of the services of the serfs. Thus, we see Christodoulos invested with all of the rights of a feudal lord without having to bear any of the responsibilities of that position. He paid no taxes, and neither his monks nor his serfs had to bear arms.

During the five years from 1088 to 1093, Christodoulos continued to enlarge and to fortify the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist. It rapidly became the most renowned monastery in the archipelago. Tradition tells us that God completed that which man had begun. One day, in a small valley, a spring gushed forth at the command of Christodoulos, and the citron trees blossomed. On another day, when the inhabitants of the neighboring islands were in desperate need of bread, they went to Patmos to ask for aid. Suddenly, on an island that did not produce a single head of wheat, there was found enough bread to feed all of the people. Such miracles were said to have been repeated more than once, with the result that the monastery was better provisioned than any other place in the empire.

When Alexis Comnenus advanced to the west against the Bohemians, the Seljuk Turks, finding the east unprotected, began to pour into all parts of the empire. They descended upon the archipelago and pillaged the islands. Fear overcame the monks of Patmos, and once again Christodoulos thought that they must flee for their lives. They carried away their treasures and left their serfs to the mercy of the Turks.

Christodoulos and eighty of his monks found refuge in Eubœa with a certain Eumathios who gave them food and clothing and shelter. After the caloyers had left the island of Patmos, it did not contain more than a dozen families, but not one of them fled. The men stayed to fight for

their homes and for their familes; the women stayed to protect the land on which but five years before they had not been thought worthy to stand.

Yet in the end it was not the Turks but the government officials who invaded Patmos. Profiting by the absence of Christodoulos, they forced each family on the island either to provide one soldier for the army or to pay the wages of one soldier. In April, 1094, however, Christodoulos succeeded in getting Christophoros Magistros to exempt the residents of Patmos from military service.

Christodoulos, by this time overcome by his advanced age and by his constant struggle against the Empire and against his own monks, felt that he was nearing the end of his life. He had given way to complete despair at having been forced to abandon Patmos. He talked constantly of returning to his beloved island, but his monks always found ways of delaying the journey. By the year 1100 he realized that never again would he be able to return to Patmos. He hastened, therefore, to give to Sabbas, one of his most devoted followers, many of the powers which normally resided in the abbot. He gave him his books and the right to dispose of the revenues of the monastery. Eleven months later, in the year 1101, Christodoulos died. His last thoughts were for Patmos. With his last words, he urged the monks to return to the island, and he implored them to take his body with them.

The last wishes of the aged man were fulfilled. The monks returned to Patmos. The residents of Eubœa, however, refused to allow the body of Christodoulos to be moved. At the end of a year the monks from Patmos descended upon Eubœa at night, recaptured the body of their former leader, and took it to the island.

Immediately upon their return to Patmos, the monks had replaced Sabbas with an abbot of their own choice. He was Joseph the Jasite. The world with all of its vanities and its temptations did not inspire the same horror in Joseph the Jasite that it had in Christodoulos. Eventually the restricted zone on the island disappeared; gradually the layman was allowed to approach the Mountain of Saint John. The women and the children followed the men to the monastery itself. By this time many of the monks were from families which lived upon the island. They were glad to have their friends and their relatives visit them and to receive the preserves, the soups, the oil, and the spices which they brought.

The ascetic life which had been counseled by Christodoulos became more and more distasteful to the monks of Patmos. The refectory became intolerable. At last, the abbot was forced to distribute among the monks the sums that were reserved for the common table. Each ate what he wished and when he wished. From that time on, the monks were anxious that their number should diminish in order that each might receive a

larger allotment for food and have larger living quarters. A kitchen and a dining room were necessary for each man. Young boys who aspired to the diaconate served the monks as cupbearers and as cooks.

The rule of the monastery had forbidden the ownership of any private property, but the rule had been written for a desert and not for a prosperous village like that on Patmos. The monks felt that they should not be dressed as beggars when they were seen by the laity. God had ordained them to assist in the holy offices and to keep the fasts but not to wear coarse, ill-fitting clothes. Accordingly, robes of blue- and green- and rose-colored silk replaced their rough garments.

Less than a half century after the death of Christodoulos, during the reign of Manuel Comnenus, two parties were formed in the monastery. One party, that of Bishop Icaria, supported the abbot Theoktistos. This Theoktistos, it is to be remembered, is the abbot for whom Sinai 157 was written and during whose term of office the Janina Gospels was probably written. The other party in the monastery was that of the patriarch. The bishop's party was the stronger. He obtained from the abbot Theoktistos the written promise that his name would be mentioned in the liturgy in place of that of the patriarch and that the seat of honor in the church would be reserved for him. The power of this party lasted until the death of Theoktistos.

When Theoktistos died, the members of the opposing party went to Constantinople to plead before the emperor. They showed him the *golden bull* which had guaranteed the independence of the monastery. In 1159, the emperor confirmed again its independence. Once more the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist prospered, and by the end of the twelfth century, under the abbot Arsenios it supported about one hundred fifty monks.

Contrary to many of the Byzantine ascetics, Christodoulos seems to have had a strong sense of the importance of literary activity. In the rules which he laid down for the guidance of the monks,[6] he had written, "If anyone is capable in the art of writing, he is bound, with the authorization of the abbot, to exercise the talents with which nature has endowed him." It is perfectly possible, therefore, that the scribe who signed himself "John a Monk" did not write Sinai 157 to be the personal property of Theoktistos. When he said that he had written the manuscript for the abbot, he may have meant that he was writing with the authorization of the abbot.

Christodoulos upheld the rule which he had formulated by his own example. While on Mount Latros, he had collected a large library. So much value did he attach to this collection of books that when the Turkish

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-80.

invasion menaced the safety of the monastery, his first thought was for his precious manuscripts. "In fleeing," says a note on one of the Latros manuscripts, "he carried away with him all of the books which he was able."[7] Christodoulos himself told of the work it was to get all of the volumes transported to Cos and then later to Constantinople, and then he added, "If I had not acted in this way, all of these books would have been destroyed."[8]

When Christodoulos founded the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist, he demanded of the emperor and of the patriarch that they give him a part of the Latros manuscripts which he had saved. He succeeded, thus, in obtaining about one-fourth of the Latros collection. With these volumes as a nucleus he soon increased the size of his new library. Throughout his life he watched over these volumes with a passionate devotion. When he was forced to flee from Patmos and to go to Eubœa, he once again took his books with him. During the last days of his life, when completely occupied with measures to assure the future of the monastery, his books were one of his chief concerns. No precaution seemed to him to be superfluous as he strove to guarantee their preservation. He had a catalogue made of all of them and at the end of it, by his own hand, he assigned them to the care of Sabbas in order that not even one book might be lost. He prohibited future heads of the monastery from ever parting with any volume of the collection. In order to guarantee that Latros should never recover any of the books which he had gotten from there, he wrote:

> If ever anyone attempts, in the name of the Monastery of Stylos or of any other monastery of Latros, to claim back any of the books which were given to me by the very holy patriarch, let there be no recognition of his demand, and let there be called down upon him the curse of the three hundred and eighteen holy fathers and my curse.[9]

In his last will, Christodoulos bequeathed his manuscripts to the monastery "in order that they might remain eternally in this monastery on Patmos."[10]

The successors of Christodoulos were no less anxious to enrich the library of their monastery than he had been. Some of them, such as Joseph the Jasite (1101-1128), collected many valuable manuscripts. When he died, he left all of them to the monastery. Arsenios, who was abbot of the monastery from about 1188 to about 1201, copied several books with his own hand, and many of the monks followed his example.

At the end of the twelfth century gifts of books flowed into the monastery. They came from Rhodes, from Chios, from Crete, and from

[7] Henri Omont, "Note sur un ms. grec du mont Latros," *Revue des Études grecques*, I, pp. 337.

[8] Franciscus Miklosich and Josephus Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

many other places. Those who gave the books to the monastery, as the subscriptions in some of the manuscripts still preserved in the library attest, believed that in making the gifts they were doing a charitable work and that they were, thus, assuring their own eternal salvation. They did not spare any expense that the books might be beautiful and that they might lend prestige to the monastery. The subscription in one manuscript which was copied and presented to the library by a monk from Rhodes gives us an idea of the literary activity in the monastery at this time. This humble monk wrote:

> I have consecrated this book to the holy and venerable monastery of Patmos, not that the monastery does not possess any like it. Such a thought be far from me! What monastery includes more learned men and holy calligraphers than the monastery of the Theologian?[11]

We know that the Patmos library was an important one by the year 1201. The *Catalogue*[12] which was made in that year lists 267 parchment manuscripts and 63 paper manuscripts, a total of 330 volumes. Liturgical books and the writings of the Fathers occupy a preponderant place among them.

In the years which have intervened since the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, this great library has been sadly depleted of its most ancient treasures. The *Catalogue* of 1355, for example, already listed many precious volumes as being badly damaged. A heart-breaking carelessness on the part of the monks has been a major factor in the loss of these priceless volumes. A second major source of loss to the library undoubtedly was the many loans which it made. In the thirteenth century its books were loaned quite liberally. In the margins of the *Catalogue* of 1201 and on its verso there are many notations which indicate that certain books had been loaned to other monasteries. Among the many borrowers from the library were two monasteries which seem to have been treated with special favor. They were the metochia of Pyrgos and Cos. Pyrgos borrowed eleven volumes at one time, and Cos ten. In both cases, the volumes which were borrowed formed almost a complete set of the liturgical books which were necessary for the celebration of the divine office. Loans were also made to the metochia of Leros, Saint George, Saint Panteleimon, and Saint Nicetas. The monasteries of Saint Mercurios and of Saint Paul of Latros also borrowed from Patmos. It is to be remembered that it was the Latros monastery from which Christodoulos received so many books for his Patmos library. Not only were books loaned to Latros, however, but sometimes, in spite of the injunction of Christodoulos, certain manuscripts were given to it by way of restitution. The monks of

[11] John Sakkelion, Πατμιακὴ Βιβλιοθήκη (Athens: Alexander Papageorgios, 1890), p. 95.
[12] Published by Charles Diehl, *op. cit.*, pp. 511-525.

Strobelos, the anchorites of Kalymnos, and the clergy of Samos were also listed among the borrowers from Patmos. Even private individuals who were related to the monks or whose positions were such as to recommend them were granted library privileges. There is one case of a book having been sent as far as Crete to the father of one of the monks.

Through the centuries the fortunes of the Patmos Library have varied with those of the monastery itself. It was exposed to attack and to plunder by the Turks, by the pirates, and by the Venetians. It has never ceased, however, to receive an almost constant stream of gifts, until today—or at least at the outbreak of the Second World War—it contains nearly 800 volumes. Many of these, to be sure, are of a very recent date.

From what we have said, it is evident that the Monastery of Saint John the Evangelist merits a very considerable place in the literary history of the East, particularly during the Middle Ages. On the coasts of Greek Anatolia and on the islands of the archipelago, the monks of Patmos kept alive for several centuries the last rays of intellectual life. For monasteries and small villages alike, the monastery of Patmos was not only a religious centre, it was a centre of learning and of culture as well.

CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW WORLD

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PART II

CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

THERE is no more essential characteristic of Christianity than its universality. This universality is present in principle in the ministry and teaching of Jesus. One has only to think of the parable of the Good Samaritan, or of his healing of the daughter of the Syrophœnician woman, or of his praise of the faith of the Roman centurion to see that Jesus' gospel of the kingdom is not a nationalistic matter. In connection with the healing of the centurion's servant we find him saying: "Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven: but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast forth into the outer darkness."[1] It also was in keeping with his welcoming of the disinherited classes among his own people into the kingdom that he should regard its doors as being open to Samaritan and Roman and "many from the east and the west."

It is, of course, with the apostle Paul and the gentile mission that the universality of Christianity becomes fully explicit. When the apostle declares: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith working through love," he discards all particularistic conditions of salvation and sets forth its inward and universal principle. And when he also says that in the Christian life "there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman," he gives the Christian charter for the essential unity and equality of mankind. There can be no doubt whatever that Christianity contains the spiritual basis for an international order which transcends nationalism and seeks to secure the coöperative unity of all men.

But as we take up this problem of a new international order in the midst of the tragedy of a world war there is another characteristic of Christianity which we need to have explicitly in our thought, for it is the profoundest one of all. It is the heart of Christianity that it brings a gospel of redemption to an afflicted and sinful world. Our sorest afflictions spring from international war, breaking out with increasing frequency on a world-wide scale and always threatening us in the intervals between actual conflicts. Our gravest sins are these dispositions of heart and will, collective but also always personal, which are the underlying causes of war. We

[1] Matt. 8: 11, 12.

need to see in the Christian gospel a way of redemption from these sorest afflictions and gravest sins.

One of the first fruits of bringing redemptive Christianity to bear upon the international problem will be a deepening of our sense of sin for the present world chaos. Let me quote again from Professor John Bennett's article, "Revolution or Counter-Revolution," to which I referred in the preceding chapter. Speaking of the responsibility of the church in America in the midst of the present struggle, he says: "It must preserve national humility by helping people to see the immediate conflict against the background of the sins and failures common to a whole civilization." And he well remarks: "The spectacular character of the incident which was the occasion of America's entry into the war obscures this background." And then he adds: "The Christian knows that, whatever the circumstances, he must first see the sin in himself and in his own nation, and he knows that there is no nation of men who are different in their essential nature from himself."[2]

But Christianity in its redemptive meaning not only deepens our sense of sinfulness, personal and national, in respect to the causes which lie behind this war; it also opens to us the ultimate way of salvation from this sinfulness and the terrible evils which it brings upon the world. That way is the one which Christ established through his ministry and his death on the cross. It is the way of sacrificial love going forth for the restoration and new realization of brotherhood among men. The Christian gospel of salvation is not fundamentally different in its message to the nations and people of the earth from what it is in its message to individuals. We know that according to Jesus' teaching God's forgiveness of our sins only accomplishes its divine work as we become forgiving towards others. We know that in the thought of Paul God both "reconciled us to himself through Christ and gave unto us the ministry of reconciliation."[3] So God's forgiveness of our personal and collective sins against brotherhood takes effect in us as we are constrained by the love of Christ to give ourselves sacrificially for the restoration of brotherhood where it has been broken down and for its extension throughout the world.

This redemptive meaning of Christianity should be seen as being closely interrelated with its creative meaning, which we were stressing at the close of the preceding chapter, if we would approach rightly our theme of Christianity and a new international order. In truth the interrelation of the two meanings is no less important for the Christian view of the problems of our internal social order. But there is a peculiar poignancy in our need to

[2] John Bennett, "Revolution or Counter-Revolution," in *Christian Century*, Feb. 18, 1942, p. 211.

[3] II Cor. 5: 18.

apprehend Christianity as both redemptive and creative now that we are in the midst of the agony of a world war and at the same time are turning our thought toward the problem of winning the peace. For there is a most urgent need for Christian inspiration to new thinking and constructive effort in respect to the political and social aspects of our international problem; and there is a no less urgent need for Christian sacrificial love going forth to restore the broken bonds of human brotherhood and to establish those bonds where they never have been realized at all.

It is indeed remarkable how many of the thoughtful studies that are being made today of the political conditions of a better world order also affirm that there is little hope for the success of their plans unless there is enough of that good will among the peoples which it is the province of religion to develop. It is here that the Christian gospel of salvation has a profound new application. We may voice that gospel in the closing words of the *Benedictus*, extending their meaning to our time and our deepest need: Once again Christ, "the day-spring from on high shall visit us, to shine upon them that sit in darkness and the shadow of death; to guide our feet into the way of peace."

In seeking to develop our thought concerning the international problem let us consider the relation between Christianity, redemptive and creative, and certain of the causes of war. The foremost political cause of war is undoubtedly the doctrine of national sovereignty. That doctrine is "that the state is an end in itself and owes allegiance to no law other than that of its own best interests." This is the principle laid down by Machiavelli, who declared: "When the entire safety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that course alone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and maintains its independence."[4]

This principle of irresponsible national sovereignty has been dominant down to the present time, with both monarchies and democracies. The Shotwell-Neilson Commission writes: "A sovereign state, at the present time, claims the power to judge its own controversies, to enforce its own conception of its rights, to increase its armaments without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such regulations upon its neighbors."[5]

The emotional and practical effect of this doctrine, operating cumulatively through several centuries, has been to elevate patriotic nationalism into a religion. Says John Herman Randall, Jr.: "Whatever its origin and ultimate value, patriotism is beyond doubt the most widespread social

[4] Quoted by John Herman Randall, Jr., in *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 195.
[5] Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Preliminary Report*, November, 1940, p. 11.

ideal of the day; it is the modern religion, far stronger than mere Christianity in any of its forms, and to its tribal gods men give supreme allegiance. Nationalism is almost the one idea for which masses of men will still die."[6] It has remained for national socialism in Germany to set up nationalism officially as a religion in defiance of Christianity. But if Christians in other lands are effectively to resist the principles of national socialism, they must make it plain, as the Confessional Church in Germany has done, that they give to God as revealed in Christ, and not to the state, their supreme allegiance.

There is, then, an inherent contradiction between Christianity and the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty. This is something which received official recognition at the Oxford Conference in 1937. The section of the Conference which had as its subject of study "The Universal Church and the World of Nations" wrote in its report: "The Church should remind its members that the principle of the unconditional supremacy of the State or nation, advanced either in time of peace or war, is incompatible with the Church's faith in Jesus Christ as its only Lord, and is therefore unacceptable as the final word of judgment or action."[7] Again this report said: "So far as the present evil (*i.e.*, power as the ultimate arbiter between states) is political the heart of it is to be found in the claim of each national State to be judge in its own cause. The abandonment of that claim, and the abrogation of absolute national sovereignty, at least to that extent, is a duty that the Church should urge upon the nations."[8]

The contradiction between absolute national sovereignty and Christianity, thus fully and officially recognized, is, however, one that has been tolerated, or overlooked and forgotten, by Western Christianity since the break-up of the mediæval system. And nowhere has it been more complacently ignored than in the United States. A great task of education lies ahead of us if we we are to bring home to our people the unchristian character of this doctrine, which so fatally frustrates all effort to realize a world brotherhood.

But along with the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty as a cause of war must be ranged another and perhaps even greater one. This second cause of war is international economic injustice. It is manifold in its workings but it may be exemplified by naming three of its typical forms: monopoly of natural resources, high tariff walls, and the exploitation of backward peoples by the more advanced nations. Concerning the first of the forms of international economic injustice I wish to quote from the "Remarks of the Honorable Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, at

[6] J. H. Randall, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 630.
[7] Oxford Conference, *Official Report*, p. 166.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

the laying of the Cornerstone of the New Wing of the Norwegian Legation in Washington," July, 1941: "No peace which may be made in the future would be valid or lasting unless it established fully and adequately the natural rights of all peoples to equal economic enjoyment. So long as any one people or any one government possesses a monopoly over natural resources or raw materials which are needed by all peoples, there can be no basis for a world order based on justice and on peace." At the moment when the United States itself is being cut off from necessary raw materials by war it is not difficult for us to see the injustice involved; but the case is not essentially different when such materials are denied to a country simply by the exercise of the sovereign authority of another country.

With respect to high tariff walls, we have only to recall those erected by the United States after the First World War, and the part they played in bringing on the great depression and consequently the Second World War, to realize the economic injustice and havoc they can produce. For a country to acquiesce in the exaction of reparations of astronomical unpayable amounts; to expect the repayment of war loans made to her allies which in turn depended in part on the payment of the reparations; to lend to the vanquished country huge sums of money; and then to boost her tariff walls to a record-breaking height—that is the kind of inebriate policy which would seem to be possible only when a people's nerve centres had been debauched by war and by a subsequent artificial boom period. But that is what the United States did. I remember that during that boom period financial leaders told us that we had at last found our way into a "permanently expanding economy." Unfortunately for that discovery the expansion ended in the explosion of October, 1929. If we obey the injunction already quoted, that the Christian should see first the sin in himself and in his own nation, we can hardly help acknowledging that our sin in contributing to the causes of this war is very great.

Mr. Eugene Staley, writing on "The Economic Organization of Peace," puts the matter in more general terms. He says: "If the large, well-endowed political units, like the United States, build economic walls around themselves and decide to go in for self-sufficiency or even for a minimum of foreign trade, they are not merely renouncing the advantages of trade for themselves. *They are renouncing trade for other peoples, too.* The big country, giving up opportunities for two-way trade that it may be led to regard as unimportant, is depriving the small or middle-sized country of a necessity."[9] It is quite evident that the ideal of economic self-sufficiency for a nation is itself a product of the fear of war; and it is equally evident that when put in practice it becomes one of the causes of war.

[9] *International Conciliation,* April, 1941, No. 369; containing Commission to Study the Organization of Peace: *Preliminary Report and Monographs.*

The third of the forms of international economic injustice which I mentioned is that of the exploitation of backward peoples by the more advanced nations. There can be little doubt that the colonial policies of the Western nations, and more recently of Japan, have been to a very large extent policies of exploitation at the expense of the native inhabitants. And we are fully aware that the struggle to gain colonies, or to keep hold of colonies already gained, was one of the potent causes of both the First and the Second World Wars. Italy's interim war for a colonial empire is a matter of all too recent memory. It is palpable, too, that the system of mandates under the League of Nations so far broke down as in many instances to render the mandated territories practically colonies of the nations holding the mandates.

Concerning this problem and its remedy let me quote from the message of The National Study Conference on the Churches and the International Situation, sent out in 1940:

> The task of colonial government is no longer one of exclusive national concern or national interest, but . . . must be regarded as a common task of mankind to be carried out in the interests of the colonial people by the most appropriate form of organization. We believe that the principle of eventual freedom for all peoples is not only the recognition of an essential right, but is also a prerequisite to the creation of that sense of justice and good will without which we cannot hope to rid the world of war.

Another of the major causes of war with which Christians are deeply concerned we had under consideration in its domestic aspects in the first chapter. It is the unsolved problem of unemployment. The existence of millions of unemployed over long periods of time in our great industrial countries is the most obvious, and perhaps the heaviest, charge against the capitalistic system. So long as that problem remains unsolved the capitalistic system is essentially bankrupt. By limiting output and creating an economy of scarcity, so as to keep up prices and profits, it throws more and more men out of employment and thereby diminishes the purchasing power of the nation and consequently sets going the downward spiral of depression.

But what we need to emphasize at this point is the extent to which unemployment becomes an international problem. In peacetime the world's economic life, in spite of all the efforts of nations for self-sufficiency, is one closely interrelated system. A serious dislocation anywhere may produce disastrous consequences everywhere. There is no doubt that unemployment and depression in the United States after 1929 greatly aggravated unemployment in Germany, and thus helped to give Hitler the chance to establish his one real claim to credit as a ruler, that of having solved the problem of unemployment in his own land—though this was done only by

his armament-building program. And in our own country unemployment remained a grave problem until it was temporarily removed by our defense effort and our involvement in the war.

The fact that unemployment with its social consequences is an international danger is recognized by responsible leaders of thought. Says Miss Helen Hill, executive secretary of the National Policy Committee, Washington, D. C.: "The current war is in part a world revolution against want in the midst of plenty."[10] Let me also quote again from the National Study Conference which I cited a moment ago. Its message to the churches includes the following: "We recognize that the close causal relationship existing between unemployment, dire economic need and war is both of domestic and international significance. We, therefore, express the conviction that the Church in its efforts to abolish war, should stress all effective means, both domestic and international, whereby basic economic needs may be met and a more equitable distribution of economic goods achieved."[11]

One more of the major causes of war should engage our attention, even though all too briefly, and that is, the enmity which springs from race-feeling. I speak of *race-feeling* rather than *differences of race;* for the differences of race of which the ethnologist treats are only relative and do not form real barriers between the various branches of the one human race. But as Arnold J. Toynbee has shown, "race-feeling is unscientific and uninformed," and yet "it is a very real factor in social psychology." It is mainly a defensive attitude which a social group assumes towards rival groups and which strengthens itself by appealing to very various objective factors. Sometimes it is language which is taken as the objective factor, as when we speak of the Latin or the Slavic race. Sometimes it is pigmentation of the skin, as when we speak of the yellow race, and perhaps begin to talk again of the "yellow peril." Sometimes it is national aspiration which is the chief basis for the term, as when we speak of the Nordic race.

Now, as Toynbee remarks, "Christianity in its origin was the antithesis of race-feeling." And he adds: "The Latin Church of the Middle Ages, with its common ecclesiastical organization, common culture-language, and common outlook on life, overrode race feeling triumphantly."[12] It was along with the rise of modern nationalism that the recrudescence of race-feeling in Europe took place. And yet this development is wholly at variance with that other product of the modern spirit, the growth of democracy. To quote Toynbee again: "Nationality and democracy are

[10] Helen Hill, "Planning the War for Peace" in *Virginia Quarterly,* Winter, 1942.
[11] *Op. cit.,* p. 16.
[12] Article "Race," in Hastings, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.*

really opposite tendencies—the one toward race-feeling and the other away from it—and one of the two must have the mastery in the end."

There is no doubt that race-feeling is one of the most potent causes of the present world war. It is used by Hitler to stimulate the German people to support his colossal campaigns of aggression and is heightened to the point of making devotion to race a religion. And this is a point at which, in a different connection, the United States is also guilty. For it should not be forgotten that our Japanese Exclusion Act has played a provocative part in bringing the United States and Japan into war with each other.

Indeed the danger is very great that this present war may so heighten race-feeling that the victory of the democratic powers may not prove to be a victory for democracy itself. Our educational leaders are aware of this danger. At the meeting of the American Association of School Administrators in San Francisco last year, Mr. James Marshall, president of the Board of Education of New York City, urged that in winning the war we should not forget about winning the peace, and then went on to say:

> Let us declare that it is not a hegemony of the English-speaking world for which we battle. Let us be clear that this is no war against "a yellow peril." These are the suggestions of the devil, for they belie the democratic principle of equality. They carry the seed of the old imperialisms and are part of the brew from which this day has come; for "the yellow peril" finds its parallel in "Asia for the Asiatics," and world domination by the English-speaking people is a mere paraphrase of Hitler's world dominance by "the Aryan master race." Let us proclaim that there is to be no subjugated race, no militant nationalism and no exploitation of the wealth and lives of others. Let us dedicate ourselves to the proposition that the peace after the war must be largely education and reëducation of peoples who have not had their integrity respected. Let us dedicate ourselves to respect the integrity of ourselves, of others.[13]

If educational leaders are thus alive to the dangers of intensified race-feeling at this time, leaders in the Christian church should be no less so. Indeed, it is an unmistakable, though exceedingly difficult, task for Christianity to conquer this recrudescence of race-feeling among modern peoples, and to win them back to that universalism and feeling of unity between all men which is of the very essence of the Christian faith.

Now with respect to all these causes of war of which we have been thinking—the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, international economic injustice, unemployment on an international scale, and the recrudescence of race-feeling—we should pronounce a judgment similar to that of Justice Brandeis upon the business practice which was destructive of good citizenship: they are sinful. They resist the eternal purpose of God to sum up all things in Christ. They defeat the realization of human brotherhood. The judgment of God is falling upon them in condemnation. If

[13] Reported in the New York *Times*, February 27, 1942.

Christianity is concerned to secure a new and better international order, it must go forth in redemptive effort to rescue mankind from these evils.

But can our thought stop with this obligation of Christians to work and sacrifice for the overcoming of the causes of war? Must Christians not go on to face the more constructive task of the positive organization of peace, even if it take them, as Christians, into the realm of political thought and effort? Let us, then, seek to take a step further by considering, as best we may, the topic of Christianity, redemptive and creative, and the organization of peace.

As their ultimate objective, I would urge, Christians should seek a world government on the federal principle. It is not enough, from the Christian standpoint, simply to seek for á further development of international law. For, notwithstanding the international law that we have had, "Relations between states," as the Oxford Conference declared, "have been and still are carried on chiefly in terms of power"; and "the power-relationship is not merely uncivilized: it is also utterly unchristian."[14] Nor is it enough for nations to submit causes of dispute to commissions of arbitration or to an international court, when they so desire, without having permanently bound themselves so to do. When this is as far as nations will go, the unchristian principle of absolute national sovereignty is still retained.

Authoritative Christian leaders have given expression to the necessity of some form of international political organization. "On December 21, 1940, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Arthur Cardinal Hinsley, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, and Walter H. Armstrong, moderator of the Free Church Federal Council (in England) put forward joint proposals for the consideration of statesmen after the war." One of these proposals declared that "international institutions must be created or recast to insure the loyal and faithful execution of international agreements."[15] The Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches convened an international conference of lay experts and ecumenical leaders in 1939, which in its memorandum affirmed: "It must be made clear to the people of our respective states that if Christian principles of national conduct are to be made effective there must be some form of international organization which will provide the machinery of conference and coöperation."[16]

But our thought should go farther than these preliminary and tentative statements. As the Shotwell-Neilson Commission has said: "Today the issue is not between moderate nationalism and easy-going internationalism,

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 157.
[15] *A Just and Durable Peace*, pp. 25, 26.
[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

but between overpowering militarism and the organization of peace." "The organization of peace," says the report of this commission, "must have back of it the force of a unifying ideal. The sovereignty of the nation-state is no longer adequate. The alternatives are world-empire, achieved by conquest, or some form of association, such as world federation, achieved by consent."[17] The outbreak of the war between Japan and the United Nations and the onward sweep of Japanese conquests have made it more evident than before that the task of organizing peace is a global one. In accordance with this conception of the task I believe that Christians should make a world government on the federal principle their ultimate objective.

The importance of defining an ultimate objective in regard to the problem of a new international order is twofold. On the one hand, it is hardly likely that a definitive peace treaty will follow upon the cessation of hostilities this time as quickly as the Treaty of Versailles followed upon the armistice of 1918. "A period of receivership" must be passed through, and an enormous task of human rehabilitation must be undertaken, before anything like a settled world order can come to pass. A blueprint of such an order can hardly be adopted successfully as an immediate objective. A process of experimentation and growth must take place if a valid and stable world order is to be secured. But all the more important, on the other hand, is a clear, positive formulation now of an ultimate objective. The experimenting should not be done at random, but should take the form of the controlled experiment. The growth cannot be left to so-called natural processes, for then a desire for "return to normalcy" and "business as usual" is likely to predominate, with the same disastrous results as before. The growth must be guided and stimulated by a resolute purpose, widely and intelligently held, and that purpose should be the achievement of a federal world government.

The distinctive feature of the federal principle may be brought out by comparing it with that of the League of Nations. A federation is a union of peoples, whereas the League is an association of governments, in which national sovereignty is jealously guarded by the requirement of unanimous consent for any positive legislation. The contrast between the two principles is exemplified by that between the American colonies under the Articles of Confederation and the United States under the federal constitution.

Mr. Eugene Staley, in a monograph on "The Economic Organization of Peace," has given further definition to the federal principle. I quote:

> The main characteristics of federalism can be grouped under these heads: (1) An agreed division of powers and responsibilities between the government at the center of the whole federal union and the governments of the smaller territorial units that make it up, with each supreme in its own sphere, and each deriving its mandate from

[17] *Op. cit.*, November, 1940, p. 10.

the people; (2) direct representation of the citizens—not merely of their State governments, as in a league or confederation of States—and direct receipt of funds from the citizens—not merely contributions from the States; (3) application of federal law—within the sphere marked out for it, directly to citizens by federal agencies—different again from a league or confederation, which has no "citizens" but only "States members," and which must rely for execution of decisions on action by "States members."

Recognizing, however, that a full-fledged federal government of the whole world cannot be expected in the near future, Mr. Staley adds: "What we need, then, is some workable method of gradual, step-by-step approach toward the ultimate ideal of world federal government;" and as one main feature of this method he recommends "a universal economic and social organization under a revised league of nations, with deliberate emphasis on nascently federal features. The federal emphasis would come through representation of social groups, instead of national governments only, and through . . . federal types of economic coöperation."[18]

There is no doubt that the foregoing emphasis on "economic federalism" is important for securing the desired progress toward political world federation. The applications of federalism to economic matters could be very numerous, and might include international loans to weaker countries through extending the power and resources of the International Bank of Settlement, international control of raw materials in what are now national colonial possessions, and the undertaking of TVA's in various parts of the world under international control. In view of the part which economic rivalries and conflicts play as causes of war the development of international coöperation in economic matters would seem to be a necessity for any better world order.

But to make international economic coöperation workable certain political features of a world federation would prove ultimately to be indispensable and should be developed as rapidly as it can be done effectively. Among these may be specified: an international court with adequate authority; an executive department, perhaps after the Swiss pattern, being composed of several men of great eminence and political experience; a legislative department which could shape and expand international law to meet new conditions; and a police force under international authority which could replace our present national armaments.

A principle which is often put forward as an alternative to that of world federation is what is known as regionalism. Let nations which naturally have the closest common interests, partly by reason of geographical contiguity, but whose development is throttled, or at least arrested, so long as they are rival sovereignties, come together in economic, and perhaps also in political, unions. Such a union in economic matters

[18] *International Conciliation*, No. 369 (April, 1941), pp. 420, 421.

has already been agreed upon prospectively for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Greece, by their exiled governments in London, with the hope that Hungary and Jugoslavia may be included. Before the outbreak of hostilities in September, 1939, the Scandinavian countries and Holland and Belgium were seeking to act together to prevent war in Europe. Other proposals are a federation of the North Atlantic democracies, an Anglo-French federation, a Danubian federation.

Thinking on a wider scale the Malvern Conference of church leaders, meeting in January, 1941, declared: "Whatever may be the necessities of the period immediately following the war, our aim must be the unification of Europe as a coöperative commonwealth, first in common effort for the satisfaction of general need and secondly in such political institutions as express the common purpose and facilitate its development."[19] Others have put it more tersely, saying, "Europe must federate or perish." Parallel to a federated Europe would be our Pan-American organization which the events of the war are leading us to strengthen. Similar regional organizations may be conceived of as beneficial and practicable in the Far East and the Near East. In favor of such regional federations it may be said that they would be based on greater community of culture and of practical interests, that they are less ambitious and more practicable, and that they do not involve the dangers that may be apprehended from a world-state.

It does not appear necessary, however, to regard regionalism and world federation as rival policies which should be pitted against each other. Rather it would seem that they are indispensable supplements of each other. It is hard to see how regional federations alone could avoid developing into competitive organizations on a grand scale, or even into hostile alliances. A federated Europe, it is true, might remove the chief sources of conflict out of which the two world wars have sprung. But the entrance of Japan into the war has shown how the prospective regional organizations might become a menace to each other; and this danger would increase as the great areas of the world which are now mainly agricultural became industrialized. Moreover, nature has not distributed the raw materials important for industrial nations impartially among the prospective regions. Some over-all political organization of the world will still be needed to coördinate the different nations and regional groups and to bring them into coöperative economic and cultural relations. And we should not forget that in the League of Nations we already have had nearly fifty nations united for consultation and some measure of common action.

At the same time federation may be capable of being achieved more rapidly and more closely in some parts of the world than in others. As

[19] *A Just and Durable Peace*, p. 24.

the Shotwell-Neilson Commission says: "It is hard to see how Europe can emerge from its present catastrophe without sacrificing a greater degree of the sovereignty of its states than would be possible or desirable in other continents."[20] Regionalism, then, should be recognized as a valid principle, but should not be made a substitute for world federation. For, as Aristide Briand is quoted as having said, "There is not one peace for America, one peace for Europe and another for Asia, but one peace for the entire world."[21]

One point of especial difficulty presents itself with regard to a federal world government, and also with regard to regional federations. Should the federation be restricted to those nations which possess democratic institutions, or should the only condition for the inclusion of a nation be that it is there by its own consent? One fundamental advantage of the federal principle is that it provides for a variety of cultures within a comprehensive unity. This variety might well include significant differences in forms of government. In the past the League of Nations has included both Japan and China, and Italy, Germany and Russia, as well as nations possessing quite widely divergent degrees of democracy. In general it has not been the policy of the League to interfere in the domestic affairs of its members. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that a federation could hold together, if some of its members abolished civil liberties and governed their citizens largely through a secret police responsible only to a dictator. And the carrying out of President Roosevelt's "four freedoms" "everywhere in the world" might seem to imply the extension of parliamentary institutions throughout a federated world.

Doubtless some compromise would be needed in the formation of a federation between requiring fully developed free institutions of member states, which would then exclude too many countries and render the federation of little avail for the organization of peace, and on the other hand making no stipulations in regard to the domestic affairs of member states. Such a compromise has been suggested by a professor at the New School of Social Research—formerly a participator in the national socialist regime in Germany, but now in exile. (I quote from a private conversation.) He suggests that for the federation of Europe what is required as a common basis is a minimum bill of rights. This, he thinks, need not include all that is in the American Bill of Rights. For example, complete freedom of the press might not be advisable at the outset, since it might open the door to all sorts of irresponsible agitation. But the minimum would have to secure to the individual the protection of law, so that he would be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and would have the right of free

[20] *Preliminary Report*, p. 13.
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

expression of opinion. Some such minimum bill of rights would need to be guaranteed by the federation, and would open the way for a further growth of freedom and responsibility in each country, and for the shaping of the political institutions of each country according to the genius of its people.

We have been thinking thus far of the obligations of Christians for the removing of the causes of war and the positive organization of peace. But we may well consider also what is the responsibility of the organized Christian church or churches in respect to these great issues. A woman asked me recently, as I was speaking on this subject to a woman's church guild, whether I thought that the church should be represented officially at the table of the peace conference after the war. I felt constrained to say, "No." The church would seek to be the inspirer of as many of the individual members of such a conference as possible, but it should hardly be represented as one "interest group" alongside of other such groups. The church, it is true, is one sociological institution among many in the life of mankind. But it also believes itself to be the bearer of a divine revelation which has supreme significance for all men. That significance, too, as we have been contending, is profoundly relevant to the peace of the world and the question of the kind of international order which can secure that peace. But the faith in the revelation—in one God and Father of all mankind and in one Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ—is one that may and should be shared by men of different political insights and different political responsibilities and affiliations.

Nevertheless the church as a body has a great responsibility for the organization of peace. Many of the most thoughtful discussions of the federation of nations emphasize the importance of developing a new international ethos, without which efforts for economic and political organization on a supranational scale are likely to fail. Webster's dictionary defines *ethos* as "the character, sentiment, or disposition of a community or a people," and as "the spirit which actuates manners and customs." The Oxford Conference declared:

> All law, international as well as national, must be based on a common ethos—that is, a common foundation of moral convictions. To the creation of such a common foundation in moral conviction the Church as a supra-national society with a profound sense of the historical realities, and of the worth of human personality, has a great contribution to make.[22]

In July, 1939, it was my privilege to take part in a study group which met for three days at Bishopthorpe, the residence of the Archbishop of York—now the Archbishop of Canterbury—and which had as its subject,

[22] Oxford Conference, *Official Report*, p. 158.

"the Christian ethos." The group, which consisted of twelve besides the Archbishop who presided, was international in its make-up. The four from America were Dr. Charles Gilkey, of Chicago; Professor Norman Pittenger, of General Theological Seminary; and Professor Reinhold Niebuhr and myself, from Union. The four besides Dr. Temple from Great Britain included Professor John Baillie and Dr. J. H. Oldham. And from the Continent there were one each from Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. This group was one of several which were seeking to continue the work of the Oxford Conference, in a manner similar to the studies which had been made in preparation for that conference. Our group conceived its task to be the working out of a Christian position in reference to the social structure, and it planned to enlist, in a process of continuing study, both professional Christian scholars who should formulate Christian ethical teaching in relevance to our time, and lay specialists who should analyze the present situation in terms of the Christian ethos.

It is not least among the casualties of this world war that undertakings of this kind should be so far checked and inhibited by it. Nevertheless such studies are still being carried on under the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, whose American representatives are Professors John Bennett and Henry Van Dusen. And certainly in this field a very great task lies at the door of the American churches, namely, that of developing in our people the capacity for participating in a genuine international ethos. The Federal Council of Churches has summoned us to this task. In the statement adopted at its biennial meeting in December, 1940, it says: "Let us, as a work of creative faith, begin now to prepare the hearts and minds of Christian people for fair and objective dealing with all international situations. This presupposes a will to coöperate; a willingness to accept, in certain areas, a surrender or pooling of the exclusive perquisites of national sovereignty and a sharing of economic advantages; a learning of the techniques whereby men come to accord through processes other than those of military or economic warfare. These matters must be studied, understood and absorbed into the Christian mind and conscience if we are to work together effectively for a more Christian world order."[23] The entrance of our nation into the war does not in the least diminish the authority of the summons to this work of creative faith.

It is not to be assumed, of course, that the church alone has this responsibility for developing an international ethos. Science and literature and many aspects of culture should bear their part, and the church should recognize the need of such allies in this great cause and should collaborate with them. But the church has a peculiar responsibility for leadership in

[23] *A Just and Durable Peace*, p. 12.

this matter, both because its own spirit and genius are essentially universal, and because through its missionary activity it has actually brought to pass a "world Christian community." This fact, signalized by the truly ecumenical conference at Madras, in 1938, and so impressively set forth in the last chapter of Professor Walter Horton's book, *Can Christianity Save Civilization?* gives the church a unique and supremely important function in developing a common ethos among the nations of the world.

There is one condition, however, that must be met if the church is to have this leadership in developing an international ethos. The church must be independent of the state in organizing its own life and in its preaching and teaching. The teaching of the church, it is true, should include a positive doctrine of the state, as it should of the family. It should inculcate in Christians a recognition of their duties to the state. The church's service to the community is of positive value to the state. But the church's ultimate source of truth and authority is the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and in this source it has a standard both for the criticism and the enlightenment of the state. If the church surrenders its independence to the state, it loses power to serve mankind as a whole. The church cannot be nationalistic in time of war and be effectively international in time of peace.

But the mission of the church in its deepest sense can be fulfilled only through a ministry of reconciliation. The cross of Christ, as the apostle teaches us in the "Ephesian" letter, has slain the enmity between Jew and gentile. "For he is our peace, who made both one, and brake down the middle wall of partition, having abolished in his flesh the enmity . . . that he might create in himself of the two one new man."[24] The cross of Christ, when it accomplishes its work in the hearts of men today, slays the enmity between Anglo-Saxon and German, between American and Japanese, between the white man and the negro.

But this work is not accomplished simply by a profession of faith in the one God, Father of all men, but also by a positive ministry of reconciliation where human brotherhood has been violated. Such a ministry will find expression in organized effort to combat the ravages of hunger, disease, and destitution which have resulted from conquest and the blockade. It will find expression in work for the relief of the refugees whom our own country is producing by deporting our Japanese-American citizens as well as Japanese noncitizens from their homes on the West Coast to some lands east of the Sierras or the Rockies. These refugees have perhaps a too naïve faith in America. "Oh, we'll be all right," said one Japanese woman to an American who had been accustomed to buy at her market; "it isn't as if we were in some countries."[25] This ministry of reconciliation will

[24] Eph. 2: 14, 15.

[25] *Christian Century*, March 18, 1942, p. 364.

work to prevent the growth of hatred and bitterness and to counteract all wholesale condemnation of nations or of racial stocks. And it will seek to reach out, in ways that the Quakers so well understand how to use, across the cleavages that war has made, to bring succour and to restore brotherhood.

The task of building a new international order will require the efforts of all enlightened statesmen in every land and of every creed, and with all such efforts Christians should be unfailingly ready to collaborate. The task will be a long one, stretching beyond the horizon of our present vision, but it is not for that reason to be postponed for a single day. It is a task which involves enormous difficulties; but that the difficulties can be overcome and the task accomplished will not be doubted by those who believe that God is the Lord of history and that his will and his way are revealed to us in Jesus Christ.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

Some misquotations of Scripture are understandable, even if not laudable. The text may well be such that a legitimate difference of opinion exists as to its precise meaning. Then the preacher who is accustomed to limit his scholarly research for his opening paragraphs of "local color" to reading the immediate context in his favorite English translation—not infrequently the King James—is quite apt to be blissfully unaware of the pitfalls which lie open before him. At other times they can be ascribed to nothing save deliberate perversion, as in the case of the preacher who preached a glowing Mother's Day sermon—made all the more moving by a copy of Whistler's "Mother" as a pulpit backdrop—on the text, "For his mother was his counsellor." What a text! How revealing it was! Why have men in every age achieved their greatness? The answer was at hand in the "dear old Book": "For his mother was his counsellor." If any wistful mother in his congregation that day went home determined to walk in that noble succession, and opened her Bible to II Chronicles 22:3 to read the tale of her godly prototype, she must have received a jolt when she read the text only to discover three more words which the preacher had conveniently withheld, *viz.,* "to do wickedly." Now it is quite conceivable that the "unemended" text would not have commended itself to him for a Mother's Day sermon, although it may be remarked that under some circumstances a decidedly pointed and wholesome homily might be preached upon it. To use it as it was used that day, however, showed a shocking disregard for one quality without which no preaching is to be tolerated.

Nor could the performance be excused on the ground that this ancient word suggested something quite different to the homiletic mind. At times, as every preacher knows, this is the case. A profound and important insight comes from words which the preacher seriously doubts were meant to convey that insight. What is he to do, thrust it aside? Of course not. Let him use it, but—if he feels that he needs scriptural support for his thesis, let him search his Bible till he finds such a support, or, and it appears to me that the latter course is not infrequently entirely justifiable, let him read the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, and then make perfectly clear, not only in the tongues of preachers and of theologians, for the benefit of any clerical strangers who may chance to be in their midst, but to all his congregation, that he is far from sure that that is what the author had intended—or, on occasion, is very sure that it is not—but that as he had read the words they had caused his mind to go in a different direction, and that he is glad to express his obligation for a new slant which

he might not otherwise have achieved. Then let him go ahead and buttress his arguments by their own merits, not by the fancied, inferred, or manufactured support of writings which have stood through the ages as a spur to truth. The one method is honest and dignified and worthy of a man to whom a congregation devotes its time and patience and, not infrequently, its attention; the other is utterly vicious and is responsible in no small measure for the lamentable lack of influence the Bible and those who profess to interpret it are experiencing today.

These words may seem to some severe, if not downright brutal. It will be a rare preacher who will not admit their truth. Undoubtedly if this method were honestly and rigidly employed, it would mean the scrapping of many sermons. That would be no world-shaking calamity, especially if from their scrapping new ones of more solid structure and on securer foundations were to rise. Nor need any shy away through the feeling that such a practice would spell the doom of biblical preaching. It would do precisely the reverse. Misinterpreting texts, using them as convenient and unacknowledged "points of departure," is not biblical preaching in any true sense of the word, and never has been.

Years ago a book appeared that exerted no little influence, *In His Steps*. The subtitle, *What Would Jesus Do?* it may safely be said, has inspired thousands of sermons. To the extent that the resultant sermons really answered that question—or even sought manfully to—I have nothing but praise. Too frequently, and we must admit it with shame, they did nothing of the sort. With little insight and less concern for the differences which the years and the miles have brought, superficial resemblances and the chance similarities of words have been seized upon and paraded; and the weightier matters, the timeless honesty and bravery and selfless devotion—those qualities so desperately needed—go in consequence unheeded today as they did when he embodied them nineteen centuries ago.

Of course, if this principle is to be followed, it entails hard work. Sermons will not always spin themselves from striking and flashy texts. Three points may not even be cajoled. And, worse than that, not infrequently the preacher may have the consciousness that he is not walking in the beaten track, may feel deprived of his earlier easy assumption that his words are, so to speak, certified checks. He may even at times be less ready to certify them himself with a pontifical "Thus saith the Lord," but he will achieve a new respect for his profession although he may no longer be certain that he is "six feet above contradiction."

From Off the Campus and On

THAT there is credulity in religion would probably be admitted by most people, even if at the same time they were confident (in varying degrees) that their own particular brand of religion was rather less encumbered than most. Dr. Matthews' essay should prove a wholesome specific against even a modicum of self-righteousness. Many of his readers are his former students and will rejoice to observe that their former preceptor's fire continues unabated. For the benefit of the few new readers who need an introduction it may be said that Dr. Matthews became professor *emeritus* of Old Testament after a long and distinguished career as head of that department at Crozer. Prior to joining the Crozer faculty he had been for many years on the faculty of McMaster, of which he is an alumnus. His graduate work, resulting in a doctorate in philosophy, was done at the University of Chicago.

A paragraph from a letter of Professor Hudson should serve to introduce him: "As for personal or 'vital' statistics, I am a graduate of Colgate-Rochester ('37), received my Ph.D. degree from Chicago in 1940, was minister of the Normal Park Baptist Church in Chicago from 1937 to 1942, was awarded the Susan Colver Rosenberg Prize for 'meritorious research' by the University of Chicago, and am the author of *John Ponet: Advocate of Limited Monarchy* (University of Chicago, 1942). That is about as far as I can go toward making myself appear a distinguished personage. In this connection, I always think of the misprint in a blurb about N—— T—— which stated that he was a 'contributor to humorous magazines.'" We pass the "in this connection" by without editorial comment, and simply append that Professor Hudson holds the chair of church history at Colgate-Rochester.

Professor Bertocci is no newcomer to these pages. An article, "The Man Neglected by Science and Education," appeared in July, 1942. He has been a member of the department of philosophy and psychology at Bates College since 1935. His graduate work was done at Harvard, Boston University, and Cambridge. He is the author of *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought* (Harvard, 1938).

Dr. Parvis' article reveals that the textual critic, who is popularly regarded as a singularly misguided individual, content, curiously enough, to burn out his eyes over manuscripts, not infrequently is led to discoveries which make distinctly readable copy. He has just completed his graduate work in the University of Chicago and is at present a research assistant in the Divinity School.

Dr. Lyman, professor *emeritus* of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary, was introduced in the last issue (October, 1943) of the QUARTERLY, when the first part of his article, entitled "Christianity and a New Social Order," was printed.

Our reviews of current books appear to continue of interest to our readers. Many write to say that they turn to this department first of all. In this issue we are devoting even more space to this section. Professor Abrams is a member of the department of sociology of the University of Pennsylvania. J. S. Bixler, a frequent and ever-welcome contributor to our pages, is president of Colby College. Professor Dubs, of Duke University, will be remembered for his article, "Evil and God," which appeared in July, 1943. Dr. Guiles is professor of pastoral psychology at Andover Newton. Dr. Hadzsits, for more than thirty-five years in the department of Latin at the University of Pennsylvania and a Latinist of world renown, is now professor of Latin at the University of Indiana. Mr. Keighton, minister of the Church of the Evangel, Narberth, Pa., is triply tied to Crozer: he is an alumnus, a trustee, and instructor in public speaking. John A. Mackay is president of Princeton Theological Seminary. Alexander Mackie, for many years a Presbyterian pastor and now president of the Presbyterian Ministers' Fund, will be remembered for his timely and salty article in a recent issue (April, 1943). Professor Marcus is on the staff of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Dr. Matthews has already been introduced in an earlier paragraph. Dr. Newell, minister of the Congregational church in Harwich, Mass., and a former president of Piedmont College, is too regular a contributor to require further introduction. Professor Newman, since his graduation from Newton in 1922 a member of the Colby faculty, is now chairman of the department of philosophy and religion. James Bissett Pratt has been since 1905 a member of the department of philosophy at Williams. Dr. Reid's article, "The Layman Observes the Minister" (July, 1942), is still being discussed. Since 1923 he has been head of the department of philosophy at Wake Forest. He has recently become a member of the board of trustees at Crozer. Professor Roberts is a member of the department of theology and dean of students at Union Theological Seminary, and is secretary of the American Theological Society. We are happy to welcome Professor Taylor, of the department of philosophy of the University of Wisconsin, to our pages and to announce our hope to print an article of his in the near future. Milton F. Wells is production manager of The American Baptist Publication Society, and a frequent contributor to religious and trade journals. Milton C. Westphal, who holds degrees from both Rochester and Crozer, has been for many years minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. The name of Alban G. Widgery, of the department of philosophy of Duke University, not infrequently ends the list of our reviewers. The reason for his place in the list is the spelling of his name; the reason for his being so frequently there is twofold, his profound knowledge and his facile pen.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Destiny, by Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. xii, 329, $2.75.

"Man is, and yet is not, involved in the flux of nature and time. He is a creature, subject to nature's necessities and limitations, but he is also a free spirit, who knows of the brevity of his years and by this knowledge transcends the temporal by some capacity within himself."

With these sentences Reinhold Niebuhr begins the second volume of his Gifford Lectures. The reader unfamiliar with Niebuhr's work might be led to expect a defense of philosophical idealism. For a few paragraphs he will not be disillusioned. Man's ability, Niebuhr continues, to transcend the flux of nature gives him the capacity to make history. History is compounded of natural necessity and human freedom. Caught in this compounding, man looks toward a reality where the conflicts of history are overcome in a reign of universal order and peace. Man thus seeks release from the ambiguities of a historical process that moves between nature and eternity. All human acts are conditioned by 1. nature's necessities and limitations, and 2. man's loyalty to his conception of the changeless principles that underlie the change.

So far so good—for the idealist. But now Niebuhr warms to his task, and by the end of the second page he has distinguished between the view which sees a realization of "life's essential meaning" occurring in history and the contrasting view which would free the human spirit from the finiteness of nature by turning to eternity. The latter view, exemplified by both idealism and mysticism, is faulty because it escapes from history. The former has more to recommend it, but too often it makes history raise itself by its own bootstraps. History must be purged as well as completed. "The final completion of history must include God's destruction of man's abortive and premature efforts to bring history to its culmination" (p. 4).

The book then settles down to an exposition of Christianity as a view of life which both takes account of historical flux and redeems it. Christians do not believe in continuous and inevitable progress. They see that finiteness involves man not merely in limitations but in actual sinfulness. They understand that the real problem of history is caused by the proud pretensions of all human endeavors which seek to obscure their finite and partial character and thereby become involved in evil. We must all be brought to see "the perennial evil in every human good," the infection of sin on each new level of moral achievement. "Each life and each portion of history . . . stand in proud and rebellious contradiction to the divine and eternal purpose; which means that only a transcendent mercy can overcome this contradiction" (p. 36). Such is the mercy of God revealed in Christ which finally overcomes man's corruption. Through God's suffering love, which takes man's sin into his own nature, man is saved.

In Christ man was given a disclosure of the meaning of history but not the full realization of its meaning. "That is anticipated in the Kingdom which *is to come,* that is, in the culmination of history." "Thus history as we know it is regarded as an 'interim' between the disclosure and the fulfillment of its meaning" (p. 288). This hope for a coming kingdom is to be taken not literally but "seriously." The finite mind cannot comprehend what transcends history, but it has a right to faith in the sufficiency of God's sovereignty over the world and history and in the final supremacy of love. Does the return of Christ at the "end" mean a continuing process

of redeemed history or the conclusion of all historical events? Niebuhr says that it means both, but he admits (p. 291) that "there is no way of expressing this dialectical concept without running the danger of its dissolution."

For the readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY this brief sketch will perhaps be sufficient to indicate the relation of the book under discussion to the main lines of Niebuhr's interest. In spite of the fact that he does not offer precise definitions of the terms that dot his pages, such as "nature," "history," "complete," "transcend," "freedom," "finite," "final," and others, the chief motives of his thought are clear. Niebuhr feels the tragedy of the times. He sees that men do not get what they want from political or economic reform. He senses the frustration of a world which seems to create desires only to flout them. He finds in human gropings after the good not only impotence and frailty but constant and unavoidable sinfulness, and he turns to the God of the Christian revelation for redemption from the human predicament.

The chief question raised in the reader's mind is that of the continuity or discontinuity of the line that runs from human to divine. Where do man's reason and conscience stop? To what extent are they helpful guides? Are *all* our righteousnesses as filthy rags or only some of them? Do we ever know the good by ourselves, and if not, how can we know it as God reveals it? Are our moral ambitions ever effective if they are always tainted with "perennial evil"? If sometimes, why not always when based on intelligence and good will? Because these questions hover in one's mind when reading Niebuhr, it is particularly interesting to see how the second volume modifies the position taken in the first. The second volume makes the break between God and man less abrupt. In this work Niebuhr makes it clear, for example, that in denouncing pride he means not the pride of particular men or cultures but the pride of man as man, not the pride of particular acts but of experience as a whole. Since pride is a necessary part of life itself, it becomes a less specific barrier between man and God. It is what God seems to expect man to have. One is interested to find that Niebuhr pays particular attention to the pride of the theologian, even the Christian theologian and the Reformed Christian theologian, as well as that of the liberal or the philosopher. Little is said in this book about pride of intellect. Indeed the author remarks (p. 110): "There is always the possibility that those who do not know the historical revelation may achieve a more genuine repentance and humility than those who do." Further, Niebuhr pays tribute in this volume to the qualities of the Renaissance as contrasted with the Reformation, and extols the virtues of the tolerance achieved under secular auspices.

All this is evidence of Niebuhr's own honesty and fairness. It seems to me, however, that it makes the dividing line between reasoned truth and revelation, between effective moral purpose and the life of the redeemed, more than ever obscure. Niebuhr has in times past unleashed some sharply barbed shafts at the pretensions of philosophy; yet he has shown himself in many ways an excellent philosopher. He has had bitter things to say about the evils inherent in attempts at moral reform; yet he has himself a distinguished record as a reformer. In this book he shows his power again, but one does not know how to take his own arguments because he seems himself to want to belittle them. The book makes some very pointed comments on the Catholic church, on justice in politics, on man's view of death, and on many other subjects. Few writers, if any, have done so much as Niebuhr has to explain to our generation the obstacles that confront intelligence and good will. But it is difficult to know what to do with his own reasonable

persuasiveness. Where, for example, do mistakenness and frustration leave off and sin begin? Is it sinful on our part to lend an ear to his reasoned appeal? If reason is trustworthy for an analysis of the Christ faith, why not for knowledge of God? If it fails us at the crucial point, how can we trust revelation itself?

Just what would Niebuhr have us believe about our own powers of winning the truth and acting on it? How can any effort to rid ourselves of "finiteness" or limitations be called "premature"? We may have been naïve in our attempts to apply the law of love, but why were the efforts themselves sinful? And what does it mean to say (p. 49) that by Christ's coming "sin is overcome in principle but not in fact," except that we are given new knowledge and a new motive? Niebuhr opposes the Christian view of suffering love to "modern liberal interpretations" and "modern sentimentalized versions" of the power of love in history. But no evidence is given that the liberal does not believe in suffering love. We are informed that "the Christian hope of the consummation of life and history is less absurd than alternate doctrines which seek to comprehend and to effect the completion of life by some power or capacity inherent in man and his history" (p. 298). But we are not really told either what is meant by a power "inherent in man" or how the "consummation of life" can be effected by the coming supernatural kingdom.

Indeed, the promise of a future kingdom which will "complete" or "consummate" the tragic frustration we see today appears only to aggravate the problem. How can a future state atone for the destruction of the present time? After all, the sentimental liberal, believing in a God of love who suffers amid obstacles not of his making, can still say that love is better than hate and that it is good to work for love even in the midst of hate and that the only quality he can approach in reverence is love, baffled and frustrated at times though it may be. It is even possible that the liberal may be more humble in recognizing the unanswerable nature of some of our questions than is his opponent who seeks for "transcendent" answers but admits that every idea "which points to the consummation beyond history is beyond logical conception" (p. 295).

The real question is whether we add either to our knowledge or to our effectiveness by construing God in terms of that which contradicts what we esteem to be good in the light of our best insights. Let me cite as an example of Niebuhr's method his treatment of our knowledge of other selves. He says (pp. 64-65):

> We know what we know about other persons, partly through an observation of their behaviour. But human personality, unlike animal life, has a depth and uniqueness which cannot be understood purely in terms of external behaviour. The depth is partly comprehended by assuming that the depths of self-consciousness within ourselves correspond to that in the other person. The uniqueness of the other person is partly falsified, however, by our effort to understand him in terms which we have drawn from the knowledge of ourselves. This represents the sinful corruption in human intercourse, the projection of ourselves into the life of the other, our effort to understand the uniqueness of the other by a false assumption that our own desires, hopes, and ambitions are identical with those of the other.

Is the description strengthened by the reference to "the sinful corruption in human intercourse"? And do we really make the assumption that our own desires and ambitions "are identical with those of the other"? No one doubts that we make mistakes in our knowledge of other selves or that such knowledge is always incomplete. What actually happens is that we proceed by observation, the use of analogy, "sympathetic understanding," and such other methods as we can employ to build up, with the aid of tests of consistency and pragmatic usefulness, a workable basis for human relations. It doesn't claim completeness. But we believe that it is progressively subject to correction.

I think we can only applaud Niebuhr's effort to take us away from the rela-

tivities of a naturalistic skepticism and to point us to the absolute and eternal. But I see no reason for the leap to the "transcendent" and the "Unconditioned" (see p. 217), especially when it entails such a circumstantial attempt to explain what according to the argument must itself be inexplicable. It seems to me that we can refuse to surrender the naturalism without involving ourselves in an obscure transcendentalism and that we can reach an absolute above the flux of history without asserting its discontinuity with what we know and what we aspire to be. There is, after all, a rule of reason which is absolute in the sense that we cannot question it without invoking it. There is also a rule for acquiring empirical knowledge which makes due allowance for our frailty and puts restraints upon our pride, in that it regards all knowledge of fact as problematic and always subject to correction. The law of love is an extension into our social life of the requirements of reason, and, like reason, is an absolute norm whose quality we cannot attain but whose validity we cannot question. The difficulties in applying it to our human situation arise from the limitations suffered by our knowledge which must always be relative in the sense that knowledge of fact must always be tentative and experimental. But the gulf between the absoluteness of our ideal and the relative character of our attainment is more like that between a limit and its variable than it is like that between a power which ordains contradictions and a creature who is punished for a sinful pride that he cannot help. Such a view, looking to a God of reason and love, does not pretend to solve all our problems but it has at least the virtue of offering an intelligible basis for hope.

J. S. BIXLER

Science, Religion, and the Future, by Charles E. Raven, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. x, 125, $2.00.

The author is Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. This gives the assurance of fine culture, tested scholarship, and trusted leadership in the Church of England. His early studies, genetics under Bateson, and Christian theology under Bethune-Baker, both beginning in 1907, have peculiarly fitted him for an intelligent interpretation of religion in a day when inherited dogmas are tottering before newly discovered biological facts. These eight lectures, delivered in Cambridge University, are rewarding studies of the necessary readjustment.

The characteristics of English churchmanship at its best are present throughout the volume. A literary quality, that is both unobtrusive and piquant, marks almost every page. Almost always he is fair to the opponent, but succinct criticism leaves no one in doubt as to his estimate of the works of theologians as Barth, Kirkegaard, Inge, Gore, Niebuhr; and of popularizers of science as Hogben and many of the modern historians. He can strike off the blistering phrase almost as happily as can Churchill. This is English scholarship that covets and improves by the give and take of criticism, which unfortunately, in this country, so often is taboo.

Principles, established by science, that are insisted on throughout the lectures are: we must see life whole; nature, man included, is all one, though there are different levels; evolution and relativity are well-established hypotheses; religion has no esoteric source of knowledge; and there can be no rigid distinction in scope or technique between science and philosophy, which is the equivalent of theology.

This being true, it is essential that theology, which still clings to a world order that is unscientific, in which the implications of evolution are disregarded, in which there is a carry-over of superstitions which violate intelligence and shock morality (pp. 18, 19), must submit to radical changes in phrase and doctrine. Professor

Raven laments that owing to the migration of the Puritans, the Act of Uniformity, and the church-controlled education of the clergy, few of whom have ever worked in a laboratory, the necessary adjustment is well-nigh impossible (pp. 24-32; 53-63). This probably accounts for the fact that even in St. Paul's sermons have been preached by leaders in the church, in which a subdued piety has been submerged in the irrational patter of prehistoric mythology.

In the relation between science and religion and in the interpretation of the history of thought the author is at his best. He holds, with abundant evidence, that personalities rather than principles were responsible for the conflict from 1860 on (pp. 33-50). Not only did the intelligence of the common man readily respond to the idea of evolution, but the principle of survival of the fittest paralleled economic practice and placed the halo of sanctity on the brow of cutthroat capitalism (pp. 97-100).

When the future is faced, the writer still leads his generation. The call is forward to intellectual integrity (pp. 80-96); to a sympathetic understanding of nature and essential values (pp. 97-112). The religious task is of all problems the most critical. The author recognizes that intelligence and morals are rooted far back in prehistory, even in the prehuman. Hence religion has traveled a long, long way. So far, so good.

But now come the questions, easier asked than answered. Is design in nature so certain that the question can be dismissed by a clerical *ipse dixit* (p. 92)? Darwin's nose and the beak of the pouter pigeon are still interrogation points insisting on an intelligent answer. A "creative intelligence," or the "Holy Spirit," that blunders at least nine out of ten times, if not ninety-nine out of a hundred, leaves some doubt as to "purposive intelligence" (p. 111). Such blundering would have short shrift in church affairs, to say nothing of military leadership. Nor is the case solved by full recognition of higher levels in thought and action in the evolutionary process.

The use of the term "mystic," even when interpreted so as to include the primitive sense of the sacred as used by Otto, and the religious experience at the higher levels, is questionable (pp. 114-119); but when stretched to include Chesterton's desire for a pork chop, it is at least mystifying (p. 68). No doubt there is a response of the whole man to the *mysterium tremendum,* but considering the history and the general connotation of the word, and its dream-world character, is it adequate for the phenomena? Is its use not mere lip service to prescientific thinking?

And further, is the most basic factor in religion an experience, "the goal of which is communion with God, and coöperation with his will," which admittedly is only attainable in rare moments of ecstasy by a few saints (pp. 15, 17)? How then can we differentiate between experiences that are religious and those that are not? between Chesterton's mystical eating of a pork chop and the rabbi's religious renunciation? Each would claim he was in communion with God and coöperating with his will. One wonders if an *attitude* is not basic to religion in all its stages; that attitude that leads one to act in devotion to an ideal, especially when it is against one's personal interests. This is personal, ethical, reverent. It is realistic, understandable, and subject to measurement. It permits a wide latitude, and yet finds a general agreement in the meaning and value of existence, so much needed for world-wide coöperation (p. 11).

This leads to the closing observation. It is indicated that the great religions, Christian, Moslem, and Buddhist, each emphasizing fundamentally different principles, are inherently exclusive (pp. 81, 82). The exclusiveness of Christianity is emphasized when the lecturer asserts that the stories of the Messiah in the New Testament "come from authentic observation," while revelations of other religions "are spurious"

(pp. 7, 8, 120-125). Here not only does he compare the best of the Christian tradition with the worst of others—automatic script, trance, and spiritualism—but ignores the simplest facts in the origin and the transmission of our gospel narratives (pp. 7, 8). To make a sacred revelation, or a sacrosanct organization, or a specific doctrine, or a type of experience the distinctive feature in religion is disruptive. Intelligent conviction as to the values in our own religion is imperative, but to insist that our shibboleths, sweet-sounding as they are in our ears, be pronounced by all the world is schismatic. It will perpetuate world strife so long as there are men who insist on thinking and acting in loyalty to their own best judgment. Much more readily can the world and religion agree on the meaning and value of existence. Herein lies the hope of the future. Parson Thwackum, wherever found, can never contribute to the crying need for adjustment to science and to world religion. This book is so good that it ought to be better.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Return to Christianity, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xii, 76, $1.00.

This book is an admirable presentation of a point of view common among defenders of so-called orthodox Christianity. It rejects the more hidebound type of fundamentalism and frequently pays at least lip service to reason. The aim of the book is to make clear the world's present need of Christianity and the kind of Christianity needed. In carrying out this aim the author exhibits the inability of science alone to satisfy man's deepest needs and what he calls on the other hand the failures of traditional theology. Modernism attempts to avoid these two difficulties by being at the same time religious and rational. The attempt, however, has proved a failure because "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Creator of the ends of the earth and of the immeasurable realms beyond the earth, can never be reduced to the *kind* of proof open to any science or philosophy that claims controlled conditions and adequate verification. He must be met, accepted, and understood in vision and power." This quotation presents fairly well the author's point of view throughout the book and suggests at once the question whether he is addressing his argument to those who already believe as he does or is attempting to convince the unbelievers. A wicked critic might suggest that this book is open to a criticism similar to that which Omar made against the books in the Alexandrian Library. For if the argument is addressed to those who already agree, it is superfluous; if to others, it is at least inadequate, for as an argument it at least suggests a *petitio principii:* the opponent of orthodoxy must be mistaken because his view is inconsistent with the orthodox view. Since the orthodox view of the Creator of the ends of the earth cannot be made the subject of rational discussion, it must be accepted to begin with, and all views that fail to agree with orthodoxy must be mistaken. Since we know without discussion the ultimate truth, all discussion about it is unnecessary and may easily be mistaken and dangerous.

How the author knows the ultimate nature of reality and of the universe is nowhere explicitly stated, but two methods of arriving with certainty at this desirable knowledge are suggested. For Dr. Ferré nowhere explicitly appeals to authority either of church or of Scripture as decisive. His appeal is sometimes to a kind of mystical intuition; sometimes it is the pragmatical appeal to consequences. Both of these open up important and very fundamental philosophical questions. Nothing very significant for or against conclusions derived from either of these forms of argumentation is possible without thoroughgoing epistemological discussion.

What are these alleged intuitions? Who has them? What is the reason for believing them to be correct? And why should we accept beliefs that bring good results as true in any other sense than pleasant? Much could be said on both these questions. Naturally Dr. Ferré, who is writing a book on theology not on philosophy, does not discuss them, and he is probably right in this. But my disappointment in his book is not due to its incompleteness so much as to his taking for granted without discussion that Christian intuition necessarily supports his view, that its consequences are better than those of other views, and that its alleged good consequences necessarily prove it true.

JAMES B. PRATT

Personal Religion, by Douglas Clyde Macintosh, New York, Scribner, 1942, pp. xvi, 411, $3.00.

The honored professor of theology and philosophy of religion at Yale University herein registers his conviction that one of our fundamental needs is for personal religion. By this he means that individual spiritual sensitivity and concern for the eternal well-being of others which constituted the good and vital essence of the "old-time religion" of the older evangelical Christianity. He illuminates the main features of such "old-time religion" through extensive quotations from the letters of one Nonconformist English family of a hundred years ago. The entire first chapter of the book, covering over one hundred pages, is devoted to quotation from, and analysis of, these letters. Therein we discover that piety was a real thing, religion an all-important matter, which, once accepted, became as normal a part of life as eating or sleeping. Such religion rooted in the mercy of God, through which one gained an experience of the Divine which promised one's eternal salvation, established one firmly "upon the Rock," and led one to a whole-souled devotion to the purposes of God and the eternal salvation of others.

Dr. Macintosh is firmly of the conviction that we have not outgrown such "old-time religion." Indeed, his conclusion is that not a few of the religious ills of our generation can be traced to the abandonment of the idea that personal religion is necessary at all. If religion is to be kept alive and vital, he sees no alternative to our propagation of just such a vitally Christian form of personal religion as that to which we have called attention in the preceding paragraph. This alone can bring the individual to a personal commitment of his life energies to God, keep vital the missionary enterprise of the church, redeem religious education from impersonal and secular trends, and provide us with an evangelism which will reach into individual lives to challenge them to a decision so personal that the time of the voluntary direction of the life toward God and his purposes can never be doubted. So he calls us to "return to essentially the same type of 'old-time religion' as that with which our study began" (p. 401). Only through conserving the living essence of such religion can we succeed "as our fathers did in propagating the vitally Christian form of personal religion" (p. 401).

At the heart of this "old-time religion" were certain profound beliefs centring in the sin of man, the divine life in Christ, the possibility of redemption, the need of conversion, and the necessity of living the Christian life. Considering each of these in turn, Dr. Macintosh makes clear their place in modern evangelicalism. We have not outgrown any of them, although many of the former interpretations are shown to have been inadequate. Our need now is to rethink the vital religious essence of each of these concepts and then incorporate that into personal Christianity today. For instance, in speaking of the life of God in Christ, Dr. Macintosh suggests that

this implies for us "that it is increasingly *possible* for the Christian to be united to God the Holy Spirit in essentially the same way in which the human nature of Jesus was united with his divine nature, or indeed with God Himself. Conversely, Jesus was united with the Holy Spirit in the same way in which every Christian ought to be united with that Spirit" (p. 115). In such a view we find the perennial vitality of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Without such personal religion the doctrine forever remains a mystery or a pagan survival within Christianity.

Especially significant is Part II of the book, which deals with the propagation of personal religion. I have space here for comment upon only one of the many important matters considered therein; namely, the relation of conversion to religious education. The trouble with too much of our religious education has been that we have dissociated it from man's need to commit himself to God. The religious educators have hoped that if the youth were surrounded with the right influences he would just naturally grow into a Christian without ever having known himself to be otherwise. Too much emphasis was placed upon the importance of the group life and too little upon the necessity of a definite type of personal Christian character. But if the Christian faith is to be mediated to boys and girls and young men and women, there must be personal religion leading to the Christian religious experience of moral salvation. "For this the most essential guiding ideas are that God, the perfect Father of whom Jesus spoke, is actual, revealed in Christ as reconciling the world unto Himself, accessible as the Holy Spirit, and adequate for all our religious needs" (p. 301). When such guiding ideas lead to a deliberate commitment to the Christian way of living, the experience of conversion acts like "the magnetizing of a steel needle." Ever after, though there may be some variation at times to one side or the other, the Christian's life will always be drawn back to its true direction according to the true nature acquired in the regenerating experience. Such a conversion experience, in the sense of a definite act of turning to God, is held to be an indispensable element in all mature Christian life.

The volume is a timely contribution, emphasizing as it does the necessity of firsthand religious experience if there is to be buoyancy, depth, and drive in religion. Indeed, it is contended that such personal religion is the prelude to all effective social religion (p. 298). Stimulating and provocative, this will be a book of value to all laymen, but even more so to ministers who desire to be sure of the genuineness of their own religious life.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Principles of Christian Ethics, by Albert C. Knudson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1943, pp. 314, $2.75.

Though the friendly exaggerations of the quotations on the jacket may be heavily discounted, this volume may be widely acclaimed as of considerable value. It is a statement and well-balanced defense of Christian ethics and a forceful challenge to some contemporary movements in Protestant circles. The exposition is one of free philosophical reflection: there is no resort to biblical or ecclesiastical authority. As such it deserves the attention of thinkers whether they call themselves Christian or not, though it is probably meant for and will make its appeal chiefly to ordained Protestant ministers. Dr. Knudson keeps his philosophy of personalism sufficiently in the background for one to accept his views on Christian ethics without being committed to that philosophy. His criticism of "dualism" is of "ethical dualism" rather than of metaphysical dualism, as held by such churchmen as Aquinas and the Presbyterian Scotch Realists. Nevertheless his treatment has the character of the idealist systems of yesteryear rather than of the value theory of today.

In his first chapter the author raises the question of the relation of Christian to general or philosophical ethics. He contrasts different views regarding this, but has little discussion of his own of the problems involved. His suggestion of an analogy between the relation of "Christian ethics to general philosophical ethics" and "theology to philosophy of religion" is useless and confusing. It is useless because he implies "Christian" theology (and not, *e.g.,* Muslim, Jewish, rational, or natural theology), and it is just the significance of "Christian" that is the problem. It is confusing because varying views are held as to the nature of philosophy of religion. The really modern concept of that appears to me to involve the consideration of Christian and other theologies as expressions of parts of the religions of history as its data. With philosophy of religion so understood the analogy would imply that philosophical ethics is wider than, but in some way includes, Christian ethics. There is a sense in which I would accept this, but I doubt if Dr. Knudson would. In his final chapter, "The Validity of Christian Ethics," the author insists, I think rightly, that "We have a native capacity for moral experience and this capacity is self-verifying. . . . It stands in its own right." In other words, ethical validity cannot be established on any nonmoral basis. He ought to have considered more specifically to what extent ethical knowledge is developed historically and socially. We are not left to merely individual moral experience; yet moral advance would be stultified if the individual were entirely dominated by the historical and the social.

Nowhere in his book does Dr. Knudson relate Christian ethics specifically to the traditional dogmas of the Incarnation, the atonement, and the Trinity. I am glad to have this type of confirmation of my own treatment of the subject without relation to these doctrines. However, he writes from within a Christian church as professionally a theologian; I as an unattached layman professionally a philosopher. Thus he devotes much space to discussions of sin, conversion, the church, and grace, which I consider more specifically religious than moral. Yet, in view of some current tendencies of thought among Protestants, his chapter on sin is as timely as it is inherently significant. Admitting, as we all must, the actuality of sin, this Protestant theologian (to my great satisfaction) writes: "The various ideas of a primitive Fall, of hereditary or racial guilt, and of total depravity may be dismissed as unwarranted speculations." That these ideas arose, have been long and are still held, implies something demanding recognition. The author does not give the recognition due to it, nor any adequate alternative for these ideas.

Those acquainted with the subject will readily note how inadequate and unsatisfactory the chapter on the history of Christian ethics is. Here I can refer to only a few incidental points in the chapter. To support his view that there was a "new" morality in Jesus' teaching, he ascribes the crucifixion to the Jewish leaders seeking "in self-defense" "to destroy the new morality by putting its author to death." That, surely, is open to challenge. He fails to suggest the spirit or inner quality of mediæval Christian ethics. He is under the influence of a certain *type* of theology when he says that according to Christianity Christ bore "punishment" "for the whole human race." That may not have seemed satisfactory to him, for he goes on immediately: "Or at least he made expiation for our sins." Remission of sins does not necessarily imply the remission of the punishment. It may signify that God welcomes back the repentant sinner. In his very mercy he may require the sinner to suffer his own punishment. "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth." There is something to be said for the frequent objection by orientals that the doctrine that Christ suffers punishment for our sins is ethically objectionable. The ideas of penance and purgatory may have important implications that many Protestants ignore. Dealing as he is in a general

way with the history of Christian ethics, the author might have considered why in English-speaking Protestant countries the term "immorality" has come to mean so predominantly sexual misconduct. It is as though that is the first of the Protestant sins as contrasted with the "pride" of the mediæval Catholic view.

Considering its title, the book's central chapters, "The Principle of Love" and "The Principle of Perfection," might be expected to be the best in it. Though they may not be the weakest, they are very defective, and suggest more than any others that the author has not kept up with the developments in ethics. He points out that the term "love" is "ambiguous, indeed *multiguous*," but he does not appear to recognize that the term "principle" is also multiguous. He does not state nor make clear what he means by "principle," and he shifts about confusedly among the different meanings of "love." I refer to just two examples. He says that the two principles of love and perfection are "the fundamental and essential elements in the Christian ideal." But later we are told: "True Christian love *presupposes* an ethical ideal"; that "the moral ideal is basal. It comes first and transforms love into moralized and Christian love." Dr. Knudson rushes into a contrast of views of Anders Nygren and Augustine, and not undertaking a careful consideration of his own of the nature of love, then slides off into contrasting views of "self-love." Nowhere in his book does he give adequate attention to love as an emotionally tinged attitude the experience of which is an intrinsic value. This I believe to be due to two things: the influence of a type of rationalistic idealism concerned with "principles"; and the too frequent absence of the mystical from the Protestantism with which he has been associated. His treatment of the *principle of perfection* is equally unsatisfactory. He seems forced to adopt the questionable, if not inconsistent, phrase "relative perfection." He talks, curiously, of a "sinlessness" which "maintains itself in spite of an occasional lapse"!

About one-third of the volume is concerned with the practical application of the principles to problems of the individual, the family, the state, war, the church, and culture. His attitude to these problems is moderately liberal. He goes "with the stream" with reference to the usual American acceptance of capitalism. It makes me wonder whether there has been a degeneration of Christian moral theory in this direction. Jesus upset the tables of the "money-changers." Revulsion from the Jews in the Middle Ages was partly due to their financial activities. "Gambling" is a term applied to some aspects of modern capitalism. Dr. Knudson does not consider this subject with sufficient discrimination. On the other hand, while recognizing that forms of punishment must be socially conditioned, he sounds a healthy note in insisting on the idea of retribution. "The only moral justification of punishment is its essential justice. Punishment implies retribution on the part of the punisher and expiation on the part of the punished." Monogamy may be recognized (as I insist) as the best ethical *rule* for marriage, but Dr. Knudson seems to want to describe it in a conservative Christian fashion almost as though a fundamental law. Yet it may be that thinkers in the future may find the relaxation of that rule in particular instances a better way of meeting some problems than some divorces now permitted. That possibility ought not to be excluded from recognition by Christian ethics. There is considerable repetition in this book, not of the kind due to references to many leading thinkers building up a well-supported position, but in the author's own recurrence to certain ideas. Why was no date of publication given on the title page or at the end of the preface? Was this due to negligence, to Christian "morality," to a reluctance to give the year 1943 to an essentially late nineteenth-century approach, or to a supposition that this treatment transcends all dates?

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Invitation to Pilgrimage, by John Baillie, New York, Scribner, 1942, pp. 134, $1.50.

The fifteen short chapters of which this book is composed, with their gripping title and their fine blending of strong thinking and literary beauty, provide the reader with a feast of good things. Here is a book on vital Christian beliefs which will prove equally rewarding to the pastor and the thoughtful lay person.

The use of the term *pilgrimage* in the title proclaims not only a movement in the intellectual apprehension and inner life of the author; it describes also the fact that the men and women of our generation are plants uprooted from the old soil, ships adrift from ancient moorings, wayfarers with a great sense of loneliness, who are, nevertheless, "seeking a city," with earnest hearts and realistic gaze. Professor Baillie's book is particularly suited for those in whom a fresh sense of need has been created, who will be satisfied with nothing short of an answer to the yearnings of the heart for love and community, and to the wistful prying of the mind for an understanding of life in relation to God.

Here we have a wayside theology in which some of the great truths of the Christian religion are presented not in systematic form, but as lights for the journey. Sometimes they reveal to the traveler the fact of a disease which afflicts him and interpret to him the meaning of his longing. Sometimes they send forth beams along his road or light up for him the surrounding country. Sometimes they illumine the goal of his journey. Only people who are willing to be something or to go somewhere can read this volume with true profit. Yet there is the hope that the complacent armchair reader who reads religious books only to "enjoy" them may also hear the call to pilgrimage.

Dr. Baillie has succeeded to a remarkable degree in fulfilling the highest test that can be applied to theological writing, namely, that the enunciation of doctrine shall have a certain musical quality. In this volume we have, to a very high degree, doctrine set to music. That is to say, we have doctrine that reaches the heart and disposes to worship.

Here are some great truths which the author has set to music and given liturgical value: Truth has an inherently coercive quality. Dogma is equally indispensable in a virile Christian system and in meeting the demands of the human heart for authority. There is a divine moral order into which all men's construction schemes must fit. In this moral order there is a plumb line which is nothing less than an "infinite perpendicular from the stars." Only in the relatedness of the Christian community in Christ can be transcended the double heresy, that man is a self-sufficient individual, and that individual man matters nothing, but the collectivity everything.

JOHN A. MACKAY

Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1943, pp. 571, $5.00.

To collect a group of philosophical essays into a single volume requires that some selective principle be invoked to render the anthology coherent and its parts significant. In the absence of such a principle of organization, a volume of philosophical writing may easily become a welter of competing theories and doctrines the diversity of which is confusing to the common reader and tiresome to the professional philosopher.

Twentieth Century Philosophy, the subtitle of which is "Living Schools of Thought," is such a volume. The book contains twenty-two essays by contemporary philosophers upon a variety of topics, ranging from personalism to naturalism.

One is led to expect by the subtitle, that the editor, Mr. Dagobert Runes, had gathered from representative philosophers a statement of the main trends of modern thought as found in the groups of thinkers comprising contemporary schools. However, Part One of the book is devoted to discussions and historical surveys of ethics, (James Tufts); æsthetic theory (Dewitt Parker); axiology (Wilbur M. Urban); the philosophy of law, history, science, life (Pound, Boodin, Lenzen, Whitehead); metaphysics (E. W. Hall); and the relation of metaphysics to theology (D. C. Macintosh). There is here no attempt to present various living schools of thought in their appropriate forms.

Part Two is slightly more consistent with the reader's justifiable expectation. Bertrand Russell's summary dismissal of pragmatism and espousal of mathematical logic entitled "Philosophy of the Twentieth Century" is again reprinted; W. P. Montague's "Story of American Realism" appears once more, as does Dewey's "Development of American Pragmatism" and Santayana's "Transcendental Absolutism." These are the best essays in the collection, although it is hardly necessary to construct a new volume for philosophers in order to include essays of this sort which have already been printed twice, and which are part of the professional philosopher's vocabulary.

Among the new essays, representing philosophical positions developed during the past thirty years, are two statements of the doctrines of phenomenology, and logical empiricism, by Marvin Farber and Herbert Feigl, which are well-organized and informative, the latter comprising one of the most concise accounts extant of the aims and achievements of the various groups—English Analysts, Viennese Circle, American Semanticists, and Logical Positivists—which make up one movement in contemporary philosophy.

Other essays of interest for somewhat different reasons are Professor Maritain's rhetorical outburst concerning the humanism of Acquinas, Professor Urban's dogmatic statement of the truth about value theory, and John Somerville's apologetic description of dialectical materialism. For good measure, the book concludes with an historical survey of the philosophies of China, by Wing-tsit Chan.

The work, which is generously sprinkled with misprints, betrays a lack of editorial care, and, as a serious publication in philosophy, lacks the diligence, judgment, and knowledge so essential to true philosophical scholarship.

HAROLD A. TAYLOR

The Building of Eternal Rome, by Edward Kennard Rand, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1943, pp. xi, 318, $3.50.

This is a notable volume—notable, if for no other reason, for the fact that it comes from one whom many of us regard as the foremost Latinist in America.

"The Building of Eternal Rome" is an intriguing title of a work that is concerned with an exposition of those spiritual forces which resulted in the creation of the *urbs æterna* of Tibullus, and with a vindication of the propriety of that designation in the world's consciousness.

Such books are more than ever essential in a Greekless and Latinless day, in order to remind the world that Rome still remains the mother city of European and of Western civilization and that we shall forget our mother only at our own risk and peril and to repent, later, in ignorance.

Professor Rand writes with charm, and there is wit and humor in these pages that not only classicists will read with profit, but which the layman, in particular, should read in order to have a new world open before his astonished view: Ennius,

Polybius, Cicero, Vergil, Horace, Lactantius, St. Augustine appear in this procession of living thinkers, speaking a very modern language, speaking very clearly to the confused generation of this day. All of this difficult exposition, often displaying the skilled craftsman's light touch, rests upon great learning embodied in innumerable footnotes for the scholar to ponder with care.

The successive chapters on stages in the evolution of the Eternal City, her mission and her destiny, are a study of ideals that continued through the ages, and they carry us, in the end, into a dream world in which the American scholar gracefully communes, intimately, with his beloved ancients and, no less, with Dante—in order to dramatize his plea for a liberal education based on the "Classics," *liberal* because it unifies past and present.

The carping critic can readily enough find points of disagreement in a discussion of such wide scope as this; but the mature, rich scholarship of the author should command, as it deserves, our respect. It would be most ungracious, I think, for me—in a brief review—to point out what seem to me errors of facts or of interpretation; such matters are properly the subject of discussion or of correspondence between scholars, and should be, if sincerity marks their scholarship. On the contrary, at this time I feel it my privilege to recommend this thoughtful work, which is obviously a labor of love, to readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY who will find for themselves much to which they will subscribe, much that will challenge their established views, much that will prove stimulating, some things, no doubt, which they may hesitate to accept as final.

The author ranges over a wide field of human history from the ancient days of the New Rome which is in the East and in the West and which, after all the chaos of broken ages, abides, for him, serene, *The Eternal City*. This book is a fine performance.

GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS

Religion and Health, by Seward Hiltner, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. xiii, 292, $2.50.

When I left seminary, which was over thirty years ago, I was very much interested in what was then called "mental healing." This interest was further intensified by the fact that in my first parish there were a great many folks greatly absorbed in Christian Science. For, at that time Christian Science was in its *floruit.* I listened to Christian Science propaganda and attended Christian Science prayer meetings, and in fact had it handed to me at every meal by the lady who took care of my gastronomic needs. She was the widow of a Presbyterian minister and was peeved by the way in which the Presbyterian church treated her—and she had lately espoused Christian Science. And while I could not subscribe to Christian Science, I was deeply impressed by it and was sure "there was something in it." And so I read about the Imanuel Movement and began to think that after I had a big church, I could set up something of that sort in it.

About that time, what was then called *experimental psychology* in contradistinction to the effete "armchair psychology" which I was taught in college, began to set in. This "experimental psychology" consisted of setting you down before a table and finding out how many seconds it took for you to say "rat" when the professor said "cat"; or whether you would think of "ice cream" when the professor said "cake." If you said "lemonade," it was a sign you had a "libido" and having a "libido" meant you had some sort of unsatisfactory sex experience when you were a child; and the professor wanted to know all about it.

So about that time I got sick and tired of the whole business of the relation of mind to body and came to the conclusion that I would let our family doctor attend to the body and I would attend to the mind. By that time I had become a dichotomist and had come to identify the soul and the mind as an ultimate metaphysical entity.

Then there came along this stuff about "pastoral counseling." "That," I said to myself, "is a lot of tripe." Let the preacher attend to his sermons and, for a change, give us a good one once in a while. Let him stop trying to be a Jack-of-all-trades—and a poor one at that! Let the doctor and the psychiatrist take care of the disordered mind and do a good job! Then I read this book—*Religion and Health* by Seward Hiltner. When I looked at its title, I said, "Here's some more stuff from our spiritual parlor—pink brain trusters in the Federal Council of Churches. Let Dr. Enslin review his own tripe. I'll have none of it!"

But I read the book—and I read it twice. And I think every preacher ought to read it and reread it. Throw away your seminary notebook on "pastoral theology," or the theological science of how to make friends and influence people, and read and study this book instead. It is well written; it is factual; it is scientific; and it is spiritual.

Dr. Hiltner, who from his picture and from the date of his A.B. at Lafayette is a young man, knows what he is talking about and has good judgment. He does not think that the *sine qua non* of the sickroom is the discussion of that pearl of great price so dear to the heart of Calvinism and of Calvinists, "sin." In fact, he thinks that oil and wine from the kindly hands of a good Samaritan mean more in the integration of a shattered personality and the recapture of lost hope than pious and platitudinarian advice. He believes in pastoral calling which, he says, "is, or should be, one of the great opportunities of the Protestant ministry. For here the minister has a chance to meet people who would not come to him, but want his help." He believes that the minister can help the sick and that to serve thus his people, the minister does not need to be an encyclopædia on the terminology of pathology. "The minister," he writes, "has many specific resources which he may use in working with the sick. The sacraments are of great importance. Prayer, meditation, the Bible, other literature, listening, quietness, understanding—these are as real as pills and sometimes more helpful."

Brother, next time you are tempted to go into a long explanation about the plan of salvation in a sickroom, just remember these words, please: "Listening, quietness, understanding!" Thank God for preachers who can listen and can understand. But read the book for yourself. Read about "The Relation of Christianity to the Maintenance of Health" and "The Cure of Illness." Read about "Mental Health and Religious Education" and read about "Pastoral Counseling." And in fact, read everything Dr. Hiltner has written in his book. And then thank God for a man with common sense and a book of common sense!

ALEXANDER MACKIE

Religious and Secular Leadership, by Solomon Zeitlin, Philadelphia, Dropsie College, 1943, pp. xvi, 117, $1.50.

Dr. Zeitlin tells us in his preface that the present volume consists of three articles previously published in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* with a new chapter added on the "Struggle between Babylonia and Palestine for Hegemony." He asks to be pardoned for a certain amount of repetition, on the grounds that the articles were not rewritten because he wished to be in accord with the government's policy

of conservation. It is a little difficult to understand how his failure to eliminate repetitions can serve a policy of conservation.

No one doubts Dr. Zeitlin's competence in the field of rabbinics, but after reading this book one may well doubt his ability to organize his material and to expound a subject without confusion and carelessness. About half the book has nothing to do with the interesting struggle between religious and secular leaders in Jewish communities during the talmudic and early mediæval periods, which Dr. Zeitlin professedly treats. Of the relevant material that remains a fair amount is common knowledge. The new points made by Dr. Zeitlin and the new insights obtained from his reëxamination of the material, while they are suggestive, unfortunately do not counterbalance the defects of the book.

On p. xii Dr. Zeitlin says that the Jews, in contrast to the Christians, "never converted any peoples either by the sword or by the spirit. The Jews had no missionaries." If he includes the period of the Second Commonwealth, as he seems to, he is simply making a statement that every well-informed person knows to be untrue. On p. xiii he tells us that in Spain "the leaders of the community were mostly lay people," meaning Spain. In the next sentence he adds, "In many provinces of Spain the Crown appointed a Chief Rabbi who supervised Jewish spiritual and social life." In this cheerfully irresponsible fashion Dr. Zeitlin leaves his readers to figure out for themselves whether Spanish Jewry was ruled primarily by spiritual or secular leaders.

Another example of Dr. Zeitlin's playful way of leaving the reader to puzzle out a general principle from conflicting or even contradictory facts occurs on pp. 5-6. First we read that in the Roman period "The authority of the High Priest did not extend beyond the limits of the Temple. The Sanhedrin, however, had religious authority not only over Judea but over the entire Jewry all over the world." On the next page we are told that "The High Priest, by virtue of being the head of the Temple, which was the center of the entire Jewish life (*sic*), exercised great influence over the people. He represented them before the Roman government. He was responsible for maintaining the peace of Judea. Hence he was actually the leader of the Jewish people." Not only is one left in doubt whether Dr. Zeitlin thinks the high priest had more or less influence than the Sanhedrin, but also wonders what reason Dr. Zeitlin has for assuming that in the first century A.D. the members of the Sanhedrin were secular rather than religious leaders. Moreover, Dr. Zeitlin does not tell us what the situation was when the rule of procurators was interrupted by the reign of Agrippa I. On p. 9 he mentions Ezra: "The priest who at the time of the Restoration was the head of the Jewish community." But the Restoration, according to his earlier statement on p. 1 (see above), took place in the time of Cyrus. Thus he makes Ezra a contemporary of Cyrus. Incidentally, he neglects to say anything about the relation of Ezra to Nehemiah. On p. 15 he informs us that the high priest Onias II allied himself with Seleucus against Ptolemy III because he was afraid that if Palestine were united with Egypt under the flag of the Ptolemies the temple (in Jerusalem) would lose considerable revenue since the Jews of Babylonia would find it difficult to continue their pilgrimage to Jerusalem and to send their gifts and sacrifices to the Temple." This is very interesting if true. But the fact is that Palestine *was* united with Egypt in the time of Ptolemy III. In the second place, there is not the slightest evidence that Ptolemy III, or any of the Ptolemies who ruled Palestine, objected to the Babylonian Jews' sending of gifts to the temple in Jerusalem. On p. 45 there is another characteristically slipshod passage which reads, "the title Rabbi indicates the origin of French Jewry as being Palestinian and

their authority as derived from the Patriarch." Again, "the title Rabbi in Franco-German rabbinic literature indicates merely scholarship, while the title Rav indicates authorization (*Semikah*) and position. Anyone who possesses scholarship but has no position bears the title Rabbi, while anyone who holds a position in the community and has authorization is called Rav." Dr. Zeitlin seems to be happily unaware that this means that in France and Germany the title Rabbi indicated authority derived from Palestinian usage, but on the other hand indicated not authority but merely scholarship. Again the title Rav indicated authority. Thus the titles Rabbi and Rav are equivalent, and the title Rabbi means both the possession of and the nonpossession of authority. Compared with this exposition the most difficult talmudic passage is clear as day.

A shining illustration of Dr. Zeitlin's philosophy of history is given on p. 73. "After the Restoration a schism broke out between the Samaritans and the Jews. There are always people who, for some reason or another, dissent from the established state or religion." An equally shining example of his understanding of economic factors occurs on p. 85 when he explains that after the Babylonian exile the Jews in Palestine shifted from a solar to a lunar-solar calendar and moved the New Year from the spring to the fall. "The reason for this change was that the Jews, being largely at that time an agricultural people, it was more in accordance with their life as farmers to have the New Year in the autumn after the harvest had been gathered instead of in the spring." Dr. Zeitlin apparently does not believe that the Israelites of the preëxilic kingdom were just as largely agricultural as the postexilic Jews. He also seems to assume that there was only one harvest—the fall harvest. As early as the writing of the Gezer Calendar (eighth century B.C. at the latest), four harvests were reckoned. There are many other things that might be said of his whole treatment of the development of the calendar, but the subject has nothing to do with the theme of the book.

It is a melancholy duty to report that there are a good many inaccuracies, slips, and errors in fact; for example, the statements on p. 60 that the Jews were expelled from France in 1360; on pp. 63-4 the twice-occurring writing "Rabbah bar Huna" for "Rabbah bar Rab Huna"; on p. 80 that the Greek *μήνη* means "moon or month" (Dr. Zeitlin has confused *μήνη* a poetic word for "moon" with *μείς* "moon" and "month"); on p. 82 that "eight times eleven and a quarter gives ninety, the number of days by which the lunar calendar was short of the solar year." (What he means is, of course, ninety is the number of days by which eight lunar years fall short of eight solar years.) As examples of Dr. Zeitlin's violation of English idiom I may cite: "the Jews laid hope for a new revolt" (p. 9); "I shall deal elsewhere on the *Semikah* system" (p. 50, n. 135); "bestow honor to their churches" (p. 54); "Saadia Gaon, champion for Jewish unity" (p. 72); "Coptics"—meaning Copts (p. 80, n. 31).

Dr. Zeitlin could make some valuable contributions to biblical and Jewish scholarship if he would take the trouble to organize his material, check his facts carefully, express himself clearly, remove repetitions and the restatement of familiar material, and, above all, show some respect for the labors of other scholars working in the same field. Dr. Zeitlin obviously strives to be original. True originality consists not ignoring current hypotheses or impressionistically criticizing them, but in studying them carefully and then improving on them after accomplishing a labor as patient and conscientious as that of the scholars on whose work one seeks to improve.

RALPH MARCUS

John Amos Comenius—That Incomparable Moravian, by Matthew Spinka, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. ix, 177, $2.00.

Again Professor Spinka has placed church historians in his debt by making available to them the results of his research in the field of Protestant beginnings. This work, published to commemorate the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of John Amos Comenius, not only features the guileless liberalism of the great Moravian educator and reformer, but also introduces us to a coterie of an international fellowship which concerned itself with the task of charting the course of education and churchmanship away from the brow-beating methods of the seventeenth-century classroom and the bigoted defenses of a wooden-headed orthodoxy.

Under the pen of Professor Spinka, Comenius takes form as the prophet of modern educational reform and the evangelist of the modern ecumenical movement. Having before him the fragment of Comenius' autobiography, the author was able to bring to the printed page the pioneer educator's personal evaluation of his own work, together with an analysis of his ambitions, successes, and frustrations.

As an invaluable aid to the student of seventeenth-century church history, Professor Spinka has published in this volume a very comprehensive bibliography of the works of Comenius, as well as an extensive list of works by those who have dealt with the personalities and movements involved in the period and thought world of Comenius. These features added to the scholarly use of usually inaccessible manuscripts by the author make it desirable for every student of church history to acquire a copy of the volume to augment his working library.

There are some characteristics of Dr. Spinka's volume which detract from its usefulness and authoritativeness, however. The first chapter, which attempts to give the historical setting of the period in which Comenius labored, lacks that lucidity and emphasis which are the prerequisites of competent historical statement. It may be that the author's own remarkable familiarity with the period of which he writes has prevented him from seeing the importance of orderliness and clarity to facilitate the use of his book. Another quality seems to be lacking to the author which a successful biographer surely needs to have, namely, that unbiased and scientific handling of facts which gives the impression of dispassionate statement and interpretation. Professor Spinka is entirely too enthusiastic in his effort to establish the greatness of Comenius to be as critical of his subject as we would expect a scholar of his standing to be. One cannot help but wish that Dr. Spinka had expended less enthusiasm in glorifying Comenius and had given us instead a critical appraisal of his work.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

Religion of Tomorrow, by John Elof Boodin, New York, Philosophical Library, 1943, pp. 189, $2.50.

Professor Boodin, of the University of California at Los Angeles, has made a distinguished contribution to the philosophy of religion in earlier volumes on God and cosmology. In all of his work he has attempted to combine the most valuable features of idealism and empiricism, and of the scientific and religious viewpoints, in a fresh philosophical synthesis. In the present brief book he lays aside the rôle of a technical philosopher and takes on the rôle of a devotional seer. There are, of course, expository, analytical, and polemical passages in the book; but for the most part the argument is carried forward by a mixture of exhortation and panegyric.

The author seeks to show that religion, in both its conservative and its creative rôles, is still indispensable to civilization and human progress; but because neither

scientific naturalism nor traditional theology can meet the present and future spiritual needs of the race, a new departure is necessary. History shows that religion loses its redemptive power when the idea of God becomes abstract. The great merit of Christianity, and the great promise which it holds for a new awakening, lie in Jesus' teaching and incarnation of the fact that God is actively present in human life. The author feels that the creeds and the other traditional formulæ of theology (both Catholic and Protestant) tend to obscure this vital core of religion more than they elucidate it. He calls for a revision of theology, based frankly upon belief in a limited God, and interpreting perennial truths through the concrete ideals of this age—especially the ideal of democracy. He praises Roman Catholicism for its sense of organic unity, especially as manifest in its stress upon the sacraments; but its authoritative structure and its resistance to many modern intellectual and social requirements make it unacceptable as a rallying point for the religion of tomorrow. Protestantism has made its positive contribution in emancipating the individual conscience and in declaring that God is directly accessible to the believer; but it has entered into an unholy alliance with nationalism and capitalism, and is still largely dominated by intolerant and fundamentalistic attitudes. Pantheism contains a measure of truth insofar as it affirms that God is the creative energy underlying the endless variety of natural and human productiveness; but because it is incompatible with belief in a personal God, it lacks ethical discrimination and vigor. Finally, scientific naturalism cannot do justice to, or direct man's creative aspiration towards, ideal ends as firmly grounded in reality.

Therefore in the latter part of the book the author presents a brief sketch of the factors which may contribute to a rebirth of religion. The chief organ of religious knowledge is love rather than analytical intelligence. Individual, social, and cosmic facts are seen in a new light, and in a manner which contributes dynamically to their own transformation, when personal communion with God rather than speculative proof is the point of departure. In a brief, but sometimes eloquent, summary the author puts forward his vision of how men today must see their religious task as firmly rooted in the crucial problems of the present, but as extending upward and onward to a perspective which leads beyond the measure of our minds, both for man's destiny on earth in the process of cosmic evolution and for his destiny as an immortal soul.

It is always gratifying when a competent philosopher feels the need to speak the language of personal religion. It is edifying to read pages written in a spirit of tolerance, boldness, sensitivity, and broad vision. But a critic always faces the unwelcome task of being candid about defects as well as virtues. The main defect of the book is that it is surcharged with "uplift," and reiterates the confidence that "somehow" a new spirit will burgeon within the heart of man. But the author's description of "how" is too tenuous to meet the needs of beleaguered religious men, either inside or outside the Christian church.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

The Ladder of Progress in Palestine: A Story of Archæological Adventure, by Chester Charlton McCown, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xvi, 387, $3.50.

An adequate primer in Palestinian archæology has now appeared. Too frequently have books on this subject fallen into one of two classes: popular, but lacking in scientific accuracy; or scientific, but utterly incomprehensible to one who is not a specialist in this highly intricate field. In this book Professor McCown has taken nothing for granted—not even a knowledge of the contents of the English Bible. He

has begun at the beginning and constructed as adequate a picture of the archæological results as one might reasonably expect in one volume. Use has been made of all the devices of modern bookmaking to illustrate the story of archæological adventure; there are fifty excellent photographs, a number of sketch maps, and other figures arranged along with the text. The author's disciplined imagination—always operating within the limits of scientific accuracy—has given the presentation a lively interest. In a description of papyri found in southern Palestine the author mentions other finds "including a dead mouse which had found the papyri indigestible" (p. 307). He pauses in a detailed description of Gerasa to contrast the carefully constructed sanitation and water supply there with the indifferent community planning of many an American town (p. 317). Such touches make this an extremely readable book. Unlike some books on this subject, this has no preconceived thesis to prove, no theory of the literal accuracy of the Bible to confirm. Its aim is to inform. In the final chapter, "What to Believe," the reader is wisely cautioned as to what not to believe. The eleven pages of well-chosen bibliography is space profitably used.

There is necessarily a lag in time between the appearance of the first reports of finds in scientific publications and the incorporation of them in popular manuals of archæology. This volume has reduced this delay considerably. Its author is a specialist, director of the Palestine Institute of the Pacific School of Religion, sometime director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem. In these capacities he has had much firsthand contact with excavations in Palestine. Furthermore, in this work he has had the collaboration of such archæologists as Professor W. F. Albright; Professor John Garstang; and his two sons, Dr. T. D. McCown, the prehistorian; and Dr. D. E. McCown, the Iranian archæologist of the Oriental Institute of Chicago. The technical reader will find in the chapters on prehistory much material which hitherto has been rather inaccessible. The chapter, "The Quest for an Alphabet," is an especially noteworthy presentation of material of a highly intricate nature.

The point of view of the author, which never obtrudes itself into questions of fact, but which is clearly apparent even in the title given the book, is interesting. There is a sober but sure optimism on the part of this historian who surveys a picture of progress over several hundred thousand years. This is in sharp contrast to the currently popular theology which insists upon depreciating the notion of man's progress and of despairing of any good in human achievement. McCown insists that "man has made progress, even in this brief space of time."

> A far larger proportion of mankind have a relatively satisfactory standard of living than ever before. Even the worst that the wars of the twentieth century have brought has not been worse than the evils of the past, while, what is even more significant, the standards of the present are incomparably higher and the area of moral obligation incomparably broader than ever before. Archæology, which records the ruins of past civilization, is equally replete with evidence of the rebirth of the better out of the good of the past (p. 350).

This book has many possible uses: it may be read for pleasure or for profit; it may be studied by ministers and by people who are interested in history from the biblical point of view; indeed, it is an admirable book for use by church study-groups.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Three Christian Transcendentalists, by Ronald Vale Wells, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 230, $2.75.

The twelfth of the Columbia studies in American culture, this volume introduces us to three little known figures in nineteenth-century American philosophical and religious life; namely, James Marsh, Caleb Sprague Henry, and Frederic Henry

Hedge. Dr. Wells contends that all three of these men were Christian transcendentalists. They were Christian in contrast to other transcendentalists like Emerson and Ripley in that they did not withdraw from the church, but remained within it to fight the battle for a religion which would be at once philosophically respectable and socially dynamic. It was their construction of a philosophical religious faith or Christian philosophy which leads Dr. Wells to call them transcendentalists. All three of them were opponents of Calvinistic orthodoxy because this depended too greatly upon old forms of thought and theological tradition. They wanted to free men from a slavery to outgrown systems of thought, helping them to construct a philosophical view of Christianity which could appeal to reason and receive the full support of man's mental powers. In this sense they were philosophical in their thinking. Since, moreover, they all insisted upon a religious faith which was not "derived from natural science and natural rights," they were the proponents of a form of religious faith which was in that sense transcendental. Something definitely was given by God to make possible the dimension of spiritual life within man.

The most important work of these three Christian transcendentalists was done in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. Marsh and Henry were reared in Congregationalism; Hedge in Unitarianism. Though they worked independently of each other, they effected a religious reconstruction of American theology which was opposed to the absoluteness and orthodoxy of Calvinism. Marsh through his "spiritual philosophy," Henry through his "electicism," and Hedge through his "liberal christianity" sought "to make religion philosophical and philosophy religious, to the glory and honor of the Christian faith" (p. 3). They all endeavored to wed philosophy to inspiration, hoping thereby that Christianity could be reëstablished in the minds of men without recourse to natural religion. Spiritual religion was their primary concern; and this, they held, could be aroused not by observation of the phenomena of nature, but only through practicing the art of philosophical reflection. Thus, for example, Marsh held that universal and necessary laws are grounded in reason. Before experience, and indeed antecedent to it, these laws are given to the mind through pure reason. As one thus gives oneself to reflection upon the grounds of being within one's self, one is able to reach a knowledge of that ground of being which is the centre and ground of all. Philosophically, this implies that the principle of the self is the key to a comprehension of that which pervades and sustains all reality. Through reflection we discover that our nature is spiritual, that the divine is manifested in the human, and this fact leads to the union of philosophy and Christianity.

Yet with all their interpretation of Christianity as a rational and spiritual phenomenon, these transcendentalists did not lose themselves in vain speculations. They saw clearly the connection between Christianity and the good life for all. Ethics was not merely a matter of personal goodness, but of social righteousness as well. Thus one finds Caleb Sprague Henry asking whether the preacher "is . . . to strike only at private and not at public sins. Is he to hit away sharply at dancing, card playing, theatre and opera going, the Sunday fresh-air recreations of poor artisans and their children, pent up all the week in unwholesome places—and never to aim a single stroke at political corruption, fraud, crime, oppression, cruelty?" (p. 71). Likewise, we find Frederic Henry Hedge, a generation before the social gospel was fairly launched on its way by Rauschenbusch and others, calling for the recognition of labor, advocating vocational education, claiming equal rights for women, and agitating for peace. Such a program indicates that these men had about them the distinct flavor of modern, liberal Christianity.

While this volume will not have wide appeal due to the nature of the subject and the obscurity of the personalities with whom it deals, it none the less deserves reading if for no other reason that that it is a pertinent reminder that there are always a few in every generation who will not allow the light of reasonable and personal religion to be extinguished by the heavy atmosphere of a dark and oppressive orthodoxy.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Popular Freethought in America, 1825-1850, by Albert Post, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 258, $3.00.

For anyone interested in the religious history of the nineteenth century in this country, the present work is to be highly recommended. Dr. Post has brought together for the first time, in a systematic coherent picture, the story of the popular freethought movement in the United States. Limiting the discussion, for the most part, to the years 1825-1850, because they represent the period of the greatest activity, the author shows the development of the movement, the principal teachings, the organizations, press, and propaganda. Much of this naturally revolves around some of the outstanding personalities in freethought such as Robert Owen, Frances White, and others.

The influence of the deists of the 1700's, and particularly the works of Tom Paine served as a philosophical background for the unbelievers. Tom Paine's *Age of Reason* for many of them became the bible of freethought. The clergy in those days regarded Paine as one of the vilest and most disturbing influences. By contrast, today this revolutionary patriot, whom Theodore Roosevelt once called a "dirty little atheist," is seen in much better perspective and more genuinely appreciated for his true worth.

Very few of the freethinkers were atheists, and certainly Tom Paine was not. However, in days of emotional confusion, when the religious leaders were afraid of their critics because congregations might be led astray by false doctrine, and when labels and theological hair-splitting were more important than "truth," the keepers of the keys of orthodoxy were not concerned with being fair to their opponents. And, on the other side, the freethinkers made often wild and unsubstantiated charges, mostly general in character, about the clergy, whom they regarded as largely responsible for many of the evils of the times.

The infidels "expectantly believed that they were hastening the approach of the millennium of reason." What optimists they were! The great debate went on against evidence of lack of reason. The Bible, revealed religion, the clergy, and the churches were under attack. Their periodicals, mostly shortlived, crusaded for the "truth." Several famous debates were held, the most notable of which was that between Robert Owen and the Reverend Alexander Campbell, held in Cincinnati, April 13-21, 1829. Lecturers toured the country. Frances Wright, the high priestess of infidelity, spoke to immense audiences in the leading large cities. Societies were organized and for awhile many of the clergy thought that infidelity was sweeping the nation to destruction.

How many infidels were there? There have been numerous guesses ranging all the way from fifty thousand to one and one-half millions or more. But there is no means by which the actual number or even a reasonably accurate approximation can be determined.

In some respects the chapter, "Infidelity Attacked," is the most interesting. Here is the plan of attack of the clergy and the arguments used by them in laying siege to the citadel of unbelief. These stock arguments against the nonbelievers and the

atheists of over one hundred years ago are repeated in practically the same pattern every week (and perhaps every day) over the radio by the fundamentalist evangelists in the Philadelphia area.

In addition to the theological proofs that the freethinkers were denying the true religion of the Almighty, they were accused of being immoral personally, depraved sinners defying God, and the French Revolution with all of its violence and bloodshed was blamed on their diabolical teachings.

Tom Paine was frequently portrayed as having a "brandy bottle at his elbow." (They had forgotten the New England clergy with their grog on the pulpit.) But it was even asserted that Paine had finally repudiated his *Age of Reason* and accepted the Scriptures as the Word of God. The alleged deathbed repentances of the leading skeptics were played up—Voltaire, Paine, Hobbes, *et al.* The conversion of even one unbeliever was heralded as of cosmic importance.

Finally the debates died out; infidelity ceased occupying so much attention. The slavery issue and the Civil War overshadowed all else. "By 1850 infidelity had ceased to be the great enemy of American Protestantism; in its place stood Catholicism and more and more of the clergy turned their verbal guns upon the new foe. After the war came Darwinism and a new chapter was to be written in the history of freethought."

RAY H. ABRAMS

Æsthetic Experience and the Humanities, by Francis Shoemaker, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xviii, 339, $3.50.

There has been an increasing interest in the understanding of the humanities, marked particularly by the publication in 1940 of *The Revival of the Humanities in American Education,* by Patricia Beesley. In numerous colleges and universities and through the activities of many individual writers and teachers, the literature of the world has come into focal emphasis as a source for specialized study. Francis Shoemaker's book is thus timely and important as a summary of our developing tendency and the present status of the subject.

Part I is the "Ideas of Æsthetic Experience Underlying Modern World Literature and Humanities Courses." The ideas are from three fields: philosophy, psychology, and anthropology. All these are concerned with the nature of the æsthetic experience. The individual self perpetuates its identity through the æsthetic impulse toward the formulation of things, ideas, and values. Language symbols exemplify this impulse, and since language and culture are mutually dependent and develop simultaneously, it is a fundamental method-material by which men and women achieve social cohesion.

Part II is "Enlarging Ideas of Æsthetic Experience among Spokesmen for the Humanities." Ten representative groups and individuals are studied and analyzed. They are concerned with the development of the self of the artist through the creative forces in the critical reader as he attempts to reëxperience the æsthetic process of the author. These spokesmen cover a field that includes John Dewey, social philosopher; the National Council of Teachers of English; I. A. Richards, psychologist-semanticist; and the modern advocates of a return to the mediæval liberal arts—Robert M. Hutchins, Mortimer J. Adler, and St. John's College.

Part III is "Converging Ideas and Practices in World Literature and Modern Humanities Courses." Teachers of world literature emphasize the resulting sympathetic understanding of other peoples and the ability of the critical reader to achieve an experience of other situations and states of mind, with a developing sense of the dignity of self. Some methods used are the study of basic æsthetic principles,

the classification of literature by types, the history of ideas, the chronological sequence of subject matter, and the accenting of social backgrounds and cultural epochs.

Part IV presents an example of literature as an æsthetic experience. Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is the chosen work, and the example is a reconstruction of "Shakespeare's æsthetic experience and sense of self and that of his audience from the symbols of this play" (p. 204).

People read from many motives and for many purposes, some clearly defined, as in the critical student, and some practically unrecognized, as in the casual reader. Two such different classes cannot be studied by the same method, and Shoemaker's book makes a direct claim to be concerned only with "certain modern ideas of æsthetic experience" (p. 6) and "with the currency which these ideas have gained among modern teachers of various schools of thought" (p. 7). Upon that basis it must be judged.

What otherwise would be an unnecessarily involved investigation of literature and methods of teaching literature becomes a student's handbook of survey. Some of the detailed and confusing material yields to this approach. Those interested in *Hamlet* as a revelation of Shakespeare's mind and day and audience may take it to heart; those who read or see the play as a dramatic masterpiece may still go on their naïve and uninhibited way—presumably even with the author's blessing.

The book, however, is particularly significant as a further piece of evidence that we are definitely emerging into a stream of thought that may soon overflow its banks and flood a wide area of cultivated fields. There is a distinct tendency today to abandon, or at least to distrust, contemporaneous authorities and principles of thought and action. The consequent search for a basis of judgment has resulted in the acceptance of the disciplines of the past, disciplines that show a departure from those of a sensate culture. We have a modern resurgence of Aristotelian Thomism, a Barthian theology and a neoscholastic pedagogy. Shoemaker's book is a record of the evidences of this discipline in the field of literature. The humanities are staging a pendulumlike comeback.

The student and particularly the teacher of literature will become serious about the facts of the trend illustrated and may even learn to make the subject interesting—a condition, alas! that is at present all too rare. Too many men and women today are victims, not of Philistinism, but of pedagogy!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Theodore Roosevelt and Labor in New York State, 1880-1900, by Howard Lawrence Hurwitz, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 316, $3.75.

This book is No. 500 of the *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law* edited by the faculty of political science of Columbia University. Dr. Hurwitz has produced an extremely well-documented history of labor conditions in New York City in the late 1800's, a history important because that city was the cradle of the labor movement we know today. He has drawn a true-to-life portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, the man whom most people remember somewhat vaguely as a liberal statesman of great fairness and strength. Of the latter there can be no doubt. Of the former the present volume speaks rather doubtfully so far as his relations with organized labor were concerned.

The labor history given in the two opening chapters of this book includes the story of the almost universal press discrimination against labor. The strike and boycott were labor's only weapons; yet any move for better wages and working conditions was labeled by the press as "un-American" and the work of "foreign

agitators." "The *New York Tribune*," says Dr. Hurwitz, "during the great railroad strike of 1877, had declared that 'authority ought not to rest until it has swept down every resisting mob with grapeshot,' and 'that labor violence must be subdued, though it cost a thousand bloody corpses.'" This paper was backed financially by Jay Gould, the railroad magnate. Without a single exception, every other daily followed suit.

In 1882 Roosevelt was elected assemblyman from New York's "silk-stocking" district. During his term in the legislature he supported and fought for a bill to abolish tenement-house cigar manufacturing in New York State, with its accompanying degradation, but fought equally strenuously against a dozen other measures for the improvement of the working classes. In general, he supported the interests of the wealthy and owning classes as opposed to those of the workers, deviating from that policy only when women and children were directly concerned. This latter tendency was no doubt inherited from his father, who was a philanthropist.

During the New York City mayoralty campaign of 1886, Roosevelt came out a bad third in the race betwen the industrialist Abram S. Hewitt and the single-taxer Henry George. George was supported by a rising labor party. The old parties were so frightened by labor getting thirty-one per cent of the votes that a stream of labor laws flowed through the New York legislature in 1887. However, dreams of a strong labor party were soon dissipated. "By 1889," says Dr. Hurwitz, "nothing remained except the knowledge that labor, if properly organized, could be a threat to the major parties. Trade unionists and Theodore Roosevelt did not forget the lesson of 1886." Thereafter Roosevelt was more careful of public statements on his attitude toward the labor movement.

In 1894, Roosevelt was appointed police commissioner of New York City by a "reform mayor," William L. Strong. He stepped out of the usual political boundaries of the job to organize the police power in favor of the employer. He did this thoroughly and to some extent unconsciously under the guise of "keeping order." He revived the notorious "night stick" and favored clubbing striking mobs and keeping order with "grape and cannister" if necessary. Under the influence of such men as Lincoln Steffens and Jacob Riis, he took some interest in unsocial conditions, but his loyalty to his class never wavered.

In the presidential campaign of 1896 he entered the national scene by campaigning for McKinley against Bryan. He used all the vitriol of the partisan politician, castigating Bryan's objectives as "a government of the mob," which would result in a "red welter of lawlessness as fantastic and as vicious as the dream of a European Communist." Though he later denied making the statement, he is quoted as having advocated taking a dozen of the opposition leaders out, standing them against the wall, and shooting them dead. There is no denying that his temper at that time was in line with that feeling. He was a many-sided man, vacillating between calm logic and highhanded action. He had a ready finger on the trigger of a gun.

After the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt's exploits with the Rough Riders carried him into the governorship of New York State by a small margin over the Democratic machine. His record as governor was not much better than as police commissioner, except that he used the militia instead of police in labor disputes. He strenuously advocated abolition of tenement-house manufacture of clothing and signed many labor bills, including the eight-hour law. He was, however, ever conscious of the welfare of the Republican machine and the power of "Boss" Platt. He later secured some measure of organized labor support, in turn losing party support due to protests of wealthy contributors to campaign funds. As a result he was "kicked upstairs" into the Vice-Presidency in the campaign of 1900.

Chapter VIII gives Roosevelt's views on class war, which are about the same admixture of vitriol and criticism of labor leaders that he used throughout his career. Chapter IX, "Looking Backward," is a summary of what has gone before. The book contains a valuable bibliography, listing also the unpublished materials which the author used as sources of quotation and information.

MILTON F. WELLS

China's Religious Heritage, by Y. C. Yang, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 196, $1.50.

President Yang, of Soochow University, knows his own people well and gives a very good account of contemporary Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. He describes these religions, not from the viewpoint of their history, but as they appear today. They have all changed greatly since they were founded. This account is valuable because it represents their contemporary state.

Dr. Yang is himself a Christian, and declares, "In comparison with Christianity, all other religions fall short and are incomplete" (p. 29). This belief does not, however, prevent him from seeing the other Chinese religions in a fair and open-minded manner. He points out that "God's love and care for mankind . . . is immanent in all peoples and all ages. He has not left himself without witness anywhere" (p. 27). Consequently he finds many worthy ideals in Chinese religions.

"All Chinese are basically Confucianists, tho some have an additional or particular leaning toward Buddhism or Daoism" (p. 39). Confucianism is declared to be a religion (p. 59), whose central theme is the art of living (p. 61), and whose central principle is *ren,* which virtue is said to be expressed by the golden rule (p. 64). But, although he does not say so, the Chinese golden rule is not the same as the Christian, except in a recent reinterpretation. Anciently, *ren* was the attitude of an ideal father or sovereign to his son or subject. An ideal son or subject was (and is), however, not expected to show *ren* towards his father or sovereign. Instead he should show *hsiao,* which is filial piety and obedience. In Confucian morality, even in its golden rule, there is always a distinction of superior and inferior. The effect of Christian teaching has been to blur this ancient differentiation. Confucianism is said to contain very little that is contradictory to Christian teaching (p. 189). It lacks, however, the conception of God as a loving Father and is too humanistic (p. 179).

Buddhism is a deeply rooted and indigenous factor in Chinese life (p. 110), in which man seeks escape from the miseries of life. It teaches that all things are nonexistent (p. 121), except as desire creates them (p. 123). Life is a passing show (p. 125). Kindness, meekness, charity, meditation, and purity (pp. 133-139) are the Buddhist virtues. This religion does not, however, attain the Christian victory over sin (p. 186). It is too pessimistic (p. 179).

Daoism, as a philosophy, is a deep and not altogether comprehensible mysticism, emphasizing *Dao,* which is the law of the universe, and nonaction or noninterference with nature (p. 155). As a religion, Daoism is quite different—a superstitious religion for the ignorant, whose central objective is the indefinite prolongation of this life. It emphasizes physical culture, seeks the accumulation of merit through doing good deeds, and is optimistic towards life. But it is too fantastic (p. 180).

This book contains a concise and clear account of Chinese religions and a comparison of each with Christianity. In these days when we need to understand our great ally across the Pacific, President Yang's book should be read by intelligent Americans.

HOMER H. DUBS

BOOK NOTICES

A Survey of Religious Literature, by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Revell, 1943, pp. 157, $1.50.

Readers of the Crozer Quarterly old enough to remember railway journeys in the gay nineties will recall that on long trips the newsboy came through the train, never forgetting the Pullman section, and distributed samples of the delicacies which he would fain persuade possible patrons to purchase. It is a service of this sort which Dr. Macfarland performs for readers of his book. Truly enough he has no personal stake in the sale of the volumes from which he quotes, but the samples he presents serve to whet the appetite for more, or (according to the taste of the reader) to give sufficient awareness of the content of the book under consideration to prevent the spending of hard-earned cash on that which satisfieth not. Thirty-six volumes are reviewed, done up in six separate packages attractively labeled "Personal Religion and Preaching," "Philosophy and Theology," "The Return to Jesus," "The Social Gospel and the World Order," "Glances at History," and "As Christians Face the Reality of War." Space does not permit a detailed list of books and authors; let it suffice to say that the names of authors pretty well cover the alphabet—from Abernethy to Walsh—seventeen of the twenty-six letters being represented. Barth, Brightman, Buttrick at the beginning of the alphabet; Ferré, Hocking, Kerr, Maynard, Morrison from the middle; and William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Quaker, D. Elton Trueblood, toward the end—these are names selected at random to indicate the breadth and depth of theological thought which Dr. Macfarland surveys. The book closes with a brief summary in which attention is called to "some trends in religious thought" over the years since 1936 when these annual reviews of religious literature were first begun. The book will be of interest to a large circle of readers, but is especially to be commended to the busy pastor whose parish duties rigidly enforce discriminating reading. Here he will find opportunity to keep abreast of contemporary religious trends under the guidance of a teacher well equipped to point out rewarding fields of such further research as his time may allow.

HENRY C. NEWELL

Christ and Christian Education, by William Clayton Bower, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 128, $1.00.

Dr. Bower again proves himself to be the peerless champion of the functional approach to religious education. He defines education as the historical process of continuity and change. Jesus' method and that of the modern religious educator (as Bower conceives it), begins with the actual experiences of living men. Education should be trustful of experience and concerned with decisions or commitments of living persons. Bower thinks of religion as a quality of integration and reconstruction of life in which "every relation and process is judged, reoriented and rectified in terms of the will of God" (p. 51). Christian education would therefore regard the making of Christian persons as its goal. Theologies, symbols, ceremonials, even the church itself, all emerge out of the developing experience of the Christian community. All these are but instruments in the making of Christlike persons. Most revolutionary is his view of the relation of religious to public education. He thinks of education as "an affair of the whole person in relation to his total world of reality" (p. 101). He is convinced that the separation of church and state in

American education has neglected religious values, excluded God, distorted education, created emotional conflicts, excluded religion from counseling, and led to moral weakness in democracy. All this can be changed, Bower urges, by a functional process. Church and state must be coöperative and not competitive. Inasmuch as religion is "a quality of personal and social living in every dimension" (p. 115), education of any sort must deal with all the relations of persons. To this end functional Christian education is basic in a democracy. In this small book Dr. Bower has embodied the basic principles of his system.

HERBERT L. NEWMAN

The Church and Psychotherapy, by Karl R. Stolz, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 312, $2.50.

This is a book full of helpful information and practical suggestions for pastors and religious workers with people, regardless of their length of service in the ministry. Professor Stolz, an effective pioneer in making accessible to pastors and teachers of religion the insights and methods which have been turned up by medical and psychological workers, has given us in this, his latest book, the benefit of his recent reading and accumulated wisdom and experience. His chapters on the healing ministry and saving work of Jesus recall those of similar title in Horace Bushnell's *The Vicarious Sacrifice.* His excellent chapter, "The Therapies of the Church," might well cause the parish minister to look over his defense plant of the soul every now and then, and take note of the production rate in the various departments. With reference to the soul, on pp. 102 f. he has gathered for us some helpful explanations of just what this soul is, which is our principal care and concern. During my last visit with Dr. Stolz, he told me with a kindly smile about an address which he rather enjoyed giving called, "Occupational Diseases of the Parish Minister." It's here in the book and is called, "Vocational Neuroses of the Minister." His presentation of the position and contribution of Carl G. Jung is particularly good (pp. 103-110). And his chapter on the therapeutic function of preaching is excellent. I had missed the articles on "Life Situation Preaching" by Dr. Harold Ruopp of Chicago from which he quoted. Medical doctors might writhe a little at some of his use of medical terms. But some of us have heard them make fairly heavy going when they have spoken of matters religious. There are a few of his illustrations of personality integration or cure of souls which I cannot accept. Cabot and Dicks' *The Art of Ministering to the Sick* is still the best book for pastors in this field. But this book by Professor Stolz is a good one. It is no small feat to sweep the heights of church history, New Testament exegesis, the history and practice of medical psychology, religious education, homiletics, pastoral counseling, and the person and work of the pastor—not to mention the "ecumenical church"—without becoming a fit subject for some psychotherapeutic expert oneself. Dr. Stolz, however, kept his eye single throughout the book. And we are grateful to him for leaving us with a clearer view of our task, and with new or neglected tools ready at hand.

PHILIP GUILES

Exiled Pilgrim, by William Hubben, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. 261, $2.00.

This is a modern *Pilgrim's Progress.* Like Christian in Bunyan's allegory, the author tells of his travels from the city of destruction to the delectable mountains; from doubt to faith, from Roman Catholicism to Quakerism, from Germany to America. In an interesting way the earlier events of his life are recounted: the unique instruction in biblical lore given him by his grandmother, a devout but somewhat

unorthodox Roman Catholic; his childhood experiences in the Rhineland; his education as a teacher, in the course of which his religious faith was unsettled; his service in the First World War; and the recovery of his faith in God through association with the Friends, who at that time were engaged in the task of feeding more than a million starving German children. In view of the present world situation what the writer has to say about conditions in Germany following the armistice of 1918 is of special interest. The lamentable results of the hunger blockade, the disastrous effects of inflation, and the rapid rise of the Nazi power are treated briefly, but vividly. The immediate consequence to the author of the elevation of Hitler to office was the loss of his position as a teacher. Later, in spite of the prevailing atmosphere of suspicion, he was able to secure passports for himself and family, and eventually to arrive in America where he is now director of religious interests at George School, Pennsylvania. Mr. Hubben describes his book as "the chronicle of [his] own religious growth." In addition to its literary excellence, it is notable for "its freedom from hate, its delightful humor, and its deep human understanding."

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

Burma Diary, by Paul Geren, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 58, $0.50.

"More a diary of the spirit than of actual events" is a correct characterization of the little booklet. But there is a recital of numerous events from the morning the first bombs fell on Rangoon through the six succeeding months, when innocent native peoples in multitudes were slaughtered, although they were as ignorant as the cattle about them as to why death should be raining on them. Paul Geren draws vivid pictures of scenes that tore his heart and that weakened the souls of his readers. But his diary is chiefly a record of his meditation and introspection as he was stunned by what he saw and felt. Somehow he often knew the stars were shining through the densest darkness. To the wounded and dying he gave the cup of cold water in the name of Christ, but he was careful not to say so lest it be thought he gave drink for some other reason than that thirsty men needed water and that he had it to give. In the midst of disease, unspeakable filth, hunger, and death he found new insights, and quoted Shelley's line: "Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought." He found that the natives coveted most of all to receive acts of kindness and love which white men accord to one another, more than to be relieved of the white man's economic exploitation. So he came to desire to be numbered with men of dark skin, "to get off the side of the sinning and on to the side of the sinned against." "Joy reasserts itself even after we had thought it swallowed and gone. Let us but see God's face, and we can look at all hell and not faint." The little booklet justifies the quotation on the first page: "If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there."

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

Mysticism in Modern Psychology, by Charles Carlé, New York, Psycho-Sociological Press, 1943, pp. 47, $1.00.

Psychology is afflicted with the curse of diverse popular theories. The young science, born in 1879, is a scapegoat bearing into the wilderness of confusion the malodorous sins of phrenology, behaviorism, mental telepathy, parapsychology, and other progeny of nescience. In this little volume, Charles Carlé applies trenchant adverse criticism to the unwarranted hypothesis of Freud and the ridiculous assumptions of some of Freud's disciples. *Mysticism in Modern Psychology* is a misnomer, however, for this brand of so-called psychology is not remotely related to genuine

religious mystical experience. The author's castigation of the indefensible uses of Rorschach's Ink-Blot Test, a simple test in perception, is also a timely exposé. Carlé himself then makes the blunder of expressing excess devotion to Gestalt psychology, itself a passing fad.

A. C. REID

Daily Life in Bible Times, by Albert Edward Bailey, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. xx, 360, $3.00.

This volume was written to help the layman visualize the life of Bible times. This end is achieved by the use of 116 good, well-known illustrations, four maps, and a wealth of well-organized, well-expressed material on all phases of ancient activity. In fact, all is "imaginatively" reconstructed. This imagination is the fascination of the volume; also the danger. Folklore and fancy please, but sometimes they lead astray. The Hebrew slaves working in the Aswan quarries? decorating the obelisks with hieroglyphics? sculpturing temple reliefs? inlaying silver in copper doors (pp. 94, 95)? This is a sample. Josephus is too slight evidence for the superstructure. Joseph dictating his weekly grain report in Pithom (p. 84)? or mulberries in Egypt in his day (p. 62)? Imagination is good when built on fact, but when captured by fiction it does not satisfy the demands of history. The ointment is unusually good; it will be most helpful to those who can remove the flies.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Inter-American Affairs—1942, edited by Arthur P. Whitaker, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 252, $3.00.

This book is the second annual survey of inter-American relations. The series will be continued, say the publishers, if the response seems to justify and if wartime conditions permit. The book is divided into eight sections, each handled by one or more different writers. The divisions are: "Politics and Diplomacy," "Industry, Commerce and Finance," "Cultural Relations," "Social Welfare in Latin America," "Labor Legislation in Latin America," "The Inter-American Health and Sanitation Program," "Inter-American Technical Coöperation," and "Summary and Prospect." There are also a "List of References" and "Appendices," including an "Inter-American Chronology for 1942." To the student of inter-American affairs, the volume would seem indispensable. To the general reader today, when most of our attention is focused abroad, it will be agreeable and enlightening to read a book which so clearly pictures our position in the home hemisphere. With the advent of the world crisis our inter-American problems have very nearly gone begging, except in some active and farseeing governmental circles. The reader will also gather some interesting general information about the Americas. For instance: At the beginning of 1942 not one of the Latin-American states maintained diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. There is a large Negro element in Brazil. The power of the United States in the Western Hemisphere is greater than that of any other nation in any region of the world. Canada is the only independent American nation that has not taken part in the Pan-American movement. Brazil was the only South American republic to declare war on Germany in both World Wars I and II. The chapter, "Politics and Diplomacy," taking up fifty-two pages, is extremely interesting and informative regarding the steps leading to Latin-American participation in the present war.

MILTON F. WELLS

BOOKS RECEIVED

**Children Need Adults,* by Ruth Davis Perry, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xiv, 136, $1.50.

**Theology in Transition,* by Walter Marshall Horton, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. viii, 196, $2.50.

**Some to Be Pastors,* by Peter H. Pleune, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 191, $1.50.

Ancient Greece in Modern America, by John R. MacArthur, Caldwell (Ida.), Caxton Printers, 1943, pp. 396, $6.00.

A popular recital of what ought to be well-known facts—but which in America are not—of the "glory that was Greece"—and of the wide influence which that culture still exerts in America. Its perusal affords a pleasant opportunity to pick up the main facts, set forth in an easy, at time piquant, style.

**A Portrait of Jesus,* by Sherwood Eddy, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xvi, 231, $2.00.

**The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research, 1941-1943,* edited by Millar Burrows and E. A. Speiser, New Haven, American Schools of Oriental Research, 1943, pp. xxvi, 229, 73 plates, $4.00.

Look for the Dawn, by Talmage C. Johnson, Nashville, Broadman, ©1943, pp. 173, $1.25.

Twelve sermons by the pastor of the First Baptist Church, Kinston, N. C.

Relief and Reconstruction, by Roger Wilson, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Pamphlet 22, 1943, pp. 62.

The Inward Journey of Isaac Pennington, by Robert J. Leach, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Historical Study 6, 1943, pp. 43, $0.25.

**Behind the Universe,* by Louis Berman, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 306, $2.75.

Get Together Americans, by Rachel Davis-Dubois, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xiii, 182, $1.75.

This book is a record of the work of a pioneer in intercultural education and is intended to serve as a "practical manual for social interaction among Americans of various social, national and religious backgrounds."

**The British Traveller in America, 1836-1860,* by Max Berger, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 239, $3.00.

**The Varieties of New Testament Religion,* by Ernest F. Scott, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. vii, 310, $2.75.

**Boys and Girls at Worship,* by Marie Cole Powell, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xxv, 198, $2.00.

**Rebuilding Our World,* by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xi, 157, $1.75.

**These Things Will Last,* by Stacy R. Warburton, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1943, pp. 122, $1.00.

Hero of Burma, edited by Kenneth L. Wilson, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1943, pp. 64, $0.40.

The story of Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave told in picture-strip.

**Defensible Spending for Public Schools,* by Arvid J. Burke, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xviii, 379, $4.50.

**The Recovery of the Historical Paul,* by Robert Martyr Hawkins, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1943, pp. vii, 292, $5.00.

Christ's Hall of Fame, by Milo H. Massey, Nashville, Broadman, ©1943, pp. 140, $1.50.

Sketches of the nine men and women in the New Testament whom the author believes Jesus "personally and publicly praised."

**English Institute Annual, 1942,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xiii, 207, $2.50.

**The Legacy of the Spirit,* by Fred G. Bratton, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. xi, 319, $2.75.

**American Freethought, 1860-1914,* by Sidney Warren, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 257, $3.25.

**The Earliest Gospel,* by Frederick C. Grant, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 270, $2.50.

The Glory of God, Poems and Prayers for Devotional Use, by Georgia Harkness, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 125, $1.00.

Fifty poems and fifty prayers comprise this volume of distinctly devotional material. The poems are for assurance and aspiration, themes from nature and a few to be used as hymns. The prayers are for personal and corporate worship, special occasions and needs, and for particular groups. Keep the subtitle in mind, and the poems and prayers fall into their proper place, not to be judged beyond their purpose, which they adequately serve by their deep sincerity and reverent modernity.

Blue Skies Beyond, by Henry Lafayette Anderton, Nashville, Broadman, 1943, pp. 215, $2.00.

The author is a prominent Alabama lawyer and Baptist layman. It bears all the marks of a first novel. The jacket calls it "a thrilling story." That will depend on the reader. There is much old-time religion, much conventional love-making, a murder trial, and, of course, a good deal of World War II. The style is sentimental, conventional, when not lurid. Why do people who are not novelists write novels—and why do publishers publish them?

**Son of Man and Kingdom of God,* by Henry Burton Sharman, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 149, $2.50.

**The Beginning of Christianity,* by Clarence Tucker Craig, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1943, pp. 366, $2.75.

**The Short Story of Jesus,* by Walter Lowrie, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. xv, 238, $2.50.

Critique by Eternity, by Howard H. Brinton, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1943, pp. viii, 56.

Fifteen short essays which might be described as contributing to a philosophy of non-violence.

* To be reviewed.